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Abstract 
Our study aims at considering two aspects of the problem of corruption that are 
its rationale and measures.  The starting point is the presentation of a concise back-
ground on the topic as Chapter I highlight definitions, causes, main effects, categorisa-
tion and the measures of corruption.  
From the causes of corruption it is the case that our understanding of this prob-
lem is limited by the assumption of the mechanism through which those causes come 
together to affect corruption. The way in which incentives predispose individuals to side 
with corruption has only been assumed in the literature. Hence, Chapter II will look into 
the rationale of corrupt behaviour and its implications. 
Using a modify version of a model developed by Macrae (1982), we build a cor-
ruption game illustrating a simple game of bureaucratic corruption between farmers and 
government officials. We argue that not only corruption is the rationale calculus of 
agents maximising their income but also that the rationale following which we reach the 
corruption equilibrium or the honesty one could explain the pervasiveness of either 
corruption or honesty. 
At last Chapter III focuses on the measures of corruption. Perception indexes are 
widely used as the result of their prevalence and the lack of better alternatives. Howev-
er, many studies show a disparity between the perception of corruption and its actual 
incidence (see Mocan 2008, Olken 2009, Donchev and Ujhelyi 2011, Fisman and Miguel 
2007). 
We propose an alternative by putting together an index of the incidence of cor-
ruption accounting for its perception using data from the incidence of corruption as 
reported by the national agency responsible for the fight against corruption in Kenya. 
Our study suggests that not only our index account better for yearly change in the 
prevalence of corruption but perception indexes can be used to account for the inability 
to detect some form of corruption. 
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There is not an agreement within social sciences on the approaches to the 
study of corruption. Sociologists and anthropologists suggest a focus on norms 
and values as they believe that corruption is the result of the collapse of ethics 
(Bardhan 2006, p343). In this view corrupt individuals are lacking or ignoring a 
moral compass that should have lead them to act according to socials norms of 
ethics and then behave appropriately avoiding corruption. However, economists 
see in corruption the consequences of incentives and organisations (Bardhan 
2006, p343). Corruption in this extend became a motivated choice, it became 
quantifiable rather than just immoral or unethical. There is therefore a set of 
motives and a clear context leading to or perpetuating corruption. This could be a 
social issue such as the prevalence of corruption or the lack of proper education, 
an economic matter such as endemic poverty or simply the result of the greed of 
individuals. Furthermore, in economics one could single out fives keys aspects in 
the study of corruption that are: its definition, its causes, its effects, its types and 
its measures. 
The understanding of the problem of corruption looking at its causes and 
context might be highly related to the definition agree upon. Indeed one could 
consider corruption as a departure from a set of accepted norm or more strictly 
any misuse whether accepted or not of public office for private gain. While the 
first definition leaves aside major cases of corruption involving political elite, the 
second does not. In addition the first definition implies that the greed of political 
elites leading to political corruption will not be a cause of corruption while the 
rent seeking behaviour of bureaucrat will be. The other implication is that 
corruption is characterised by the illegality even though law and regulation could 
be choose by corrupt individuals. Hence, we will review and choose a definition 
of corruption before assessing the causes and context of corruption leading to the 
understanding of such problem. 
Having agreed upon a definition of corruption, its understanding will bring 
about the behaviour of two main actors that are the official and the individual. As 
such we will dig into the rationale of an individual standing by corruption and 
later on look at the main effects resulting. Indeed, corruption being a matter of 
incentives, its causes or incentives will be a set of conditions strategically 
implemented in a specific context that transform corruption into the best option 
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for each individual and eventually into a pareto-efficient solution for all those 
involve. Further, the problem that is corruption will be highlighted looking at the 
mains effects resulting of its presence. Consequently, we will look at the causes of 
corruption as presented in the corruption literature focussing on how far and how 
much they strategically interact together and also highlight the main consequences 
of this problem. 
A corrupt practice could take various form depending on characteristics 
such as the type of individual involve, the number of individual involve, the size 
of the amount involve and the legality of the action perform. These classifications 
will be affected by the definition agreed upon and more importantly dictate the 
approach to the measure of corruption. As result we will differentiate a corrupt 
practice from other similar practices but also help to achieve the classification of 
various types of corrupt acts.  
At last, a review of the measures used will bring light to the elusiveness of 
corrupt acts. Indeed, corrupt practices are not advertised and there are few records 
of the number or overall values of corrupt acts that take place as those practices 
are mostly hidden away from public view. Measures of corruption are rather 
based on the perception of this phenomenon and they allow a comparison and 
ranking of the incidence of corruption around the world. However, being 
perception based those measures may be highly subjective. Hence, the necessity 
to not only review and assess the measures available but also looks into ways to 
improve them. 
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Section 1. Definition of corruption 
 
The importance of defining corruption is the result of the necessity of 
delimiting the scope and the reach of our research. A definition might help us to 
figure out the type of actions that will be include and could also be useful to test 
the quality of the measurement used (Kurer 2005, p234). Indeed, without a precise 
definition of corruption it is not clear whether a corrupt practice should involve 
the coalition of a public official and a private individual exclusively or if 
mismanagement leading to the theft of resources by public officials should be 
consider as corruption. 
Following the earlier works of Heidenheimer et al (1970), Kurer (2005) 
presents three definitions of corruption. Those definitions consist of a subjective 
conception that is the public opinion definition and two objectives conceptions 
that are the public interest definition and the public office definition (Kurer 2005). 
Kurer (2005, p223) suggests that the foundation of those definitions is the ideal of 
equality amongst individual living in the same country anything else being equal. 
In other words it is the assumption that all other things remaining equals, citizens 
of the same country have identical rights and duties.  This suggests that corruption 
could be considered at first sight as a step toward inequality between individuals 
in any matters that involves the government. It is the introduction of multiple 
standards in the practice of justice, the redistribution of wealth or the access to 
public services. In this extend the subjective conception of corruption is 
appropriate as it presents corruption as the result of the public perception corrupt 
behaviour (Kurer 2005, p222). With this, it is those kept away from their rights 
that will define what constitute the offence. The only problem appears to be the 
characterisation of the concept “public perception” (Kurer 2005, p222). How will 
one come up with what will be accepted as the voice of those kept aside is likely 
to affect the definition. In fact, whether one consider the political elite as part of 
the public or only individual from the civil society or only those with low level of 
education or those highly educated, the definition provide will change. Political 
elite will tend to choose a definition that will downplay or overplay the incidence 
of corruption depending whether they are in power or not, those with low level of 
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education within the civil society might just follow the headlines and those highly 
educated might not constitute a representative sample because not numerous 
enough. Hence, this conception of corruption does not facilitate the identification 
of corrupt practice as it is not clear which segment of the population will provide 
the definition. 
The public interest definition, as one of the two objective conceptions of 
corruption, characterises corruption as anything that causes the mismanagement 
and/or the theft of public goods (Kurer 2005, p222). The focus is first of all on the 
negative consequences of the action look at. There should be indeed negative 
outcomes directly link to this action. The second implication of this definition is 
the necessity of the involvement of a public good: the negative outcome should be 
relative to a good that does not belong to a single individual but the whole 
population. Corruption is in this view any activity or behaviour that has negative 
consequences attached to the provision and/or use of common goods. This 
definition like the previous one does not meet the basic requirements as one will 
find it difficult to define what should be consider as common goods (Kurer 2005, 
p223). To differentiate a corrupt action from a not corrupt ones one will have to 
be able to characterise what constitute a common goods and then which action 
negatively affect its provision or use. The problem now became to figure out who 
will decide what will constitute or not the pool of common goods: the government 
approach will be minimalistic as it is costly, those wealthy will be reluctant to be 
taxed for goods that they can get on their own and the poor will be the one asking 
for it as they heavily rely on. The current context of recession in Europe could 
illustrate this problem as household expect the increase of public goods to help 
them cope, while the government want to reduce the pool of common goods in the 
aims to reduce the deficit and those wealthy are oppose to any increase of their tax 
which means no increase of the pool common goods. Hence, the public interest 
definition of corruption fails because of the difficulty to quantify the concept of 
common good. 
The public office definition, suggests that any action that goes against the 
generally accepted behaviour of individual within an office and that is motivated 
by ulterior private incentives should be consider as corruption (Kurer 2005, p225). 
This presents corruption as the departure from the set of accepted norms 
regulating any business-related environment caused by a selfish pursuit of wealth.  
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The emphasis is therefore on inappropriate behaviour in the work place and their 
cause that are equivocal interests. An obvious limitation of such definition is the 
claim that acceptable behaviour of individual within an office could be link to a 
corresponding culture in which case there could not be only one definition of 
corruption (Kurer 2005, p225). The set of norm regulating business-related 
environment could be highly related to the set of cultural norm unique to each 
society. To this extent, what is considered to be a gesture of friendship and 
appreciation in one place could be seen as corruption in another depending on the 
prevalent culture. However considering with Tanzi (1998, p565) that the 
difference between a gift and bribe is obligation of counterparty that comes with 
the bribe this limitation might fall apart or one could simply argue that gifts also 
comes with some moral obligations. The other problem with of this definition is 
the fact that it leaves aside state capture or political corruption (Kurer 2005, 
p223). State capture or political corruption refers to use of unofficial payment to 
government official in the aim to influence the process of enactment of law and 
regulations (Hellman et all, 2003). This type of corruption is not take into account 
by the definition as it does not go against the accepted norm of an office but just 
modify those norms to comply with one needs. Consequently, even though one 
can ultimately agree upon a set of norms regulating business-related environment 
that are above cultural specifics, this definition is still incomplete as failing to 
account for attempts to stir these set of norms toward ones needs and interests 
making corrupt behaviour part of the set of future accepted behaviour.  
Other definitions of corruption follow Rose-Ackerman (1975, p187) as she 
focuses on the illegality of the transfer that takes place whether the counterparty is 
money or any other advantage while characterising corruption.  It is the case of 
Bardhan (1997, p1321) who presents corruption as an illegal activity involving a 
public official looking covertly to acquire personal gains. This suggests that 
corruption may be characterised by the illegality of the practice that takes place. 
With the assumption that a corrupt act cannot be legal one will exclude political 
corruption as it refers to the modification of the rule of law to accommodate 
private interest (Kurer 2005, p225).  Further with Senior (2006, p27), it is the act 
of a corruptor secretly providing a bribe to a corruptee, which is a public official, 
in the aim to take advantage of the position or power of the corruptee. Senior’s 
definition requires the existence of both a public official and a private party, it 
also requires the secrecy. The necessity of the existence of the two parties rejects 
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others forms of corrupt practices such as theft and misappropriation of resources 
that public officials achieve on their own. In addition, considering the financial 
contribution of privates firms to political campaigns (aka lobbying) as a form of 
state capture, the requirement of secrecy could be limitative for a definition of 
corruption. Indeed, there is generally no secret as to which lobbies belong which 
political movement even though those lobbies highly influence the erection of law 
and regulations. At last the Transparency international definition of corruption 
(2008) presents corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain”.  This 
is similar to the definition of both Kurer (2005, p227) and Amundsen (1999, p2) 
following whom corruption relate to the behaviour of a state official who takes 
advantage of his/her position to seek for private gains going against the norms of 
offices. Here at last there is neither a requirement of the presence of both 
corruptor and corruptee nor a requirement of secrecy which suggest an inclusion 
of theft and mismanagement in the pool of corrupt practices. However, state 
capture is left aside as technically it does not refers to any misuse of 
mismanagement since law and regulations are already in oriented toward the 
captors interest legitimating what would have been otherwise illegal. 
Hence, we will understand corruption as the rent seeking (greedy) 
behaviour of state officials that goes against the appropriate code of conduct in an 
office in addition to other various malpractices that are state capture, thefts, frauds 
and embezzlement. Corruption define as such takes into account political 
corruption and others crimes committed by public officials but it leaves aside 
corrupt practices encountered in private firms. The later cases of corruption will 
not be considered in this analysis as they do not directly affect the provision of 
public goods and generally does not involve a government official. 
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Section 2. Causes and context of corruption 
 
The cause and context of corruption presented here will account for the 
understanding of corruption as a as the rent seeking behaviour of individual that 
goes against office regulation in addition to other malpractices that may remain 
within the legality. 
Although bribing a public official to achieve a task he/she was supposed to 
do and bribing a public official to disregard rules and regulations are both corrupt 
acts, the incentives and the individuals involve differs. In the case of the bribery 
of a public official to provide a service he/she is entitle to provide, the individual 
providing the bribe will be rationally allocating his/her resources in accordance to 
its current incentives and context. In this case the bribe provides to the officer is 
an extra unplanned cost for the individual who in an attempt to minimize its 
expenditure will paid the bribe only as a last resort. As result the individual 
bribing the public officer here appears to be acting rationally out of necessity 
while engaging in corruption. However, in the case of the bribery of a public 
official to ignore the law, the individual providing the bribe will be acting out of 
greed. Indeed, the individual bribing the public officer to ignore the law is 
targeting a profit that is not available for those following the rules. The effect of 
greed as an incentive could differs from those of necessity. In the following 
paragraph we will consider and assess some of the mains causes of corruption that 
are the pre-existing level of corruption, greed, excessive regulations, industrial 
policy, the quality of regulations and other social settings as found in the 
literature. 
Some authors believe that there is a corruption equilibrium (Bardhan 1997, 
p1332; Bardhan 2006, p344; Blackburn, Bose and Haque 2006, p2451). The ideas 
is that since corruption is a frequency dependant equilibrium as any benefit from 
corruption is function of the number of people potentially corrupt, initial high 
levels of corruption are likely to remain high while initial low ones would move 
toward lower one (Bardhan 1997, P1331-1332). This implies that the incidence of 
corruption does not fluctuate much over the time and current levels are highly 
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influenced by previous ones. Indeed the equilibrium comes from the fact that as 
highly dependent on the belief of its occurrence, the incidence of corruption will 
be very hard to reduce as long as the belief will persist (Bardhan 2006, p344). 
Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2006, p2451) arrive at the same conclusion by 
presenting corruption of an individual as the result of the spread of corruption 
amongst the group which makes its real occurrence the result of its expected one. 
However both approaches explain the prevalence of corruption simply as a result 
of the belief (perception) relative to its spread but the rationale behind such 
consideration remains to be made. As such it remains to be proven that those 
siding with corruption are or are not rational agents maximising their income in 
the light of their surroundings. Hence, perceptions and beliefs relative to the 
incidence of corruption are causes of corruption but the process following which 
one decide to be corrupt remain to be highlighted. 
Corruption in its most simple form can be characterised as the greedy 
behaviour of a state official who extracts bribes from private individuals in 
exchange for regular services or favours. This suggests that the proximity to state 
official might increase the probability of being asked for a bribe. Svensson (2003, 
p216) argues that the proximity to public official is positively related to the 
probability of control and regulations and highly to the probability to be ask for a 
bribe. In addition, he also suggests that the probability to be ask for a bribe is 
unrelated to the profit made by the provider of the bribe but the later affect the 
size of the bribe (Svensson 2003, p216-219). Consequently, the frequency of 
dealing with public official being highly related to the occurrence of corruption, it 
could be the case that the prevalence of corruption in sectors where public official 
numerous will be higher. 
Presenting corruption as a form of rent seeking behaviour, Anne Krueger 
(1974, p291) claims that it is the result of an excessive regulation of the economy. 
Her argument is that people try to get around regulation which gives opportunities 
to government’s officials to extract rents. Indeed, to have a strong hand over the 
economy the government gives a lot of power to its officials instead of letting the 
market regulates itself and firms looking forward to operate in such market will 
not hesitate to pay the bribe asked for. In addition, the existence of many rules and 
regulations creates a context where facilitators can flourish (Tanzi 1998, p566). 
Because of the complexity of the system as the result of the multitude of 
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regulation, another type of corruption comes to life in the form of individual 
officially unrelated to the state who offers for the right price to provide a way 
around the system. Hence excessive reforms and regulations are causes of 
corruption. 
One might suggest that the case of market regulations is quite different 
especially in the light of the dislike of market failures such as unexpected inflation 
by the general population. However, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000, p18) believe 
that government inventions aiming to solve those failures have a considerable 
adverse effect. Indeed, because government invention is achieve by a diversify 
group of bureaucrats having individual incentives and aware of the principal-agent 
problem existing between those officials and the state, the result is the spread of 
corruption (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000, p195). In the process of implementing 
government interventions, state official may be endowed with a considerable 
amount of power but the state has very little means to verify the veracity of the 
information collected by the official. This leave bureaucrats free to act on their 
own initiatives which might lead to an adverse effects such as corruption. Further 
in poor countries attempting to generate growth, there is the necessity to increase 
government intervention aiming at the reduction of market failure but this will 
ultimately leads to corruption as describe earlier (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000, 
p196). This is due to the specificity of poor countries as because of low 
productivity growth is generally achieve through capital intensive activities, it 
means that the opportunity cost of increasing the number of state’s official is very 
low as compare to rich countries. This is also cause by the attempt to improve 
growth by pulling people from the private sector to implement government 
intervention leading essentially to corruption as it increase the interaction with 
government officials thus giving more opportunities to extract rents (Acemoglu 
and Verdier 2000, p195). Kaufmann (1997, p122) brings a limit to those 
arguments as he claims that when reforms are correctly erected and implemented 
they will not lead to corruption. However, even if one assumes his claim to be 
correct, the principal-agent problem remains unsolved. It is the case that if we 
consider a context where reforms are rightly erected and implemented (which by 
default will get rid of state capture), this will not stop corruption at the level of 
bureaucrat as one could always create delays and difficulties to extract rents. 
Hence, even in the light of the necessity of market intervention, rules, regulations 
and government interventions may be conducive to corruption.  
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The attribution of an excessive power to government official could also 
happen as the result of industrial policy as point out by Ades and Di-Tella (1997). 
They argue in this extend that industrial policy towards investment can provide 
opportunities to engage in corrupt practices. It is the case that with a targeted 
industrial policy for investment, the final selection of recipient firms will be the 
opportunity for government officials to ask for bribe (Ades and Di-TellMocan 
2008a 1997, p1039). In addition, corruption is found negatively correlated to 
spending on Research and Development which could be explained by the 
consideration following which corruption will act as a “brain drain” or a 
disincentive for such sectors (Ades and Di-Tella 1997, p1040). Hence, all the 
advantages of an industrial policy seem lost since the selection process is not 
based on meritocracy and with no research done there will be not improvement of 
the productivity.  
Another way to provide government officials incentives to engage in 
corrupt practices is by setting up regulations lacking precision and clarity. Rose-
Ackerman (1975, p188) suggests that the lack of clarity and precision in 
government regulation allows official to order expensive goods that could have 
been purchased in the private market at a better price. She also suggests that such 
type of regulations make it harder to detect corrupt practices (Rose-Ackerman 
1975, p202). For an official the absence of clarity in rules and regulation is clearly 
a safe haven in the sense that the interpretation is up to him. Whether the official 
is already corrupt or not will not really matter because entrepreneurs looking for a 
better share of the market might be the ones competing to offer the highest bribe. 
Therefore, the ambiguity of regulations will lead to corruption. 
Mocan (2004) finds other social settings beside economical and 
institutional circumstances allocating too much power to government officials that 
will cause corruption. He claims that small cities have lower levels of corruption 
while males, the top half on the income distribution, the most educated peoples, 
individuals in their twenties and thirties and married people are quite likely to 
come across corrupt practices (Mocan 2008, p499-500). This might not say a lot 
since a smaller city means few peoples, fewer interactions and fewer opportunities 
to ask for bribes. Moreover, these groups of individuals that have the higher 
probability to come across corrupt practices represent the active population that is 
generally in contact with government’s officials and might have the means to pay 
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the bribe. However, Mocan also suggests that the size of the population and 
unemployment are positively link to corruption as he founds that the rise of the 
population by a million will lead to the rise of the prevalence of corruption by 
zero point zero one percent and one percent increase in unemployment will lead to 
zero point one percent increase in corruption (Mocan 2004, p501). This brings us 
back to the earlier argument following which more people lead to more 
interactions and more opportunities for rent seeking but this might not be 
conclusive as it tells us nothing about the type of interaction. One alternative is to 
consider the increase of population comes along with poverty in the light of the 
inequality characteristic of poor countries and poverty gives rise to more 
opportunities for corruption. As result, even if we can only assume that via its 
effect on poverty and inequality the growth of population causes corruption, there 
is no doubt that statistically unemployment highly promotes corruption. 
The causes of corruption could be summarised as the frequency of dealing 
with public officials for firm, the strength of rules and regulations or anything that 
will put too much power in the hands of government officials. The last one could 
vary from too much constraint on the economy to the implementation of a specific 
type policy or could simply be the ambiguity in regulations. Corruption might also 
be cause by the increase of the population assuming a context of poverty and 
inequality. At last unemployment is a clear cause corruption, ten times faster than 
population would. 
Having presented the main causes of corruption, the mechanism through 
which individuals choose to be corrupt remains to be clarified. Indeed, most of the 
causes and context presented in the literature of corruption refers to either the 
equilibrium in which corruption prevail or the context that will promote or 
facilitate it. The way in which those incentives predispose individuals to side with 
corruption is not explain but only assumed. In this respect while it is acceptable to 
consider that the more prevalent is corruption initially the more new individuals 
will tend to be corrupt, the rationale of such behaviour remain to be explain. 
Chapter II will address such concerns as we will assess the rationality of the 
decision to side with corruption and its implication for both sides involved. 
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Section 3. Main effects of corruption 
 
An awareness of the causes and consequences of corruption might help not 
only to better understand the problem but also to assess its prevalence even in 
absence accurate indicators. It is therefore necessary to presents the effects of 
corruption which could be useful to assess the precision of the various indicators 
available. In addition it is the case that the consequences of corruption could be 
highly diversified. Whether or not corruption is organised, structured and offering 
a high degree of guarantee, the consequences of corruption could be either 
facilitate the economy or weaken it (Amundsen 1999, p19-20). However, the 
mains effect as identify by the literature are those on tax, efficiency and 
productivity, institutions, growth, inequality and poverty. 
Corruption is first of all a way around tax and regulation. Private 
individuals and firms bribe corrupt officials to be able to pay a lesser amount of 
tax or simply be exempt. Further Rose-Ackerman (2004, p7) claims that the 
presence of corruption validates the belief that not paying tax is normal. This goes 
beyond an attempt to take advantage of a way around tax that corruption 
represents as private individuals might end up contesting the legitimacy of the tax 
system. In such context even if the income from tax is low any attempt to raise the 
level of tax will just boost corruption (Gupta et all, 1998). Looking into the case 
of developing countries Tanzi and Davoodi (1998, p16) find out that there is 
effectively a high correlation between corruption and low level of government 
income. Consequently, corruption does reduce the amount of tax collected by 
government. 
Corruption presented as speed money is supposed to improve market 
efficiency and productivity but this does not always happen. Through its negative 
effect on the rule of law, on people incentives, on tax, on government legitimacy 
and objectives, corruption negatively affect the market (Tanzi 1998, p583-584). It 
is the case that corruption by providing a way around rules does make the market 
ineffective while attracting at the same time individual toward administrative 
position. In addition with ineffective rules, the government have less hold the 
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state. Further, Svensson (2003, p223) finds out that the prospect of high 
corruption push entrepreneurs to opt for less advance technology in the light of 
the fact that by providing lower return and costing more to operate it will be 
associate with a lower level of bribe. As such corruption not only disorganise the 
market but also promote low productivity. Indeed with Mbaku (1996, p2) 
corruption through its effect on efficiency, rules and regulations appears to be 
harmful for the state as a whole. Hence, corruption promotes inefficiency and low 
productivity. 
Looking deeper into the effect of corruption on the State institutions, it 
could be the case that corruption destabilises the rule of law by providing a way 
around it. In a context of prevalent corruptions institutions affected can no longer 
play the role they were design to play just like a judiciary system no longer 
condemning the guilty (Jain 2011, p5). Further, policies implemented suffer 
adverse effects due to the ineffectiveness of the institutional framework. Ades and 
Di-tella (1997) take the example of industrial policies as they are more expensive 
to implement while in corrupt environment. They claim that corruption cut a 
significant percentage of the profit from an industrial policy as with corruption 
expected gain in productivity are lost as they opt for less advance technology and 
advance in research and development is forsaken (Ades and Di-Tella 1997). 
Hence, corruption distorts institutions either by making them useless in the 
process of implementing rules or by generating adverse effects to the policies 
implemented.  
Corruption also has a negative effect on investment (Bardhan 1997, p1327; 
Mauro 1995; Blackburn, Bose and Haque, 2006, p2460 and p2464; Tanzi and 
Davoodi 1998). According to Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2006, p 2464) this 
happens because in a corrupt context, the capital will not be allocated based on its 
return or the even the importance of the sector. This will affect the overall amount 
of investment available and the accumulation of capital. Corrupt officials make 
sure that the profitability of the investment is no longer the focus point in the 
selection process (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998, p8). The case of the infrastructure 
sector is point out by Collier and Hoeffer (2005, p13) as the most corrupt sector in 
the light of the high asymmetry of information there.  This could be explained by 
the fact that according to Olken (2009) corrupt individual could easily hide in 
such sector. Collier and Hoeffer (2005, p16) also claim that by lowering 
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investment in this sector corruption affects both the productivity and the quality of 
the outcome. Indeed, corruption reduces the return of investment while increasing 
its costs due to the misallocation of capital (Gyimah-Brempong 2002, p16). The 
particularity of investment in road construction illustrates it clearly as the bigger 
the public investment the bigger the adverse effect of corruption on road quality 
(Tanzi and Davoodi 1998, p20). This goes well beyond the case of infrastructure 
as Gyimah-Brempong highlights the negative effect of corruption on investment 
in human capital (2002, p17). He suggests that corruption affects the hiring 
process, makes education inaccessible to the poor due to the high cost and might 
even push away those well-educated because of favoritism (Gyimah-Brempong 
2002, p17). Further, corruption would reduce the output of initial investment 
either directly by diverting such funds or indirectly by reducing the money 
available for the maintenance of the investment made (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998, 
p10). At last, considering foreign aid as a type of investment, it is the case that 
corruption is negatively correlated to foreign aid (Tavares 2003). Conclusively, 
investment on infrastructure, investment on human capital and foreign aid are 
negatively affected by corruption. 
The effect of corruption on growth is mainly seen as negative by various 
authors (Mauro 1995, p704; Blackburn, Bose and Haque 2006, p2450; Thamrong 
Triprasertphot 2011, chap2; Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Gyimah-Brempong and 
Camacho 2006; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998; Gupta et all 1998). This is the case 
because of the reduction of the overall level of investment and the inefficiency of 
the ones achieved (Mauro 1995, p704-705). More specifically, through its 
negative effect on investment directed to human capital or through its positive 
effect on income inequality mainly in African countries, corruption negatively 
affects growth (Gyimah-Brempong 2002, p19; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). 
Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2006, p2450 p2464) believe in a cycle of low growth 
and high corruption where the absence of growth gives more incentives to get 
involve into corrupt practices since people do not stand to loose much if caught. 
This contradict the view of Bardhan (1997, p1329) for whom the presence of 
corruption is conditioned by long lasting growth since the availability of a bribe 
comes from the fact that investor and entrepreneurs can put aside such money. 
Thamrong Triprasertphot (2011, chap2) unite those two view by suggesting that 
there could be the case of positive effect of corruption on the short run and 
negative one on the long run where corruption takes advantage of potential long 
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lasting growth on the short term to extend its reaches but this will on the long term 
considerably lower the growth rate and impose a context of low growth high 
corruption. Further, Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho (2006, p247) find out that 
for the case of Africa if corruption increase by 10% this will lead to a reduction of 
growth rate per capita income by 2.8%. Aware that for 2011 the average growth 
rate of Sub-Saharan African countries was 5% (IMF 2012, p1), corruption has a 
considerable effect on growth. However, while testing for the direct effect of 
corruption on growth taking into account the respect of the rule of law, Mocan 
(2004) finds out that this effect is null. He suggests that it is in a context of weak 
institutions that corruption directly affects growth (Mocan 2008, p508; Rose-
Ackerman 2004, p15). Consequently, corruption reduces the rate of growth 
through its effect on investment, on income inequality and on institutions. 
Finally, the effect of corruption on both bureaucratic and market efficiency 
is rather complex. Use as speed money, corruption could effectively improve the 
efficiency of bureaucracy and hence improve market efficiency as well in cases 
where bureaucratic procedures are complex and long (Bardhan 1997, p1322; 
Bardhan 2006, p344-345; Mauro 1995, p685). However it could be the case that 
speed money is effective only because the delay was just a means to accumulate 
rents (Clunies-Ross, Forsyth and Huq 2009, p154). In addition, there is a strong 
positive correlation between bureaucratic efficiency and economic development 
which means that inefficiencies both bureaucratic and market limit the 
opportunities for growth (Mauro 1995, p687). This is similar to the findings of 
Thamrong Triprasertphot (2011, chap3) suggesting that corruption increases 
income inequality and poverty and also the findings of  Gupta et al (1998) 
suggesting that corruption not only increase income inequality but also reduce 
poor’s income growth. This happens either directly or indirectly via the promotion 
of inequality within the education system and the repartition of the land, the 
reduction of investment in social activities and the fall of the income tax (Gupta et 
al 1998). It is therefore the case that corruption promotes inequality. 
To sum up corruption does negatively affect institutions, investment, 
growth and the overall level of efficiency mainly by restraining the countries in a 
state of poverty with inefficiency, misallocation and inequality. Consequently it 
appears that within a corrupt country ways out of poverty are very limited.  
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Section 4. Categorisation of corruption 
 
There is a variety of classification of corrupt practices (see Rose-
Ackerman, 1975; Kurer, 2005; Amundsen, 1999; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; 
Kaufmann, 1997). It could be based on the type of individual involve, the way it is 
structured and organised, the effect it has on income and growth or even the group 
that the extortion targets. However it does involve a bribe taker and in most cases 
a bribe giver that both are better off standing by corruption. We will review the 
following categories: various form of bureaucratic and political corruption, 
concept of centralised and decentralised corruption, redistributive and extractive 
corruption and at last singular types of corruption that are bribery, embezzlement, 
fraud and extortion. 
Petty corruption or bureaucratic corruption refers to corrupt practices 
involving public officers with low levels of authority. According to Bradham 
(2006, p342), even though they are generally numerous, they mainly involve 
small amount of cash. They can be found in almost every single daily interaction 
of the population with a public official. Such prevalence could explain the small 
amount of cash involve, indeed the corrupt official is aware of the high frequency 
(daily basis) of the opportunity to ask for a bribe therefore there is no point to ask 
for a huge a bribe which might attract attention or discourage the individual. Other 
than the recurrence of the practice, there is also the low level authority of the 
officials involve in this type of corruption that prevent them from asking a huge 
bribe. Public officials involve in petty corruption are low level ones, this give 
them a limited power over the individuals to whom they ask the bribe. In other 
words, within petty corruption the veto of public official may at most just delay 
the process for the individual seeking the service not stop it. This type of 
corruption consist of acts like a request of a bribe by a police officer at a check 
point, a request of a bribe by an administrative officer to deliver a service that is 
supposed to be free of charge or even the request of a bribe by a public official to 
speed up the administrative process. It mainly affects individuals in civil society 
who lack connections with those in power but have to deal daily with state 
authorities.  
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Contrary to petty corruption, political corruption involves fewer 
transactions but leverages a considerable amount of money (Bardhan 2006, p342). 
High ranking public officials and the political elite are those in a position to exert 
political corruption. Holding a considerable amount of power as the result of their 
status they can then ask for bribe per transaction higher than the one asked in the 
case of petty corruption as the briber expects to have at his/her disposal the 
discretionary power of the high ranking official. The low amount of transactions 
involved could be thus explained by the competitive nature of this type of 
corruption which is fuelled by the discretionary power of the official. In other 
words, the willingness of the private entities to pay expensive bribes within cases 
of political corruption suggests itself that they expect benefits from the 
discretionary power of the official to at least account for all the expenses made 
including the bribe. In addition, it is also the exclusivity that comes with such 
power that matter. Such exclusivity will give to the chosen one an edge over other 
private entities. At last, because it involves highly sensitive issues and involving 
high ranking officials, political corruption is hidden. Unlike petty corruption 
which is achieve in broad daylight, political corruption is hidden behind closed 
doors as political elites would lose the population support otherwise. At this point 
the main two types of corruption are a widely spread request of bribe by low level 
public officers in their daily dealing with private individuals and a more secretive 
form of corruption happening in the high sphere of  the state. Furthermore, 
characteristics of those two types of corruption go beyond the size of the bribe and 
its frequency. 
Petty corruption refers to the opportunistic rent seeking behaviour of 
public officials at the occasion of their usual interaction with individuals. The 
origin of the fund extorted and the frequency of the operation suggests the 
maximisation behaviour of the provider of the bribe. Indeed, being private, the 
funds extorted could be allocated to another activity or simply moved elsewhere 
by the owner who therefore pays the bribe because it is its best option. This idea is 
strengthen by the frequency of the activity as the individual will have the 
opportunity to learn from his/her eventual mistakes or simply repeat the same 
strategy if it is optimal. In addition, in the case  of the recipient of the bribe who is 
a low level public official the prevalence of such type of practices in addition to 
the low level of cash involve reduces the probability of detection and/or 
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punishment which make such behaviour the best opportunity for a low level 
official to increase its income. 
Political corruption in turn refers to the private use of the discretionary 
power of high ranking public officers or political elite in exchange for a payment 
to the officer or elite. Here the payment provide is still a private fund but 
representing a considerable amount of money, individuals or firms paying the 
bribe are maximizing their income aware of the exclusivity that comes with it. 
Indeed, the discretionary power of the high ranking official or political elite will 
provide to the briber an edge over the rest of individuals or firm that could have 
benefit from it. However one could suggest that being a bargaining process, the 
winner will be the one who would provide a bribe above the optimal level and 
therefore would have fail to choose its best option. In spite that the fact remain 
that those competing for the discretionary power are attempting to maximize their 
income by choosing the option that will provide them the highest return.  In 
addition, the public official or political elite involves clearly maximize his/her 
income as individuals or firms compete to take advantage of his/her discretionary 
power which means that he/she is ensure to have the highest level of bribe. The 
recipient of the bribe just like the provider is choosing the best option for him/her 
by maximizing his/her income. 
A more advanced approach to petty corruption and political corruption is 
given by the World Bank which makes the distinction between Administrative 
corruption and crony capitalism or state capture (Rose-Ackerman 2004, p12). 
Elements included in administrative corruption are: bribery and favouritism used 
to reduce tax, get around regulations and be awarded minor contracts (Rose-
Ackerman 2004, p12). Here the emphasis is on the finality of the corrupt 
behaviour as this approach makes it clear that with administrative corruption the 
individual’s aim is to boost their regular activity by using bribe. An individual 
will therefore resort to petty corruption in the aim to facilitate and ease his/her 
daily encounter with public official. Kurer (2005, p234) adds extortion, nepotism 
and mismanagement in public office and judiciary system to bribery as part of 
administrative corruption as he focus instead on the type of public official 
involve. Following Kurer, petty corruption will then be a type of corruption that 
will involve administrative officer as oppose to politics as he includes corruption 
in the judiciary system as part of petty corruption. Whether one choose to focus 
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on the aim of the corrupt act or on the type of officials involve to characterise the 
type of actions that will counts as petty corruption will affect the concept of 
political corruption. Hence, considering corrupt practices in the justice system as 
more than just a means to ease daily dealing with public officers and aware of the 
discretionary power of judges we will exclude such type of practice from petty 
corruption. Bribery, favouritism use to reduce tax, favouritism use to get around 
regulations, favouritism use to get minor contracts and extortion and 
mismanagement including low level officials will be at this point the infractions 
that will constitute petty corruption. This widens and clarifies the scope of 
administrative corruption to include any malpractice that involves a low level 
state representative and a private individual or entity aiming to provide a service 
to the private party in exchange for a bribe for the official. 
In relation to crony capitalism or state capture, an advance conception 
adduces that it reflects the focus of powers and means of a whole country on the 
interest of a few political elite and firm owner (Rose-Ackerman 2004, p12). It is 
not about misuse or mismanagement made by low level official, it is about 
modelling regulations and institutions to serve the interest of a minority in power 
(Amundsen 1999, p3). The scope here goes beyond the action of the few political 
elite to include an attempt by anyone having the means to put the whole power of 
the state at his/her service. Hellman et all (2003) define state capture as the act of 
firm buying the rule of law in a country. In this context law and legislation are 
design to satisfy the needs of a specific group of firms and institutions serve at the 
pleasure of those firms. It is also about the behaviour of corrupt political elite in 
charge of designing and enforcing law (Amundsen 1999, p3; Kurer 2005, p234). 
In fact in some cases, the political elite will be behind those firms achieving the 
capture of the state as suggests Amundsen (1999, p12) referring to countries such 
as Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Kurer (2005, p234) considers as state 
capture: the bribery of high level official aiming to redesign regulations or 
targeting tax exemption or targeting the provision government funding. To that we 
will add the bribery of high level official such as judges to form the pool of 
actions that will be consider as political corruption. Presents like this the detection 
of political corruption will require a thorough analysis of state policies 
implemented, their effect and the implementation process. Indeed, to figure out 
whether or not the state has been taken over by private firm one should look at the 
redistributive process and repartition of wealth implement within this state in 
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relation to the situation of the poorest part of the population and also how does 
high level official interpret policies and regulation in place. However, Amundsen 
claims that state capture is generally based on pervasive administrative corruption 
(1999, p4). Indeed, it is sensible to assume that a context of prevalent 
administrative corruption will be a breeding place for crony capitalism since such 
practices will became acceptable and be assimilate to just another corrupt 
behaviour. In other words, the prevalence of administrative corruption in an 
economy or in a specific sector could be used as an indicator of the potential 
existence of crony capitalism even in absence of hard evidence suggesting the 
presence of the later.  
Following the advance approach of petty corruption, individuals will 
adhere to it in the aim to ease their regular dealing with low level official. This is 
once again a maximization behaviour as the individual involves in such type of 
corruption will provide the bribe only if this will ease the process and more 
importantly lead to the desired outcome. In this extend, the payment of the bribe 
will take place only in cases where it represent the best option for the individual 
providing it. In addition, crony capitalism or state capture could suggest the self-
maximization behaviour of both the briber and the bribee as it refers to the use of 
the whole power of the state to serve the interest of a wealthy minority in 
exchange of a considerable amount of bribe. The choices present to the bribee are 
either content himself/herself with its regular wage or sell one discretionary 
power. At this point, the willingness to increase one’s income - assuming that 
everyone is a forced self-maximizer and also that administrative officials and 
political elite do not have any higher motivation than increasing their own income 
- will lead both parties to side with corruption (see Cheung 1996). In addition, 
following the multiple corruption equilibrium, whether we are in a context of high 
level (low level) of corruption the bribee will be motivated to sell his/her 
discretionary power (not sell his/her discretionary power). The briber is then 
choosing his/her best option by siding with such type of corruption as otherwise 
someone else will take the opportunity and rule of law will became unfavourable 
for him/her.  
Anne Krueger (1974) presents corruption as form of rent seeking. This 
means that corruption is the opportunistic behaviour of those in a position to ask 
for money before delivering a service that should be free of charge and is related 
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to what Mbaku (1996, p1) calls bureaucratic corruption. This suggests that 
corruption is a matter of opportunity, the corrupt individuals behave as such 
because they are able to. In other words the problem of corruption is a problem of 
a lack of regulation and restriction. In addition, Krueger (1974, p292-293) argues 
that the availability of rents in the public sector explains the high demand for such 
positions. However this high demand does not means that all bureaucrats are 
corrupt. The rush for administrative position that could be used as an aggregate of 
the prevalence of corruption is therefore dismiss as the vocational call of some 
bureaucrats should be considered. Therefore, bureaucratic corruption will be 
considered as matter of bad regulations. It could be the case that those willing to 
take advantage of corruption and in a position to do so will put together the 
conditions for it to take place. In this extend the recipient of the bribe in his/her 
position of state representative will set up the wrong regulation or simply 
undermine the existing one. Hence the prevalence of such type of corruption (rent 
seeking) will suggests not only bad regulations but also the lack of willingness to 
fight corruption. 
Centralised corruption refers to a monopolistic system where corruption is 
organised so that the bribe is taken once and redistributed amongst all the corrupt 
official while in a decentralized one since nothing is organised the amount of the 
bribe require is not known and new public officers could always appear to ask for 
a bribe(Triprasertphot 2011). It is the case that the choice between these two types 
could either boost or damage investment in a country (Amundsen 1999, p19-20). 
The organisation and structure promoted within a centralised corruption might 
present corruption as another tax to potential investors while with decentralise 
corruption the absence of structure mapping the way around the system might just 
scare away investors unable to make any forecast. In addition, it has been argued 
that centralised corruption give the advantage to limit the extent of corruption, its 
inefficiency and even the overall amount of the bribe unlike decentralized one 
(Bardhan 1997, p1324-1325). This is related to the fact that with centralised 
corruption the bribe is taken once which limit the eventually of people asking for 
more bribe at every step, speed the process and relatively guarantee the delivery 
of the service. Nevertheless, the fact that the bribe is asked once means that it 
should be big enough to be shared amongst the entire group of corrupt official 
because being an organisation the affordability and permanence of the system are 
take into account.  Therefore, in a centralised corruption system the private entity 
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providing the bribe will be kept happy which could be seen as a better form of 
corruption while with decentralised one since no attention is paid to the private 
entity it could be consider as a bad form of corruption.  
Additional typologies of corruption include redistributive corruption vs 
extractive corruption. Redistributive corruption refers to case where corruption 
ultimately takes wealth and resources from the state to give it to specific groups of 
individuals (Amundsen 1999, p5). Similarly to state capture, powerful groups will 
take advantage of state resources and wealth by the means of corruption 
(Amundsen 1999, p6). The particularity here is that those groups could be diverse 
from ethnic or religious group to corporations whether local or not but they are 
definitely distinct from state official or politician as a group (Amundsen 1999, 
p6). Extractive corruption however is the opposite. The state or actually the 
minority in power will extract resources from the general population or the society 
in the case of extractive corruption (Amundsen 1999, p8). Here the state official 
extracts resources not from the state directly but from the firms and individual 
within the country. Despite the similarity of redistributive and extractive 
corruption since leading both to the expropriation of resources by a powerful 
group, there is an important distinction that should be mention. Extractive 
corruption suggests that the state is strong enough to extract resources from firms 
and individual but this also imply that those firms already exist and have 
something to be extracted. Redistributive corruption implies that the state as a 
whole will still have enough resources or power to be extracted. Indeed, while 
with extractive corruption one could assume a kind of organised system looking 
after its permanence and sustainability similarly to centralised corruption and 
therefore supporting in some ways firms involved, redistributive corruption seems 
to be just about how much and how fast the powerful group can extract in the light 
of their power.  Further, redistributive corruption is found in Cameroon as some 
regions (The Sultanate of Bamoun in the West region and the Rey Bouba in the 
North region) are virtually independent as long as they support the ruling party 
(Amundsen 1999, p7). 
Focussing on the utility of both the provider of the bribe and its recipient 
we could find further evidences of the difference between extractive and 
redistributive corruption. Indeed, with extractive corruption aware of the actors 
concern with their future gain as well as the present one, public official will 
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ensure that the bribe asked for maximise both their own utility and the ability of 
various firms providing bribes to afford it. This follows the understanding that the 
provider of the bribe will keep doing so if and only if it maximizes his/her utility. 
As such extractive corruption could imply the maximization of the utility of both 
the provider of the bribe and its recipient. It is the case that both parties could 
reach a pareto-efficient solution as the maximization behaviour of the recipient of 
the bribe is function of the possibility of the provider of the bribe to maximize its 
revenue. However, redistributive corruption being the exploitation of state 
resources it is the case that the group of individuals or community perpetrating 
such act is essentially just increasing its income. Here, there is no interest for 
efficiency but just self-interest having no counter-party. Those groups will attempt 
to capture as much as possible from states resources.  
At last there are fundamental concepts related to corruption such as 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion that are useful to complete basic 
definition of corruption. Bribery refers to the financial counterparty provides to an 
official in exchange for a favour or service in a corrupt transaction (Amundsen 
1999, p11).  This is the major tool for administrative corruption as it is the means 
through which officials extract rents. Embezzlement is technically 
misappropriation rather than corruption as it involves a criminal act see in the 
extraction of public resources by officials in charge of managing it (Amundsen 
1999, p11). It involves also the use of political status for private dealings, 
Amundsen (1999, p12) cites the case some African countries amongst which 
Cameroon where the president and its relatives are owner of majors firms in 
monopoly such as breweries or sugar refineries. As such it could be seen as a form 
of redistributive corruption. Fraud, just like embezzlement, is crime rather than 
corruption in a strict sense. Fraud is a general term that includes all different ways 
of using deception to obtain bribe or achieve embezzlement (Amundsen 1999, 
p12). Finally, extortion similarly to fraud and embezzlement is a crime as it 
consists of the extraction of rent using means that involve violence (Amundsen 
1999, p13). 
Bribery is a generic term referring to the money that exchange hand in any 
corrupt transaction, embezzlement, fraud and extortion however it could be 
included into redistributive corruption with the state official responsible for the 
misappropriation of state resources. As result while bribery consists of self-
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maximizer individuals and could potentially lead to a pareto-efficient state, the 
three others concepts are simply self-interested acts. 
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Section 5. Measuring corruption 
 
1. Major indicators of corruption: 
 
There is a huge variety of indicators of the perception of corruption, for 
example the Corruption Perception Index of 2011 includes seventeen indicators 
(www.transparency.org ). Such variety of perception indexes could be useful or 
not depending on whether or not it leads to an agreement on levels of corruption 
around the world. Fortunately it appears to be a blessing as indicators are 
generally correlated one to another (Treisman 2000). 
The major indicators of corruption are the Bribe Payer Index (BPI), the 
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(Transparency International, 2005). The BPI is the result of survey distributed to 
employee in company from major export countries on their tendency to give bribe 
to foreigners (Transparency International, 2005). The GCB gives annually the 
public point of view of corruption as reveal by surveys distributed amongst the 
general population (Transparency International, 2005).  
The CPI is an index produces by Transparency International and it 
compiles a wide range surveys administrated to experts and businessman on the 
perception of corruption in the public sector (www.transparency.org/research/cpi  
). The 2010 CPI for example compiles the results from the following indicators: 
the Country Performance Assessment Ratings by the Asian Development Bank, 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the African Development 
Bank, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index by Bertelsmann Foundation, the 
Country Risk Service and Country Forecast by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
the Nation in Transit by Freedom House, the Global Risk Service by IHS Global 
Insight, the World Competitiveness Report by the Institute for Management 
Development, the Asian Intelligence by Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the World Bank 
and the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum 
(www.transparency.org/research/cpi).  
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One of the main limit of those indicators is relative to the fact that they are 
based on surveys distributed either to foreigner who are not always use to local 
habits or to locals population who will either emphasise or down play the actual 
incidence of corruption depending - among other factors- on their political 
orientations. Aware of the importance of the perception of corruption in the matter 
of its occurrence Bardhan (2006, p347) claims that this is a majors flaws of those 
indicators. However it should be mention that the lack of accuracy of those 
indication and apparent biased is tempered by the wide range of indicators take 
into account in the case of the CPI (Triprasertphot 2011). Indeed, the fact that 
most of the indicators gravitate toward the same score for a specific country could 
be a sign that the actual incidence of corruption is not far from that. 
2. Perception of corruption vs. incidence of corruption: 
 
The attempt to measure corruption has but one major flaws; the perception 
of corruption differs from its actual incidence. The common indicators of 
corruption such as the BPI, CPI and GCB are indicators of the perception of 
corruption rather than its incidence. The reason is that it is hard to measure the 
incidence since those practices are generally hidden. However some authors 
manage to assess the incidence of corruption either per sector through individual 
micro-data or within a specific project. 
The United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
collect data from individual in some specific countries 
(http://www.unicri.it/documentation_centre/publications/icvs/_datafiles/participati
ng%20countries.pdf ) on corruption through the International Crime Victim 
Survey. By 2002, four surveys had already been done. It is worth mentioning that 
out of 68 countries in this survey, eleven are African countries but only three of 
them have been survey more than once. Using this dataset, Mocan (2008) looks 
into the causes of corruption and the link between the incidence of corruption and 
its perception. Indeed, the survey clearly asks to individual if they have been ask 
for a bribe by various governments official belonging to services such as 
administration, customs or police. The answer provides an approximation of the 
incidence of corruption per sector. Mocan (2008, p499) finds out that the increase 
of the overall incidence of corruption causes the increase of the perception of 
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corruption as measure by the CPI. More specifically, the rise of the incidence of 
corruption in government office and in the police is the main cause of the rise of 
the perception of corruption as measure by the CPI (Mocan 2008, p507). 
However, by taking into account the quality of institutions, the incidence of 
corruption became irrelevant and only the risk of expropriation became relevant 
(Mocan 2008, p508). It seems therefore that the respect of the rule of law or 
simply the quality and strength of institutions matter more to the perception of 
corruption than its actual incidence. 
Unlike Mocan (2008) who looks at the incidence of corruption across 
various countries, Olken (2009) focuses on a specific project in one country. The 
project in question is the construction of a road in rural Indonesia and the survey 
takes place after the project is achieved (Olken 2009, p950). The incidence of 
corruption is define here as the “missing expenditures” seen as the difference 
between the official cost of the road and the estimation of how much it should 
have actually cost (Olken 2009, p950). Three surveys were used to estimate the 
actual cost of the road: an engineering survey to assess the quantity of material 
required following the analysis of core samples dug at various places of the road, 
a worker survey to assess the wages level and the number of hours done on a daily 
base and a supplier survey to assess the price of materials used in the project 
(Olken 2009, p953-954). In addition, another survey was done to measure the 
villager’s perception of corruption within the project in question. The result shows 
that the perception of corruption and its incidence are weakly correlated (Olken 
2009, p956). In addition, the villager’s perception of corruption is highly 
positively correlated to inflated price and weakly to inflated quantities (Olken 
2009, p956). This suggests that individuals cannot detect inflated quantities. 
Further, the results also show that the inflated quantities account for all the 
incidence of corruption (Olken 2009, p957). In other words the inaccuracy of the 
perception of corruption could be the results of the strategic behaviour of corrupt 
individuals who achieve corruption in such a way that is not perceivable by the 
general public (Olken 2009, p957).  
The difference between the perception and the incidence of corruption is 
caused by the focus of perception indice on the quality of institutions and/or the 
strategy of individuals in their attempts to avoid detection. Perception indexes 
rightfully focus on the quality of institutions as corruption could be seen as the 
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disregard of the rule of office which ultimately distorts the work of institutions. 
Corrupt individuals would be the one involve in any activity that led to the 
disregard of office regulation by administrative officers. It is the case that by 
providing a way around rule and norms that institutions are supposed to enforce 
corruption robs them from their purpose. In this regard the extent of the distortion 
of institution could be seen as an aggregate of the incidence of corruption or at 
least petty corruption. However, corruption presented as the behaviour of state 
officials that goes against office regulation only include petty corruption leaving 
aside fraud, embezzlement, thief and more importantly political corruption or state 
capture. Subsequently, perception indexes could potentially be far away from the 
incidence of corruption depending on the persistence of corrupt practices that it 
does not consider. 
The other explanation for the difference between perception indexes of 
corruption and the incidence of corruption is the strategic behaviour of corrupt 
individuals. It is the fact that corrupt individuals could actually strategically affect 
the perception of corruption (downplay or overplay it). This, unlike the focus of 
perception indexes on the quality of institution, could have damaging adverse 
effect since it is not a focus on one or another practices but a misrepresentation of 
the prevalence of corruption. Here, those involve in corruption will affect the gap 
between perception indexes and incidence of corruption in one way or another. 
The length of the gap will therefore reflect the needs of the corrupt individuals. 
Perceptions indexes could downplay the incidence of corruption in a context of 
fight against corruption with its indexes below the actual incidence of corruption 
or overplay it where there will be the need to justify the failure of the policies 
implemented or point out the insolvability of the problem with its index above the 
actual incidence of corruption. Hence, perception indexes could potentially be use 
to promote the incentives that will make corruption the optimal option for 
individuals living in a specific context. 
It is therefore the case that perception indexes are limited in their 
assessment of the prevalence of corruption. Having presented studies combining 
the perception and the incidence of corruption while measuring the extent of 
corruption across countries or within a specific project, it remain to be seen if 
there is a way to improve upon such literature. Indeed, agencies tracking and 
reporting actual cases of corruption are more and more active in Sub-Saharan 
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African countries which may lead the way to alternatives ways to measure 
corruption. To this extend after having assessed the rationale of corrupt behaviour 
in Chapter II, we will attempt to generate an alternative way to measure 
corruption taking into account actual data on the incidence of corruption and 
perception indexes in Chapter III. 
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Chapter II. The rationale of corrupt behaviour and its implications 
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Section 1. Introduction 
 In economics we approach social deviances such as crime or corruption 
as problem of incentives. We consider that all individuals are rational and as such 
moved by the necessity to maximise their utility. Macrae (1982, p678) states that 
"Corruption is part of a rational calculus and an integral and often deeply rooted 
method by which reasonable men take decision in the soft states of the third 
world". He lays as such one of the basic assumption in the economics of 
corruption. 
 Our primary objective is to present the rationale of such assumption 
following the framework use by Macrae in his paper. We want to understand the 
rationality of agents choosing to be corrupt. However, while Macrae focuses on 
the behaviour of firms competing for a contract we will look at the behaviour of 
the two individuals taking part to a corrupt game. Our game consist of a case of 
bureaucratic corruption where farmers expecting a subvention from the 
government have to choose between paying a bribe and receive the subvention on 
time or refusing to pay and receive the subvention with delay. In the meantime the 
official in charge of delivering the subvention can either be honest and deliver it 
in time to everyone or be corrupt and request a bribe to deliver on time while 
creating delays for those who do not pay. In addition, those being corrupt whether 
farmers or official face the risk of being punished if detected with the punishment 
function of the prevalence of corruption among each group. The payoff of each 
strategy is then function of the prevalence of corruption among each group 
through the effect on the size of the punishment and the size of the boost/delay 
incur. 
 Our game presents corruption as the result of the rationale calculus of 
agent attempting to maximise their income. It is the case that the official will side 
with corruption as an attempt to take advantage of the rents available while the 
farmer will only be corrupt in case where such option will yield higher return. 
 The second objective is to find and understand equilibriums existing in a 
corruption game. We want to be able to advise players in a corruption game upon 
the best strategy to adopt while unaware of the prevalence of corruption in the 
game. In this regards our game leads us to two equilibriums that are: the 
corruption equilibrium and the honesty one. The corruption equilibrium is found 
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to be an equilibrium by default as build into the game. The honesty equilibrium is 
less frequent and always coexists with the corruption equilibrium. 
At last, our third objective is to participate to the debate on the fight 
against corruption. In this extend, we found a divergence in the relationship 
between the gain from corruption and its prevalence depending on whether one is 
the provider or the recipient of the bribe. Such fact could potentially bring about a 
different approach to the fight against corruption aware of the divergence in the 
incentives of the players. 
The remaining of this chapter will be organised as follows: Chapter 
II.Section 2 will present a selected literature on corruption games, in Chapter 
II.Section 3 we will review the original version of the model used here and then 
present our version of it in Chapter II.Section 4, Chapter II.Section 5 will be the 
analysis and finally Chapter II.Section 6 will be about an overview of the findings 
and the policies implications. 
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Section 2. Literature on corruption games with a focus on 
competitive bribery games 
 
Corruption has been considered for a long time as a social deviance, a 
cultural attribute related to some groups or societies. Barr and Serra (2010) 
illustrate this as they look into the existence of a cultural component in the 
individual decision to side with corruption. Their aim is to assess how far one’s 
cultural background will affect one’s attitude toward corruption. To such extend 
they use two experiments on bribery games conducted using undergraduate and 
graduate students from the University of Oxford.  The cultural diversity of the 
sample of both experiments are an essential feature as the result those game are 
being analysed with regard to the eventual correlation between an individual 
propensity for corruption and the prevalence of corruption in his/her home 
country. The 2005 experiment illustrates a case of petty corruption in which 
private citizens will choose whether or not to offer a bribe in exchange for a 
service, public officials will choose whether or not to accept the bribe and others 
members of the society will incur a cost whenever the previous two players opt 
for corruption (Barr and Serra 2010, p 864-866). With thirty-four countries 
represented, the 2005 experiment reveals that the sample as whole does not 
support the hypothesis that levels of corruption exhibited by participants are 
correlated to the level corruption in their home country. However, introducing a 
dummy variable relative to whether the participant is an undergraduate or a 
graduate student reveals that even though the response of graduate participant 
does not support the hypothesis, the response of undergraduate potentially does 
(Barr and Serra, 2010). They make the case that one could predict the prevalence 
of corruption among undergraduate students base on the level of corruption on 
his/her country of origin. In addition, the 2007 experiment with twenty-two 
countries represented provides similar results as while one can predict the 
prevalence of corruption among undergraduate based on the level of corruption in 
their country of origin, this will not be true for graduate students (Barr and Serra 
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2010, p867-868). Hence, there could be a cultural component in one’s decision to 
side with corruption. 
Barr and Serra (2010) attempt to justify their findings by suggesting that 
while undergraduate students are still heavily influenced by their home cultural 
habit, graduate students having been away longer are less so. To this extend 
culture will be significant in an undergraduate student decision to side with 
corruption but not for a graduate student. However, if we consider corruption as a 
rational strategic behaviour, Barr and Serra (2010) results could simply make the 
case that while graduate students seems to have the knowledge to behave 
strategically, undergraduate do not as they rely on cultural habit. Indeed, one 
could consider that graduate students might have strategically updated their 
behaviour to the new environment not conducive to corruption while 
undergraduate did not because lacking the knowledge to do so. Here lies the focus 
of our review of the literature as we will look at the main studies analysing 
corruption as the behaviour of rational individual attempting to increase their 
wealth. To that extend we will successively make the case of the efficiency of 
corruption, the case of the rationale expectation of those paying the bribe and the 
case of the rationale expectation of both the provider and the recipient of the 
bribe. 
Beck and Maher (1986) look at the efficiency of corruption as a system by 
comparing the results from bribery and competitive bidding. Focusing on a 
context of competition for a governmental procurement and in absence of 
punishment for bribery, the firm providing the highest bribe would have been the 
same winning the bidding process. In other words, assuming the inability to detect 
and punish bribery, the winning bid in a competitive bidding (which will be the 
lowest one in this case) will be equal to the bid propose by the firm providing the 
highest bribe less the amount of the bribe. This also means that for country as a 
whole and leaving aside concern over the repartition of wealth, the two systems 
are identical. Further, Lien (1986) extends the result of Beck and Maher (1986) by 
looking at the efficiency of a bribery system. Under the assumption that all firms 
use the same bribe – gross profit function, he founds that all the firms will 
converge toward the same Nash Equilibrium (Lien 1986, p 340). Indeed, aware 
that in the bribery system each firm is effectively looking for the optimal level of 
bribe in the light of its gross profit and having assumed that the ratio bribe to 
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gross profit is the same for all firms, the firm with the highest gross profit or 
respectively the lowest cost will win the bid. Hence, corruption in the form of 
bribery is not only the rational behaviour of agents attempting to increase their 
income, it could be seen in some cases as the rational strategy for a society as a 
whole aware that it is as efficient as competitive bidding. 
Lien extends his analysis of competitive bribery by first considering the 
case of incomplete information and then the case of coalition. A model of 
competitive bribery game with incomplete information is presented in his 1987 
paper. There, he considers a case of firms competing for a contract by bribing 
officials who may or may not be corrupt and hence may award the contract based 
on the bribe received or may award it based on the bid proposed (Lien 1987, 
p157). He finds out that at the equilibrium all firms will pay a bribe mainly 
because in his model the punishment incurs if caught is independent of the 
awarding process (Lien 1987, p155). Further in his 1988 paper, he extends his 
work to include cases of coalition. While firms are competing for a government 
procurement by the means of bribes, each firm knows only its cost and chooses 
the amount of bribe it will pay accordingly as the amount of bribe a firm is willing 
to pay will increase with the expected profit (and  will decrease with the cost 
function of the firm) (Lien 1988, p190). Focussing on a game with three firms, 
when two of them form a coalition he finds out that even though the coalition as a 
whole end up with a greater  expected profit (as compare to the firm left alone), 
each member of the coalition will have a smaller expected profit (as compare to 
the firm left alone) (Lien 1988, p194). Indeed, because the coalition reduces the 
total number of actor on the market (which reduce competition), expected profit 
rises and the coalition as a whole win as having a lower cost function. However, 
the expected profit for each of the member of the coalition will be lower than the 
one from the firm left alone and as result firms will be reluctant to form a 
coalition in such context. Consequently, with the punishment independent of the 
award of the contract firms will always remain corrupt even when the officials 
may or may not be so and coalition is unlikely to happen because not beneficial to 
the member of the coalition individually. 
Following the work of Beck and Maher (1986), Lien (1986), Lien (1987) 
and Lien (1988), we can make the case of the efficiency of corruption with the 
underlining assumption of the rationality of the individuals involved. Lambert-
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Mogiliansky et al (2008) look into this assumption as they model a case of petty 
corruption involving an entrepreneur facing one or more bureaucrats in the aim to 
understand the effect of the existing equilibriums. They design a game in which 
an entrepreneur requires a bureaucrat approval to proceed with his/her project. 
Prior to the approval the entrepreneur must qualified his/her project. In the case of 
only one bureaucrat, the process is a follow: first the entrepreneur learn the value 
of his/her project, secondly he/she decides whether to qualify or not the project, 
thirdly he/she decides to apply or not for the approval, if he/she applies the 
bureaucrat checks whether the project is qualify or not and asks for the bribe and 
at last if the entrepreneur pays the bribe the project is approve, if he/she refuses to 
pay the project is not approve (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al 2008, p277). Whether 
the track consist of one or more bureaucrats they find out that when the cost of 
qualification for the project is not null (not negative in the case of more than one 
bureaucrat), the entrepreneur might never apply because there is no Pareto-
efficient equilibrium that will guarantee the approval of the project (Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al 2008, p278). Indeed, no matter what the entrepreneur 
expectations are for the bribe, the bureaucrat best response will always be to ask 
for a larger one. Further, with a repeated game, existing equilibrium can guarantee 
the approval of the project with a positive probability and replacing a track of 
bureaucrat with a single one appears to be socially beneficial as it reduces the total 
amount of bribe. Nevertheless, Lambert-Mogiliansky et al study focuses on only 
the strategic behaviour of the provider of the bribe aware that the bureaucrat is 
assumed to always ask for a bribe. 
Andvig and Moene (1990) look into the rationality of both the provider 
and the recipient of the bribe as they assess the link between the prevalence of 
corruption and its profitability. Focussing on bureaucratic corruption they build a 
model in which an individual can offer a bribe to an official in exchange for a 
service. The bureaucrat can be corrupt and accept the bribe or honest and refuse it 
in which case the individual will look for another official until he find a corrupt 
one. In addition, the corrupt official can be detected by a colleague who will either 
be honest and denounce the corrupt official (causing the loss of the bribe received 
and all future income) or corrupt and ask for a bribe to not report the case of 
corruption. They characterise corruption as the act of an official concluding an 
arrangement with an individual trading his/her power of office and access to 
information in exchange for an illegal payment (1990, p64). They found multiple 
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equilibrium based on the cost of corruption for the official involve.  For example 
with a bell shaped cost of corruption, three equilibrium levels of prevalence of 
corruption among officials are found. This illustrate how the return from 
corruption will increase with its prevalence as the spread of corruption by 
lowering the cost of taking bribe will lead us to the high corruption equilibrium 
level (Andvig and Moene, 1990, p70-72). In other words, the increase of the 
prevalence of corruption will positively affect it profitability which means that 
rational agents will have more incentive to be corrupt. Thus for a given level of 
wage the rise of the prevalence of corruption will come along with the rise of its 
profitability for both sides involved. 
However, this does not account for the potential effect of competition on 
corruption. According to Rose-Ackerman (1978) competition between officials 
can in some cases reduce the size of the bribe and may even eradicate bribery. 
Considering officials free to deliver their services to any individual, aware that the 
service provided is homogeneous with the perfect information about the level of 
the bribe and the quality of service and assuming that neither group (nor officials 
or individuals) is organised; the possibility for an official to be honest will provide 
individual with the bargaining power to lower the size of the bribe (see Rose-
Ackerman 1978; p137-151). Indeed, with perfect information and homogenous 
services provided by the officials, competition among unorganised officials will 
drive the level of bribe down. A low bribe will reduce the number of official 
accepting the bribe in the light of the lower gain from corruption and this in turn 
will increase the bargaining power of individuals leading to a level of bribe even 
lower than the risk face and hence the end of bribery. As result it is only when one 
consider that there is asymmetric information and officials and individuals are 
free to collude that it can simply be accepted with Andvig and Moene (1990) that 
the prevalence of corruption increase with its profitability for both parties 
involved. 
Despite having consider the behaviour of the individual and the official 
with both having the option of being either honest and corrupt, Andvig and Moene 
(1990) study does not present either directly or explicitly the rationale following 
which individual will side with corruption. Indeed, their study essentially 
establishes the link between prevalence and profitability of corruption from which 
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one could infer the existence of incentives that will explain the behaviour of the 
agents.  
Looking into cases of corruption involving a government official and a 
candidate requesting a permit, Cadot characterises it as the act of an official 
maximizing his total income that is his/her wage plus the bribe received aware 
that if caught the official will lose all future income (Cadot 1987, p224). The 
model used consist of a game in which following a test conditioning one access to 
a permit, honest official will grant the permit based on the result of the test 
(whether one is a good candidate ie passed the test or a bad candidate ie failed the 
test) and corrupt official will grant permit based on the bribe received. The study 
explores three scenarios that are perfect information, asymmetric information and 
imperfect information. When candidates know with certainty that they passed or 
failed the test (perfect information), bad candidate will always pay a bribe as high 
as the return they expect from the permit, good candidate will refuse to pay 
anything higher than the cost of denunciation and corrupt officials will act 
accordingly (Cadot 1987, p226). When the official know the outcome of the test 
and the candidate does not despite having a belief on his/her result that is assumed 
to be correct, both type of candidate will use their belief to calculate the cut-off 
value that will guide their behaviour [like in the previous case] as such corrupt 
officials will either ask a bribe based on the result of the test (like in the perfect 
information) in which case bad candidate will pay no more than the expected 
return from the permit and good candidate will pay no more than the cost of 
denunciation or choose to ask the same bribe to everyone (Cadot 1987, p 227). At 
last, in the case where both officials and candidates do not know the result of the 
test despite the later having a belief on his/her result (imperfect information), an 
official attempting to ask the same bribe to all the candidate will choose his bribe 
as the equilibrium point of tangency between the linear probability of not being 
denounced for asking a bribe and the curve depicting the marginal probability of 
not being detected (marginalised by the size of the bribe asked) for each 
candidate.  
Although simplistic, Cadot results seem to characterise corruption as seen 
in poor countries with low wages reinforcing the rent seeking ability of official in 
the light of the relative low cost of corruption. Interestingly, the game he presents 
allowed him to thoroughly consider the strategy of both sides involved in the 
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game. Nevertheless, his focus being on the difference between the cases of perfect 
information, asymmetric information and imperfect information little is said 
regarding the existing equilibriums and their implications. Indeed, even though he 
clearly presents the strategy of each player within each case, his study does not 
allow for the use of the existing equilibrium to inform upon the behaviour of the 
players as officials have types (some are corrupt by nature and other are honest by 
nature) and players play in turn with the candidate choosing whether to pay or not 
and the amount to pay only after the official has declare his/her type. 
Mishra (2006) analyses corruption from two different perspectives that are 
corruption as a norm at the level of the society and corruption as a choice at the 
level of an individual. In the case of corruption seen as a social norm, he analyses 
a model of enforcement in which firms choose whether to comply or not to a 
regulation while officials decide whether or not to learn how to detect firms not 
complying to the regulation before both sides settle on the level bribe that the 
official will accept to not report the firm (Mishra 2006, p 351-353). Such analysis 
reveals the existence of an equilibrium of high corruption where officials do not 
acquire the knowledge and most firms choose to not comply with the regulation 
and an equilibrium of low corruption where officials choose to acquire the 
knowledge and most firms choose to comply with the regulation. This result is 
conform to the findings of both Bardhan (1997, p 1331-1332) and Blackburn et al 
(2006, p2451) characterising corruption equilibrium as the result of beliefs of its 
occurrence which means that a belief of the high prevalence of corruption (most 
firm choosing not to comply) will lead to high corruption equilibrium and vice 
versa. Looking at corruption as an individual choice, Mishra (2006, p 354- 355) 
uses an evolutionary game theory to show that corruption in this case become the 
norm rather than a deviance. He suggests that because the strategy being corrupt is 
more rewarding than any other strategy in a context where most people are 
corrupt, being corrupt will remain dominant over time as new comers will likely 
adopt the pre-existing consideration. Hence, Mishra (2006) does not only provide 
an alternative way of understanding the corruption equilibrium but he also 
provides a rationale for the persistence of corruption. 
Mishra (2006) clearly and with simplicity rediscovers the concept of 
corruption equilibrium. He also provides an understanding of the persistence of 
corruption. However, the later finding is based on the assumption that new comers 
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will simply imitate the behaviour of the majority solely because of the frequency 
of this behaviour. This means that in a case where existing player in the game can 
make new comers believe that a specific behaviour is prevalent, the new comers 
will likely adopt the behaviour independently on whether or not it is actually the 
best strategy for them. 
In the light of the literature on the analysis of corruption using a game 
theory approach as presented earlier, it is the case that having establish the 
potential efficiency of corruption suggesting the possibility for rational individual 
deciding to side with corruption it is not clear what is the process following which 
those individuals make their choice, what are the existing equilibriums they face 
and what is the implication of those equilibriums. Consequently, we will consider 
a game of bureaucratic corruption as we analyse the strategy of both sides taking 
part to the game in the aim to present rationale following which corruption or 
honesty will prevail. However, unlike existing studies, our study will not only 
look back at the rationale of agents while making their choice but also consider 
the condition and implications of the existing equilibriums. To this extend our 
model will be based on the one developed by Macrae (1982). In addition, having 
explored the rationale of agents playing the game we will also consider the likely 
overall outcome of the game while assuming the rationality of the player in 
attempt to advise player on the best strategy. 
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Section 3. A review of Macrae model 
 
Macrae (1982) models bribery into a game in an attempt to understand the 
decision of rational agent to opt for corruption. We will review Macrae’s 
approach and main conclusions.  
1. Macrae Game theory approach to Corruption 
Macrae’s model consists of a bribery game where N firms are competing 
for a contract worth “P”. His aim is to understand the typology of the firms 
willing to bribe, assess the characteristics relative to the size of the bribe paid and 
the effect of punishment in the decision to side with corruption. 
A is one of the N firms that compete for the project. The project is 
indivisible as such only one firm will be awarded the whole contract.  
In the absence of corruption, the probability for A getting the project is 
1
𝑁
 
or p.  
In the presence of corruption, official will be able to affect (increase) the 
probability for the firm A getting the contract such as:  
𝑝′ = 𝑝 + 𝑎(1 − 𝑝) =
1
𝑁
+ 𝑎(1 −
1
𝑁
) with 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1 
Equation II-1 
𝑝′ is the probability of A getting the contract in the presence of corruption aware 
the he bribes the official or make an “arrangement” in the words of Macrae. The 
parameter “a” reflects the power of office giving the official the ability to boost 
the probability for the firm A to get the contract. 
So far it was assumed that only one of the firm bidding for the contract is 
making an arrangement. In the case where there was another firm making an 
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arrangement along with firm A, this will reduce A’s chances of getting the 
contract. Effectively, with “a” being the total boost/leverage that the official can 
offer, “a” will be share amongst the firms competing for the boost (ie the firms 
paying a bribe). 
The probability for a firm not making an arrangement to get the contract is 
assume to be greater than zero as Macrae consider that firms are heterogeneous 
and is attempting to avoid a situation where everyone is oblige to make an 
arrangement as this will then cancel the expected gain from such arrangement.  
For 𝑝′′ the probability of firm A not making an arrangement to get the 
contract aware that everyone else is making an arrangement and for 𝑝′𝑏 the 
probability of firm B getting the contract if all the other (𝑁 − 2) firms are making 
an arrangement and B is making an arrangement as well; 
𝑝′𝑏 = 𝑝 +
𝑎(1 − 𝑝)
(𝑁 − 1)
 
Equation II-2 
 
𝑝′′ = 1 − (𝑁 − 1) ∗ 𝑝′
𝑏
= 1 − (𝑁 − 1) ∗ [𝑝 +
𝑎(1 − 𝑝)
(𝑁 − 1)
]
= 1 − 𝑝(𝑁 − 1) − 𝑎(1 − 𝑝) 
𝑝′′ =
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁 − 1)
𝑁
 𝑎𝑠 𝑝 =
1
𝑁
 
Equation II-3 
Equation II-3 could also be express as; 
𝑝′′ =
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁 − 1)
𝑁
 ⇔ 𝑎 =
1 − 𝑁𝑝"
𝑁 − 1
 
In other words, for a given number of firm (N) the boost/leverage that the 
official sells will reach its maximal value when the probability for a firm to get 
the contract without paying the bribe despite the presence of corruption is zero 
(𝑝′′ = 0). Hence at 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 : 𝑝
′′ = 0 .  
55 | P a g e  
 
However, having set that 𝑝′′ > 0, it will be the case that:  
𝑝′′ > 0 ⇔
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
> 0 ⇔
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
<
1
𝑁
⇔ 𝑎 <
1
(𝑁−1)
. 
Further, the firm A is unaware of the decision of his rivals. It does not 
know whether or not they will be making arrangement with the official. As such 
its strategy will have to take into account the two alternatives. For x the proportion 
of rivals firms making an arrangement, firm A total expected gain will include his 
expected gain when it makes an arrangement (𝐸𝑌1) and his expected gain when it 
does not make an arrangement(𝐸𝑌2).  
When firm A makes an arrangement, it incurs the cost “c” which 
represents the bribe it pays to the official in the aim to take advantage of his 
power of office. The bribe paid “c” will account also for the opportunity cost of 
making an arrangement or the cost that firm A will have face if it has not made 
the arrangement. In addition, by making an arrangement firm A exposes itself to a 
sanction “F” that is assumed to be exclusively monetary. Firm A will face the 
sanction with the probability “𝑝𝑓”. 
Therefore, the expected gain when firm A makes an arrangement will be: 
𝐸𝑌1 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑃 + 𝑝
′ ∗ (1 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝑃 − 𝑝𝑓 ∗ 𝐹 − 𝑐 
Equation II-4 
When firm A does not make an arrangement, the frustrated official will 
cause delays and difficulties which can be consider as a cost “d” that firm A will 
have to bear. 
Hence the expected gain when firm A does not make an arrangement will 
be: 
𝐸𝑌2 = 𝑝
′′ ∗ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑃 + 𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝑃 − 𝑑 
Equation II-5 
Now, assuming that the cost of the arrangement is equal to its opportunity 
cost (𝑐 = 𝑑) and that F is proportional to the benefit from the project (𝐹 = 𝑣𝑃), 
then: 
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𝑝𝑓 ∗ 𝐹 = 𝑝1𝐹 ∗ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑣𝑃 + 𝑝2𝐹 ∗ (1 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝑣𝑃 
Equation II-6 
Here, 𝑝1𝐹 is the probability of being fined given that all the rivals are 
making arrangements and 𝑝2𝐹 is the probability of being fined given that no other 
rival is making an arrangement. 
 
2. The equilibrium 
Macrae’s model brings together firms that compete to increase their ex-
pected gain in the award of a contract while facing a corrupt official. As result we 
will look at existing equilibrium between firms testing whether they will choose 
the corruption equilibrium or the honesty one. 
The expected gain for a firm is as follow: 
 When the firm choose to make an arrangement (be corrupt): 𝐸𝑌1 = 𝑝𝑥𝑃 +
𝑝′(1 − 𝑥)𝑃 − 𝑝𝑓𝐹 − 𝑐 
However, 𝑝′ = 𝑝 + 𝑎(1 − 𝑝) , 𝑝 =
1
𝑁
 and 𝑝𝑓𝐹 = 𝑝1𝑓𝑥𝑣𝑃 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)𝑣𝑃 
Hence, 𝐸𝑌1 =
1
𝑁
𝑥𝑃 + (
1
𝑁
+ 𝑎 (1 −
1
𝑁
)) (1 − 𝑥)𝑃 − 𝑝1𝑓𝑥𝑣𝑃 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)𝑣𝑃 − 𝑐 
=
1
𝑁
𝑥𝑃 +
1
𝑁
𝑃 −
1
𝑁
𝑥𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃 − 𝑎𝑥𝑃 −
1
𝑁
𝑎𝑃 +
1
𝑁
𝑎𝑥𝑃 − (𝑝1𝑓𝑥 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)) 𝑣𝑃
− 𝑐 
=
1
𝑁
𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃 (1 − 𝑥 −
1
𝑁
+
1
𝑁
𝑥) − (𝑝1𝑓𝑥 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)) 𝑣𝑃 − 𝑐  
 When the firm choose to not make an arrangement (be honest): 𝐸𝑌2 =
𝑝′′𝑥𝑃 + 𝑝(1 − 𝑥)𝑃 − 𝑑 
However, 𝑝′′ =
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
 and 𝑝 =
1
𝑁
 
Hence, 𝐸𝑌2 = (
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
) 𝑥𝑃 +
1
𝑁
(1 − 𝑥)𝑃 − 𝑑 
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=
1
𝑁
𝑃 + (
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁 − 1)
𝑁
−
1
𝑁
) 𝑥𝑃 − 𝑑 
=
1
𝑁
𝑃 −
𝑎(𝑁 − 1)𝑥𝑃
𝑁
− 𝑑 
We have then: 
{
𝐸𝑌1 =
1
𝑁
𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃 (1 − 𝑥 −
1
𝑁
+
1
𝑁
𝑥) − (𝑝1𝑓𝑥 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)) 𝑣𝑃 − 𝑐
𝐸𝑌2 =
1
𝑁
𝑃 −
𝑎(𝑁−1)𝑥𝑃
𝑁
− 𝑑
 
Now assuming that P=1, that gives us: 
{
𝐸𝑌1 =
1
𝑁
+ 𝑎 (1 − 𝑥 −
1
𝑁
+
1
𝑁
𝑥) − (𝑝1𝑓𝑥 + 𝑝2𝑓(1 − 𝑥)) 𝑣 − 𝑐
𝐸𝑌2 =
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁−1)𝑥
𝑁
− 𝑑
 
Considering a firm A attempting to decide whether to make an arrangement or 
not, we will focus on two contexts: In case 1, x=0 as all other firms decided to not 
make an arrangement and in case 2, x=1 as all the other firms decide to be corrupt. 
 
 Case 1: All the other firms decide to not make an arrangement (remain 
honest) 
As result : {
𝐸𝑌1 =
1
𝑁
+ 𝑎 (1 −
1
𝑁
) − 𝑝2𝑓𝑣 − 𝑐
𝐸𝑌2 =
1
𝑁
− 𝑑
 
Here, aware that all the other firms are honest, honesty will be an equilib-
rium among firm if and only if: 𝐸𝑌2 ≥ 𝐸𝑌1 
This means that: −𝑑 ≥ 𝑎 (1 −
1
𝑁
) − 𝑝2𝑓𝑣 − 𝑐  
If we consider a large enough population suggesting that 
1
𝑁
≃ 0 and assum-
ing that the delay caused is higher or equal to the bribe paid ( 𝑑 ≥ 𝑐); We have 
now:  
0 ≥ 𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑓𝑣. 
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This is highly unlikely as the boost (a) received is expected to account for not 
only the risk of detection but also the bribe paid. In case where the punishment 
(𝑝2𝑓𝑣) is equal to only the boost (a) the firm will not be willing to be corrupt as 
having no incentive to do so. Hence when all the other firms decide to make an 
arrangement it is not beneficial for firm A to do the same as honesty is not an 
equilibrium among firms. 
 
 Case 2: All other firms decide to make an arrangement (be corrupt) 
As result: {
𝐸𝑌1 =
1
𝑁
− 𝑝1𝑓𝑣 − 𝑐
𝐸𝑌2 =
1
𝑁
−
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
− 𝑑
 
Here, aware that all the other firms are corrupt, corruption will be an equi-
librium among firms if and only if: 𝐸𝑌1 > 𝐸𝑌2 
This means that: −𝑝1𝑓𝑣 − 𝑐 > −
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
− 𝑑 ⇔  𝑝1𝑓𝑣 + 𝑐 <
𝑎(𝑁−1)
𝑁
+ 𝑑  
Considering once again a large enough population so that 
𝑁−1
𝑁
= 1 and as-
suming that 𝑑 ≥ 𝑐; we have now:  
𝑝1𝑓𝑣 < 𝑎 
This is true aware that in a context of prevalent corruption the probability 
of detection will be lower and as such the punishment inflicted will hardly be as 
high as the boost received from corruption. In addition, just like in the previous 
case the boost will be attractive to firms if and only if it account for not only the 
bribe paid but also the risk of detection. Therefore, when all other firms decide to 
make an arrangement it is beneficial for firm A to do the same as in such case 
corruption is an equilibrium among firms. 
Macrae reaches others conclusions; firstly whenever a corruption 
equilibrium exist, firms and official will attempt to cooperate in a way that 
prohibit anyone else from providing a bribe. Secondly, as result of the first 
conclusion only one bribe will be accepted, it will be the bribe of the winning bid. 
Thirdly, it is impossible to determine the firm which will be awarded the contract 
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based on economics consideration since all firm have the same profit curve. 
Fourth, it is up to the official to make sure that the bribe required will be 
affordable by the firm in light of the boost offered. 
Here, Macrae not only highlights the rationale following which agents 
decide to side with corruption but he also presents bribery as the result of the 
strategy of rational agents attempting to maximise their expected gain. 
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Section 4. Our model 
 
Macrae (1982) looks at a case of a bribery game consisting of a group of 
firm competing for a contract that is to be awarded by an official. However, in his 
case firms can only attempt to increase their expected gain but not the probability 
of winning the bid as only one firm will emerge as the winner with the contract 
being indivisible. Further, there is no indications here as to the size of bribe 
provide by each firm as it is not clear whether each firm choose the level of bribe 
it is going to pay or the bribe is identical across all firms. This means that it is 
unclear how the selection process will take place. 
The other concern with Macrae approach is that he assumes that the 
official responsible for the evaluation of the bid made by each firm will be 
corrupt. Indeed, he only considers the strategy of the firm between being corrupt 
and being honest and assumes that whenever the firm chooses honesty it will be 
punished by the official.  
We will consider instead a case of bureaucratic corruption involving 
farmers applying for a stamp to officials. Here, all farmers will eventually receive 
their stamp but some will have theirs faster than other which will be accounted for 
as either a reward or a punishment. In addition, both farmers and officials will 
have the choice between being corrupt and being honest and the bribe paid by 
every farmer siding with corruption will be assumed to be identical. 
1. Definition and context 
We consider three keys elements while defining corruption: 
 It is a rent seeking activity. As such it could be understood as the trade of 
an official power of office for monetary gains. 
 The official extracting the rent expose himself to the risk associated to 
such activity that will be the potential punishment inflicted if caught. 
 The farmers siding with corruption are expecting to take advantage of the 
official power of office in exchange for the payment made. 
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We have a group of “N” farmers who are all eligible to receive funding from 
the government. To such aim each farmer is require to obtain a stamp from one of 
the “M” administrative officers. The purpose of the stamp is simply to identify 
each farmer making sure that the government funding went to the intended 
beneficiary. At last, each farmer is supposed to receive an equal share “s” of the 
total funding “S”. 
 
2. The model 
The model we will use will simply be a modified version of Macrae 
approach as presented earlier. In a corruption-free environment, each farmer I is 
expecting an amount of funding s such as 𝑠 =
𝑆
𝑁
. In the presence of corruption or a 
case where both the official and the farmer are corrupt, a farmer wishing to 
increase his share of the funding could take advantage of the tradable power of 
office of the official. Practically, having assumed that all farmers eventually 
obtain their funding, the tradable power of office will consist of the idea that the 
official will choose to process faster the case of farmers paying the bribe. Such 
speed will be accounted for monetary as we will assume that by having access to 
the funding in advance, corrupt farmer will be able to purchase fertilizers and 
other necessary equipment at a better price that they would have otherwise. 
The parameter “a” will represent the power of office or boost that the 
corrupt official sells to corrupt farmers. As such for “𝑠𝑐” the amount of subvention 
received by a corrupt farmer from a corrupt official: 
𝑠𝑐 = 𝑠 + 𝑎   
In addition, the farmer could choose to be honest despite facing a corrupt 
official. In such case, the official will not only refuse to speed the process but will 
manage to punish the honest farmer. The punishment here will consist of delays 
and difficulties that the corrupt official will create. For the honest farmer, this will 
effectively means that he/she will incur a cost “d” accounting for the extra amount 
of money he/she will add while attempting to purchase fertilizers at the last 
minute. Hence, for “𝑠ℎ” the share of the funding received by the honest farmer 
facing a corrupt official: 
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𝑠ℎ = 𝑠 − 𝑑  
So far we have consider that only one farmer is taking advantage of the 
official’s power of office. In fact, more than one farmer could choose to side with 
corruption. As result, for x the total number of farmers taking advantage of the 
official’s power of office (being corrupt), the amount of subvention received by a 
corrupt farmer will now be: 
𝑠𝑐 = 𝑠 +
𝑎
𝑥
 
This means that “a” is now the total amount of power of office that the 
official holds.  
For a farmer choosing to remain honest (ie not making an arrangement) 
while all the remaining farmers are corrupt, his/her share of the funding will 
remains 𝑠ℎ = 𝑠 − 𝑑. The understanding here is that the official selling his/her 
power of office is just reprioritising the provision of the stamp based on the bribe 
received. Indeed, the official will delays and creates difficulties to honest farmers 
while focussing his/her attention and energy to corrupt farmers. Hence, we 
suggest that the power of office “a” that the official sell will be equal to the delays 
and difficulties “d” caused to honest farmers: 𝑎 = (𝑁 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝑑. 
Turning to the official, an honest official will provide stamp immediately 
upon request in the aim to avoid any favouritism. Here, all farmer will receive an 
equal share “s” and will not incurs any delay or difficulties in the process. 
However, as presented earlier a corrupt official will punish the honest farmer 
through delays and difficulties which will effectively reduce the farmer share of 
the funding by an amount “d” and reward corrupt farmers by speeding the process 
which will be account for by the variable “a” accounting for the total official’s 
power of office that the farmer will take advantage of.  
We assume that both farmers and officials are unaware of the proportion of 
corrupt individuals amongst either group. As such the total expected gain of each 
farmer (EX) will depend on; his/her choice between being corrupt or not, the 
overall number of farmers being corrupt and the number of officials being corrupt. 
Similarly, the total expected gain of each official (EY) will depend on; his/her 
63 | P a g e  
 
choice between being corrupt or not, the overall number of officials being corrupt 
and the number of farmers being corrupt. 
a) Expected gain of a farmer 
For any farmer i and for 𝐸𝑋1 his/her expected gain assuming that he/she 
chooses to be corrupt: 
If the official is corrupt: 
The expected gain of the corrupt farmer will be:  
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥1 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐) +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝑝𝑥2 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐)
= 𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥1 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐)
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝑝𝑥2 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐)
=
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑠 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑠 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)
− 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2) 
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥1 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐) is the gain that the corrupt farmer will obtain in the case that all 
the other farmers are corrupt aware that the official is corrupt. 
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝑝𝑥2 ∗ 𝐹𝑥 − 𝑐) is the gain that the corrupt farmer will have in the case that all 
the other farmers are honest aware that the official is corrupt. 
If the official is honest: 
The expected gain of the corrupt farmer will be:  
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥1 ∗ 𝐹𝑥) +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥2 ∗ 𝐹𝑥)
=
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑠 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥(
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)
= 𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥(
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2) 
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(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥1 ∗ 𝐹𝑥) is the gain that the corrupt farmer will have in the case that all 
other farmers are corrupt aware that the official is honest. 
(𝑠 − 𝑝𝑥2 ∗ 𝐹𝑥) is the gain that the corrupt farmer will have in the case that all 
other farmers are honest aware that the official is honest. 
𝑝𝑥1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑥2 represent respectively the probability for the farmer i of being 
detected if all other farmers are corrupt and the probability for the farmer i of 
being detected if none of the remaining farmer is corrupt. 
 
As result, the total expected gain for a corrupt farmer is: 
𝐸𝑋1 =
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2))
+
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)) 
Equation II-7 
 
For any farmer i and for 𝐸𝑋2 his/her expected gain assuming that he/she 
chooses to be honest: 
If the official is corrupt: 
The expected gain of the honest farmer will be: 
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠ℎ) +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠ℎ) = 𝑠ℎ =
𝑠 − 𝑑  
Here, the gain from a case where the remaining farmers are corrupt and a 
case the remaining farmers are honest is the same as our farmer i does not 
participate to corruption. 
If the official is honest: 
The expected gain of the honest farmer will be: 
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠) +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
(𝑠) = 𝑠 
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Once again, the gain from a case where the remaining farmers are corrupt 
and a case the remaining farmers are honest is the same as our farmer i does not 
participate to corruption. 
As result the expected gain for a honest farmer is: 
𝐸𝑋2 =
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑠 − 𝑑) +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑠 = 𝑠 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑑 
Equation II-8 
 “y” represents the number of officials that are corrupt and “x” the number of 
farmers that are corrupt. “c” is the payment or bribe made by the farmer to the 
official in exchange for his/her power of office “a”. 
The fine imposed to corrupt farmers caught is 𝐹𝑥 and 𝐹𝑥 = 𝑣 ∗
𝑎
𝑥
 with 𝑣 ∈
[0; ∞]. This fine is based on the extra funding (
𝑎
𝑥
) acquired by the farmer with the 
help of the official. In addition, “v” accounts for the ability of agents investigating 
cases of corruption to accounts for all the extra funding as such we should have 
𝑣 ∈ [0; 1]. However, v also accounts for the strategy chooses by the government 
in the fight against corruption. As such if the aim is simply to recapture the extra 
funding the we will have 𝑣 = 1 but if the aim is to also prevent and discourage 
further corrupt acts then: 𝑣 ≥ 1. This is why we consider that 𝑣 ∈ [0; ∞]. 
b) Expected gain of the official 
 
For any official j and for 𝐸𝑌1 his/her expected gain assuming that he/she 
chooses to be corrupt: 
If the farmer is corrupt: 
The expected gain of a corrupt official will be: 
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𝑦
𝑀
(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) =
=
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑐 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑐 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦 −
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦
= 𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦(
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) 
(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) is the gain of the corrupt official when all the other officials are 
corrupt and the farmer is corrupt as well. 
(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) is the gain of the corrupt official when all the other officials are 
honest aware that the famer is corrupt. 
 
If the farmer is honest: 
The expected gain of a corrupt official will be:  
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦)
=
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑘𝑑 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑘𝑑 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦 −
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦
= 𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦(
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) 
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑝𝑦1 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) is the gain of the corrupt official when all the other officials are 
corrupt aware that the farmer is honest. 
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑝𝑦2 ∗ 𝐹𝑦) is the gain of the corrupt official when all the other officials are 
honest aware that the farmer is honest. 
𝑝𝑦1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑦2 are respectively the probability for a corrupt official of being caught 
when all the other officials are corrupt and the probability for a corrupt official of 
being caught when no other officials is corrupt. 
 
As result the total expected gain for a corrupt official is: 
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𝐸𝑌1 =
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2)) 
Equation II-9 
 
“k” represents the percentage of the cost “d” impute to the honest farmer that the 
corrupt official will absorb. This follow the idea that while facing an honest 
farmer, a corrupt official will be delaying and complicating the process that the 
farmer has to go through to have access to his/her share of the funding. These 
delays could be considered as a time off from work that the official will take (or 
simply the time off that the official will allocated to those farmers who pay the 
bribe). Here we capture this time off by considering that it could represent a 
fraction k of the financial punishment inflicted to the honest farmer. 
The fine imposed to corrupt officials who are caught is 𝐹𝑦 and 𝐹𝑦 =
𝑤(𝑘𝑑 ∗
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
+ 𝑐 ∗
𝑥
𝑁
). This fine is based on the profit accumulated by the official 
through the means of corruption (𝑘𝑑 ∗
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
+ 𝑐 ∗
𝑥
𝑁
). In addition, “w” accounts for 
the ability of agents investigating cases of corruption to account for all the profits 
accumulated by the official as such we will have 𝑤 ∈ [0; 1]. However, w also 
accounts for the strategy chosen by the government in the fight against corruption 
that is if the aim is to simply recapture the rents then we will have 𝑤 = 1 but if 
the aim is to prevent other officials from following the same path then 𝑤 ≥ 1. 
This is why we suggest that 𝑤 ∈ [0; ∞]. 
 
For any official j and for 𝐸𝑌2 his/her expected gain assuming that he/she 
chooses to be honest: 
 
If the farmer is corrupt: 
The gain will be: 0 
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If the farmer is honest: 
The gain will be: 0 
 
As result the expected gain of for a honest official is: 
𝐸𝑌2 = 0 
Equation II-10 
 
 
 
We can summarise the previous result in the following pay-off matrix: 
Table II-1 
 Official j 
Corrupt  Honest 
F
a
rm
e
r 
i 
C
o
rr
u
p
t 
((𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)); (𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀−𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))) 
((𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑝𝑥2));0) 
H
o
n
es
t 
((𝑠 − 𝑑); (𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀−𝑦
𝑀
∗
𝑝𝑦2))) 
(𝑠;0) 
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3. Implications of the model 
 
a) For the farmer 
(1) Strategy of the farmer 
If the farmer is indifferent between being honest and being corrupt then: 
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1)) = (𝑠 − 𝑑) 
⇒ (𝑑 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝑐) = 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1) 
Equation II-11 
And  
(𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)) = 𝑠 
⟹ 𝐹𝑥 = 0 𝑜𝑟 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2) = 0 
Equation II-12 
If Equation II-12 is true then: 𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝑐 = 0 ⇔ 𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
= 𝑐 
If Equation II-12 is not true then:  we will assume that:  
𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2) = 𝑃𝑢𝑥 
Equation II-13 
𝑃𝑢𝑥 being a constant term as ultimately the punishment imposed by the 
government should be an exogenous variable (a given variable or constant term) 
for the farmer when deciding to whether or not to be corrupt. Indeed, even though 
the level of punishment is based on the prevalence of corruption, the individual 
farmer has a very little impact on it as he/she is assumed to have no information 
on the prevalence of corruption amongst his/her pairs. 
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Then we have: 𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
= 𝑐 + 𝑃𝑢𝑥 
Hence, in the absence of any punishment the farmer will be indifferent 
between being corrupt and being honest if and only if the bribe paid is equal to the 
delay he/she will incur when honest plus the boost obtain when corrupt. However, 
in the presence of punishment the farmer will be indifferent between being corrupt 
and being honest if and only if the bribe paid plus the punishment incurred is 
equal to the delay he/she will face if honest plus the boost he/she will face if 
corrupt. 
 
(2) Implications 
 We looked at the condition for the indifference of the farmer between 
honesty and corruption. Now we will consider the conditions following which the 
farmer will always choose to be corrupt and those following which he/she will 
always choose to be honest. 
A farmer will always choose to be corrupt (ie corruption will be a 
dominant strategy) if and only if 𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
> 𝑐 + 𝑃𝑢𝑥. This means that as long 
as the benefit from corruption – the delay plus the boost – is higher than its cost – 
the bribe plus the punishment – , the farmer will always choose to be corrupt. This 
condition will remain the same whether the punishment exist or not. However, if 
the benefit from corruption is lower than its cost (𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
< 𝑐 + 𝑃𝑢𝑥) then the 
farmer will always choose honesty over corruption (ie honesty will be the 
dominant strategy). Hence, the strategy of the farmer will always depend on the 
weight of corruption (the cost of the bribe and the eventual punishment) as 
compare to the reward (the delay avoided and the boost received). 
 
b) For the official 
(1) Strategy of the official 
If the official is indifferent between being honest and being corrupt then: 
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(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2)) = 0 
⟹   𝑐 = 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) 
Equation II-14 
And 
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2)) = 0 
⇒   𝑘𝑑 = 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) 
Equation II-15 
Assuming that: 
𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) = 𝑃𝑢𝑦 
Equation II-16 
𝑃𝑢𝑦 being a constant (similarly to 𝑃𝑢𝑥), the official will be indifferent between 
being corrupt and being honest if and only if: 𝑐 = 𝑃𝑢𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝑑 = 𝑃𝑢𝑦  ⇒ 𝑐 =
𝑘𝑑 = 𝑃𝑢𝑦.  This means for the official to be indifferent between corruption and 
honesty the reward obtains when facing a corrupt farmer (c) should be equal to the 
one extorts from an honest farmer (kd). 
 
(2) Implications 
We found out that the official will be indifferent between corruption and 
honesty if and only if the reward he/she obtains from facing a corrupt farmer and 
the one from facing an honest farmer are both equal to the punishment he/she will 
face (which will be the same in both case since he/she is corrupt). However, the 
reward obtains from facing a corrupt farmer and the one obtain from facing an 
honest farmer cannot realistically be assumed to be equal. Indeed, here we 
consider that the official ultimate goal is to trick the farmer into paying the bribe 
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by punishing him/her when he/she decides to be honest. As result we can consider 
that the gain from a corrupt farmer will be higher than the gain from an honest 
farmer (𝑐 > 𝑘𝑑). 
This means that if 𝑘𝑑 > 𝑃𝑢𝑦 the official will always choose to be corrupt 
(aware that 𝑐 > 𝑘𝑑) as corruption will be a dominant strategy for him/her. 
Further, if only 𝑐 > 𝑃𝑢𝑦 (with 𝑘𝑑 < 𝑃𝑢𝑦) , the official may not always choose to 
be corrupt but will have a strong incentive to do so. At last, the official will 
always remain honest (ie honesty will be a dominant strategy) if and only if  
𝑐 < 𝑃𝑢𝑦 as the bribe receive fails to cover the punishment the official will face. 
Hence, as long as the gain from corruption while facing either a corrupt farmer or 
an honest one is higher than the punishment, the official will have a strong 
incentive to be corrupt. 
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Section 5. Analysis 
 
So far, we only consider the case of dominant strategies ie the best 
response of one player to every strategy of his counterpart. Such approach does 
not allow us to consider cases where the game could present multiple 
equilibriums. This is why now we will instead look at Nash equilibriums. Nash 
defines an equilibrium as a point where one’s strategy will maximise his/her 
payoff given the strategy of the other players (Nash 1951, p287). This means that 
we will now look for undominated strategies instead of dominant ones. 
By design, this game has only two potential Nash equilibriums: the farmer 
and the official are either both corrupt or both honest. Indeed, whenever their 
strategy diverges one of them will be worse off. With a corrupt official, the farmer 
will do best by being corrupt as well or otherwise he/she will incur delay. In 
addition, with an honest official the farmer will do best by being honest otherwise 
he/she will still not receive the boost but be punish because being corrupt. 
Looking at the official, he/she will rather be corrupt when facing a corrupt farmer 
and honest when facing an honest farmer thus ending up with a higher gain in the 
first case and avoiding punishment which may not be cover by the income from 
the delay inflicted to the farmer in the second case. Hence, the best strategy for 
the farmer will be to do whatever the official does and the best strategy for the 
official will be to do whatever the farmer is likely to do. 
 
1. The Nash equilibrium corrupt-corrupt 
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Table II-2 
 Official j 
Corrupt  Honest 
F
a
rm
e
r 
i 
C
o
rr
u
p
t 
((𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2)); (𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀−𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))) 
((𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑝𝑥2));0) 
H
o
n
es
t 
((𝑠 − 𝑑); (𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀−𝑦
𝑀
∗
𝑝𝑦2))) 
(𝑠;0) 
 
For corrupt-corrupt to be an equilibrium, the farmer has to always choose 
corruption whenever the official is corrupt:  
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1)) > (𝑠 − 𝑑) ⇔ 𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
> 𝑐 +
𝑃𝑢𝑥  
As for the official, whenever the farmer is corrupt he/she will always choose to be 
corrupt if and only if the gain from corruption is higher than the punishment 
he/she is expose to (𝑐 > 𝑃𝑢𝑦).  
The conditions for corrupt-corrupt as an equilibrium is therefore as follow: 
{
𝑑 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
> 𝑐 + 𝑃𝑢𝑥
𝑐 > 𝑃𝑢𝑦
 
Equation II-17 
Equation II-17 has two main implications:  the prevalence of corruption as 
equilibrium exclusively depends on the behaviour of the official and corrupt-
corrupt will always be an equilibrium as long as corruption exist.  
For a given level of punishment for corrupt farmers and corrupt officials, 
the size of the bribe paid (c), the size of the delay (d) created by the corrupt 
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official, the boost (a) the official will award to corrupt farmers and the prevalence 
of honesty among farmers are the key elements determining the existence of 
corrupt-corrupt as an equilibrium (see Equation II-17). The scale of the first three 
key elements are effectively chosen by the official and as such emphasise upon 
his/her key role in establish corruption as a dominant strategy.  
Looking at the prevalence of honesty among farmer, this could be once 
again seen as highly linked to the behaviour of the official aware that each farmer 
will choose between corruption and honesty based on the same three key elements 
that are set by the official. The farmer choice between corruption and honesty can 
be consider as weighting the net gain of those two options (ie comparing the boost 
from a corrupt official net the bribe paid to the delay incurred if honest). In 
addition, the importance of the prevalence of honesty among farmers as a key 
element is caused by our assumption following which the boost given to corrupt 
farmer is the result of the delay caused to honest ones. In other words, corrupt 
officials need a critical mass of honest farmers to fuel the boost received by 
corrupt ones as if every farmer where to be corrupt, corruption will stop being 
rewarding. 
The official is responsible for setting up the size of c, d and a while the 
farmer essentially choose between corruption and honesty based on the size of 
those key elements relatively to the punishment he/she may face. It is the case that 
the corrupt official will set up the four key elements in such a way that makes 
corruption the best option for the farmer if he/she wants the farmer to be corrupt. 
Hence, as long as the official will want corruption to exist as an option for the 
farmer, it will prevail as equilibrium simply by design. 
Consequently, looking at the equilibrium corrupt-corrupt it appears that the 
existence of such equilibrium is related to the behaviour of the corrupt official. It 
is also the case that a degree of honesty among farmers matter for the corrupt 
official. At last, corruption will be an equilibrium simply by design. 
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2. The Nash equilibrium honest-honest 
For the strategy honest-honest to be an equilibrium, the farmer has to 
always choose honesty while facing an honest official;  (𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑝𝑥2)) < 𝑠 ⇔ 𝑃𝑢𝑥 > 0 
Evidently as suggests the equation, the simple existence of a punishment 
(not null) will be enough to steer the farmer toward honesty while facing an 
honest official. As for the official as he/she will always choose honesty while 
facing an honest farmer if and only if;  
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2)) < 0 ⟺ 𝑘𝑑 < 𝑃𝑢𝑦 
In other words whenever the percentage of delays absorbed by the official 
is lower than the punishment this official is exposed to, an official facing an 
honest farmer will always remain honest. 
This gives us two conditions for the existence of honest-honest as equilibrium: 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑥 > 0
𝑃𝑢𝑦 > 𝑘𝑑
 
Equation II-18 
A farmer will choose honesty over corruption while facing an honest 
official whenever there is a punishment for corrupt farmer. Our model does 
assume that the punishment for a corrupt farmer will be non-null as function of 
the prevalence of corruption among farmer and the fine impose to those caught 
(see Equation II-13). A justification for this could be to consider corruption as a 
way around rules and regulations, a misuse of public goods or public office for 
private gain and as such punishable by law. Hence, because there will always be a 
non-null punishment for corrupt farmers, they will always have an incentive to be 
honest while facing an honest official. 
An official will choose honesty over corruption while facing an honest 
farmer whenever the advantage he/she gets from delaying the farmer cannot cover 
the punishment he/she faces. Interestingly, Equation II-17 presents two conditions 
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for the existence of corrupt-corrupt as an equilibrium that are: the gain from 
corruption should outweigh its cost as far as the farmer is concern and the bribe 
should be higher than the punishment as far as the official is concern. Those two 
conditions for the existence of corrupt-corrupt as equilibrium (see Equation II-17) 
do not exclude the conditions for the existence of honest-honest as an equilibrium 
(see Equation II-18). The fact that the gain from corruption while facing a corrupt 
official is higher than it cost for a farmer (𝑑 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
> 𝑐 + 𝑃𝑢𝑥) does not 
exclude the existence of a non-null punishment (𝑃𝑢𝑥 > 0). In addition, having 
already assumed that 𝑐 > 𝑘𝑑 (see Chapter II.Section 4.3.b)(1) it is possible that 
𝑐 > 𝑃𝑢𝑦 > 𝑘𝑑 and as such the official will choose corruption while facing a 
corrupt farmer and honesty while facing an honest one. Hence, corrupt-corrupt 
and honest-honest can simultaneously be equilibrium for a given game. 
In summary, it is not only the case that the farmer will always have an 
incentive to remain honest but corruption as an equilibrium and honesty as an 
equilibrium will coexist in such game. 
 
3. The effect of the incidence of corruption on its 
profitability 
 
Andvig and Moene (1990) find out that the income from corruption is 
supposed to increase with its prevalence. Indeed, their model suggests that the 
higher the prevalence of corruption the higher the equilibrium level of bribe which 
will boost the income of the official involve. We will test this result in our model. 
The punishment for corrupt agents is present as follow in our model:  
For the farmer: 
𝑃𝑢𝑥 = 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2) with  𝑝𝑥1 < 𝑝𝑥2 
For the Official : 
𝑃𝑢𝑦 = 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀−𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2) with 𝑝𝑦1 < 𝑝𝑦2 
The increase of the prevalence of corruption will means the decrease of the 
overall punishment as more weight will be given to the lower probability of 
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detection which is the one corresponding to a state where everyone else is corrupt. 
Hence, more corrupt individual means lower level of punishment which also 
means higher expected income from corruption. 
Our model also consider that the power of office sell by official as a boost 
to corrupt farmers is in fact function of the delay caused to honest farmers as 𝑎 =
(𝑁 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝑑. This implies that for corruption to be efficient there is the need for a 
critical mass1 of honest farmer who will fuel the boost sell to corrupt ones. Indeed, 
in a case where all the farmers are corrupt, the official will no longer have any 
power of office to sell (𝑎 = (𝑁 − 𝑁) ∗ 𝑑 = 0) which means that there will no 
longer be a return from corruption but just a cost. Consequently, the return from 
corruption is positively related to its prevalence through its effect on the level of 
punishment but also negatively through its effect on the availability of the power 
of office to be shared among the corrupt farmers. 
Further, If we consider the expected gain of a corrupt farmer (see Equation 
II-7), its differentiation respective to the prevalence of corruption among farmers 
(x) will highlight the relationship between the gain from corruption and its 
prevalence as far as the farmer is concern. 
𝐸𝑋1 =
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑎
𝑥
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2))
+
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥2))
=
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑎
𝑥
−
𝑎
𝑁
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑥2 −
𝑥 ∗ 𝑝𝑥2
𝑁
)
+
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑝𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑥2 −
𝑥 ∗ 𝑝𝑥2
𝑁
))
=
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝑐 +
𝑎
𝑥
−
𝑎
𝑁
− 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ (𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2) + 𝑝𝑥2)
+
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
(𝑠 − 𝐹𝑥 (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ (𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2) + 𝑝𝑥2)) 
 
                                                          
1 The critical mass of corrupt farmer will be function of the ratio between the gain from the 
decrease of the level of punishment and the loss from the reduction of the share of the boost 
available. 
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∆𝐸𝑋1
∆𝑥
=
𝑦
𝑀
∗
−𝑎
𝑥2
−
𝑦
𝑀
∗
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑁
−
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑁
= −
𝑎𝑦
𝑀𝑥2
−
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑁
 
And 
∆𝐸𝑋1
∆𝑥
= 0 ⟺ −
𝑎𝑦
𝑀𝑥2
−
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑁
= 0 ⟺
𝑎𝑦
𝑀𝑥2
= −
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
𝑁
⟺ 𝑀𝑥2
= −
𝑎𝑦𝑁
𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
 ⟺ 𝑥2 = −
𝑎𝑦𝑁
𝑀𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑝𝑥2)
 
However, 𝑝𝑥1 < 𝑝𝑥2. 
So : 
𝑥2 =
𝑎𝑦𝑁
𝑀𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥2 − 𝑝𝑥1)
⟹ 𝑥 = √
𝑎𝑦𝑁
𝑀𝐹𝑥(𝑝𝑥2 − 𝑝𝑥1)
2 
∆𝐸𝑋1
∆𝑥
= 0 has a solution meaning that the expected gain of the farmer 𝐸𝑋1will 
either have a minimum or a maximum (see proof in Appendix 1). As such it is the 
case that the prevalence of corruption for the farmer will affect the profitability of 
corruption both negatively and positively depending on the value of the 
surrounding parameters such as the prevalence of corruption among official, the 
value of the boost and the level of punishment. 
Now considering the expected gain of a corrupt official (see Equation II-9), 
similarly to the case of the farmer, the differentiation of the official expected gain 
will provide evidences relative to the relationship between the profitability of the 
corruption and its prevalence as far as the farmer is concern. 
                                                          
2 x is positive by definition as it is the number of farmers who choose corruption 
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𝐸𝑌1 =
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑝𝑦2)) 
∆𝐸𝑌1
∆𝑦
= −
𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝐹𝑦(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2)
𝑀
− 𝑁 −
𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝐹𝑦(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2)
𝑀
= −
𝐹𝑦(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2)
𝑀
 
However, with 𝑝𝑦1 < 𝑝𝑦2. 
So:  
∆𝐸𝑌1
∆𝑦
=
𝐹𝑦(𝑝𝑦2 − 𝑝𝑦1)
𝑀
> 0 
∆𝐸𝑌1
∆𝑦
 being strictly positive, the expected gain of the official is increasing with the 
prevalence of corruption among officials (see proof in Appendix 1).  
In conclusion, we can confirm the findings of Andvig and Moene 
following which the profitability of corruption will increase with its prevalence 
only as far as the official is concern. Looking at the farmer, the prevalence of 
corruption will increase and then decrease the profitability of corruption (or 
decrease then increase it).  
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Section 6. Summary of the Findings and Policy implications 
 
1. Summary of the Findings 
We set out to contribute to the understanding of the rationality of agents 
siding with corruption through the rationale they follow, the equilibrium they face 
and its implications. To that extend we use a corruption game in which both sides 
can choose whether or not to be corrupt with the payoff matrix ultimately 
depending on the prevalence of corruption amongst each group through its effect 
on the punishment. We reach six main conclusions that are relative to the 
implications of the setup of the game as a whole, the implications of the setup of 
each variable within the game, the existing equilibriums, the implication of the 
characterisation of the game, the implications of the solution of a mixed strategy 
game with imperfect information and the relationship between the profitability 
and the prevalence of corruption. 
The primary implications of the game is that the farmer will always remain 
corrupt (respectively honest) if and only if the benefit from corruption (honesty) is 
higher than the bribe paid plus the punishment faced (the delay incurred). 
However, for the official with the gain from the delays caused to honest farmer 
higher than the punishment faced he/she will always be corrupt (aware that the 
gain from the delay is lower than the bribe he/she ask for). In addition, the official 
will have strong incentive to be corrupt when only the bribe received is higher 
than the punishment faced. 
The payoff of the game is determined by the setup of key variables such as 
the level of the bribe, the delay inflicted and the boost received among others. In 
addition, those variables are all determined by the official who is expected to 
calibrate them according to his/her aim and objectives. Hence, it is the case that 
whenever corruption exist the strategy corrupt-corrupt will always be equilibrium. 
Further, the boost provide to corrupt official being function of the delay cause to 
honest ones,  the prevalence of corruption as an equilibrium require a critical mass 
of honesty.  
Alongside corrupt-corrupt, the other equilibrium is honest-honest. Indeed, 
the farmer will always have an incentive to remain honest while facing an honest 
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official as the punishment is non-null and the official will choose honesty while 
facing an honest farmer whenever the punishment face is greater than the gain 
from the delay inflicted. Moreover, the condition of the existence of each of the 
two equilibriums being non-exclusive both equilibriums can exist simultaneously. 
Consequently, while corrupt-corrupt will always be an equilibrium, we have cases 
where honest-honest appears as a secondary equilibrium. 
The existence of an equilibrium in which both sides choose to remain 
honest is similar to the findings of Bardhan (1997) and Ryvkin and Serra (2011). 
Using a Shelling diagram Bardhan (1997, p1331-1332) shows that in a bribery 
game three equilibriums can be found: two stable equilibriums that are the 
corruption equilibriums and the honesty one and one unstable one where both 
parties are indifferent between corruption and honesty. Similarly, Ryvkin and 
Serra (2011, p470) analysing a bargaining model of bribery between citizens and 
officials randomly matched find out that such game will have two stable 
equilibriums (an honesty equilibrium and a systemic corruption equilibrium) and 
an unstable one that is an interior equilibrium. In both cases, the unstable 
equilibrium is essentially a transition stage where a little increase of incentives for 
corruption will lead to the stable corruption equilibrium while a little decrease of 
incentives for corruption will lead to the stable honesty equilibrium. This leads to 
the conclusion that initial levels of corruption are important as they will dictate 
whether a country is heading toward the corruption equilibrium or the honesty one 
depending on which side of the unstable equilibrium it find itself initially 
(Bardhan 1997, p 1332). 
Our work confirms the existence of the two stable equilibriums as we 
present the rationale leading to either equilibrium but more importantly we 
suggest that the two equilibriums can coexist simultaneously. The possibility for 
the two equilibriums to coexist together will limit the strength of the initial 
prevalence of corruption in dictating the future and also open alternatives to the 
fight against corruption. Indeed, having the honesty equilibrium alongside the 
corruption one will reduce the dominance of either equilibrium. This is positive in 
cases where corruption is more prevalent than honesty as it gives an alternative to 
corruption but this also bring about caution in cases where honesty is more 
prevalent than corruption as the corruption equilibrium still exist. Further, it is 
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now the case that fighting corruption could rather consist of promoting honesty 
focusing on the honesty equilibrium. 
At last, similarly to Andvig and Moene (1990) we found out that the gain 
from corruption is increasing with its prevalence as far as the official is concern. 
Nevertheless, while considering the case of the farmer it is not strictly the case as 
the relationship between the gain from corruption and its prevalence is either a 
concave or a convex function. 
 
2. Policy implications 
 
The simple existence of corruption implies that the strategy corrupt-
corrupt will be an equilibrium. This means that the only way to fight it will be by 
eradicating it. In other words, if the focus of the fight against corruption is to 
make it not profitable for its participant this will require the extinction of 
corruption as a whole which seems unfeasible. In addition, having found that the 
function expressing the gain from corruption relative to its prevalence in the case 
of a farmer will be different from the one in a case of an official, we can suggest 
that the approach to the fight of corruption should be targeted accordingly. Indeed, 
while for the farmer restricting the prevalence of corruption to levels where it 
negatively affects the gain from corruption will be enough to discourage corrupt 
farmers, the same strategy will not works for officials. Hence, while the 
implications of the corruption equilibrium makes the fight against corruption 
based on the reduction of the gains from corruption hardly achievable, the reality 
of the difference of gains from corruption between farmers and officials calls for a 
more tailored approach to the fight against corruption.  
The existence and importance of honesty for corruption (as a system) has 
been highlight earlier. Indeed, it appears that according to our model a mass of 
honest individual is important for the corruption equilibrium. As such, an 
alternative to fighting corruption through the reduction of the gain it procures 
could be the promotion of honesty as an equilibrium. Promoting honesty as an 
equilibrium can be done independently of the presence of the corruption 
84 | P a g e  
 
equilibrium having seen that both corruption equilibrium and honesty equilibrium 
can co-exist independently one of the other. This could consist of simply 
rewarding honest individuals from both sides (whether farmer or official), which 
will ultimately increase the opportunity cost of the honesty equilibrium. Hence, a 
strategy of promotion of good behaviour will be advised over a strategy of 
punishment of bad one. 
In this vein, Mookherjee and Png (1995) introduce a model highlighting 
the divergence between punishing corruption and rewarding honesty as a means to 
fight corruption. They present a model in which factories choose the level of 
untreated waste they will illegally release in the public sewer while  
simultaneously inspectors choose to invest or not in learning to detect the level of 
illegal waste disposal and inspectors having learn to detect it will later on choose 
to report accurately or not the level of waste detected in exchange for a bribe 
exposing themselves and the factories concerned to a punishment if detected 
pollute (see Mookherjee and Png 1995, p148-150). They find out that when 
inspectors can detect level of illegal waste disposed, an increase of penalty for 
corrupt inspectors will increase the level of the bribe asked to alter the report 
instead of decreasing the willingness of factories to pollute (Mookherjee and Png 
1995, p153-154). One explanation is that increasing the penalty for corrupt 
inspectors will discourage them from learning to detect pollution which will lead 
to more pollution and higher level of bribe asked by the remaining inspectors 
having learnt to detect level of pollution. Alternatively, rewarding inspectors 
proportionally to the level of pollution detected will increase their willingness to 
learn how to detect it while reducing the willingness of factories to pollute 
(assuming that inspectors have no incentives to over-report the level of pollution 
in the light of the high level of penalty incurred and the low cost of appeal for 
factories). 
Practically, looking at the case of corruption in public administration 
whether it is when one want to collect its pension or a subvention provided by the 
state, it is generally the case that official will tend to ask for a percentage of one’s 
allocation. This will be call petty corruption or administrative corruption. Here, 
instead of increasing the penalty for corrupt officials caught one could consider 
acclaiming and rewarding those remaining honest. Indeed, by publishing regularly 
a list of officials being professional and honest one will spread the news about an 
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alternative to corruption, which will raise the incentive for individuals to refuse to 
pay the bribe and remain honest. Rewarding those professional and honest 
officials with the reward proportional to their wage for example will increase their 
incentive for honesty which in turn not only convinces honest one to remain so 
but eventually rallies corrupt one to honesty. Measuring the level of corruption of 
the official in this case could consist of measuring the involvement of ones 
department in cases of corruption detected, denunciations made and opinion 
survey relative to customer satisfaction and efficiency. Considering now types of 
corruption such as embezzlement or mismanagement, a solution could consist of 
putting together a fund rewarding monthly or annually the best managed 
institution and its team. The reward once again proportional to one wage will 
encourage everyone (especially those not taking advantage of the 
mismanagement) to be honest and professional but also to denounce corruption 
seen as having a direct negative impact to individual overall income. In those two 
alternatives approaches to the fight against corruption, the main idea is to propose 
an alternative to corruption identified here as the promotion of honesty. Both 
individuals and officials need to be presented with options around corruption. In 
this respect the diversification and simplification of the payment of the property 
tax as done in Cameroon recently with the introduction of online registration and 
mobile payment method could participate to a new approach to the fight against 
corruption (see Cameroonpostline.com, 2015 and Ecofin Agency, 2015) 
In cases where one will still prefer to punish instead of reward, it appears 
that the focus should be on the official. Indeed, with the official being the one 
setting up the level of the key elements determining the gain from corruption and 
aware of the strictly positive relationship between his expected gain and the 
prevalence of corruption, reducing his/her incentive to be corrupt will not only 
affect his/her choice between corruption and honesty but also the game as a whole 
through its constraint on the level of the key elements. 
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Chapter III. Incidence and perception of Corruption: Case of Kenya 
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Section 1. Introduction 
The sentence to life in prison for a former high Chinese political figure – 
Bo Xilai – (The Economist Printed Edition China, 2013), the arrest of the chief of 
justice of the constitutional court in Indonesia - Akil Mochtar – (The Economist 
printed Edition Asia, 2013) and the arrest of a Venezuela mayor  – Edgardo Parra 
– (BBC Latin America & Caribbean, 2013) all over the last few months on ground 
of corruption and corruption related practices suggest the high prevalence of 
corruption and related offence on the headlines.  
Indeed, with the rise of anti-corruption program and anti-corruption related 
policies (see the Ethic Intelligence website: http://www.ethic-
intelligence.com/compliance-tools/43-voluntary-initiatives-against-bribery/ ), the 
topic of corruption alleviation seems to be fashionable. Moreover, its importance 
goes far beyond the headlines as suggests the British Independent Commission for 
Aid Impact (ICAI). In the light of the growing concern of foreign aid donors, they 
advocate for a wide range of approaches including a clear anti-corruption strategy, 
an investment in management of risk relative to corruption, an investment in a 
sectorial analysis of risk associated with corruption and the promotion of 
transparency and accountability (ICAI, 2011). Further, as corruption appears to 
undermine development mainly through two of the Millennium Development 
Goals that are education and health care, the necessity to reach those MDGs will 
have to include a tighter hold on corruption (TI, 2010). 
The necessity of the study of the problem of corruption will bring about 
concerns relative to its characterisation and also its detection. Corruption is 
designed as a way around institutions as result it constantly evolves as a response 
to new challenges presented by improved institutions. In addition, similarly to 
crime it is generally consider as an activity in marge of the legality and as such 
perform behind closed doors which make it hard to detect. Those two features will 
therefore limit the availability of direct measures of this problem with instead the 
proliferation of measures relative to the perception of its occurrence. 
The 2013 edition of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International includes thirteen different perception indexes relative 
to the prevalence of corruption among which none existed before 2000 (see TI, 
2013). Such recent spreads and increasing reliance on perception indexes of 
88 | P a g e  
 
corruption bring about two concerns: how are they made and how far do they 
actually reflect the incidence of corruption. Our focus is on the second concerns as 
the first one has been considerably discussed (see Lambsdorff (2006), Kaufmann 
et all (2006), Knack (2007) and Huberts et all (2006)). Indeed, because the 
purpose of perception indexes of corruption is to provide a measure of the 
incidence of corruption, it is important to insure the accuracy of such measures. 
Hence, aiming to further understand the relationship between a measure of 
the perception of corruption and a measure of its actual incidence, our next step 
will be a look at the roots of the problem in addition to the review of the main 
empirical work on the topic. In Chapter III.Section 2, we will not only introduce 
the dataset used but also highlight the difficulties faced in this process and the 
importance of such analysis. The presentation of the data, it advantages and 
disadvantages and the identifications of events related to corruption will constitute 
0. Chapter III.Section 4 will consist of the model used, the presentation of the 
dataset before transformation, the transformation process and the result of such 
transformation. Finally, before providing the conclusion and limitations of our 
work in Chapter III.Section 6, the Chapter III.Section 5 will present the analysis 
conducted as follow: Firstly the description of indexes of societal corruption 
generated, secondly the highlight of the distinctive features of these new indexes  
in the light of the perception of corruption, thirdly a review of those distinctive 
features through the lens of keys facts of the history of Kenya and the summary of 
the findings at last. 
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Section 2. Perception indexes of corruption and data on its actual 
incidence 
1. The origin of the problem 
Perception indexes relative to corruption refers to indexes constructed 
from opinion surveys administrated to various entities assumed to be primarily 
concern or involve in such practices. In this extend entrepreneurs whether foreign 
or local and individual are generally the target of such surveys. The main ones are 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) and 
the Country Policy Institutional Assessment (CPIA) from the African 
Development Bank (AFDB). In addition, there is also the CPIA from the World 
Bank (WB), the Global Integrity Index from Global Integrity (GII), the Mo 
Ibrahim Index from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Global Corruption Barometer 
(GCB) and the Bribe Payer Index from TI (BPI). 
At the other end there is the actual incidence of corruption which will 
refers to the volume of case of corruption brought to light. This type of data is 
reported by the growing number of national agency in charge of the fight against 
corruption. Indeed with the rise of the anti-corruption movement, countries have 
to not only track case of corruption on the daily base but also publicly report cases 
founds. It is the case of the Economics and Financial Crimes Commission in 
Nigeria (EFCC 2013), the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission in Liberia (LACC 
2013 ), the Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission in Kenya (EACC 2013 ) and 
the National Anti-Corruption Commission in Cameroon (NACC, 2013 ). 
However, the quality of such type of index is highly correlated to the level of 
actual commitment to the fight against corruption. 
A very corrupt regime might create an agency responsible for the fight 
against corruption but will hardly give them all the required accreditations and 
power to do so. This could be seen as a principal-agent problem as the country as 
a whole (the principal) will be better off without corruption hence the need for an 
anti-corruption agency but the regime in power (the agent) does not feel the same 
way because being already involve in corruption. This is why countries that would 
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mostly benefit from a well-functioning anti-corruption agency are generally the 
one unable or unwilling to do so. The EFCC was establish in 2004 but it is only in 
2012 that the Directorate of planning, policy and statistics was created, as result 
the EFCC have not publicly release data on the incidence of corruption in Nigeria 
so far (EFCC 2013 ). The LACC was establish in 2008 but only corruption cases 
relative to 2011 and 2012 have been publicly released (LACC 2013 ). The NACC 
was created in March 2006 by presidential decree but it was only in 2008 that the 
commission started working effectively since it was then that the members were 
appointed (NACC, 2013 ). Since then, only two reports were publicly released: 
the first one in 2011 and the second in 2012. At last in the case of Kenya, the 
history of the actual EACC dates back to 1997 when it was then known as Kenya 
Anti-Corruption Authority and despite a turbulent beginning since 2004 it 
publicly releases a yearly report on the incidence of corruption in Kenya (see 
EACC 2013 ). 
In addition to the principal-agent problem affecting the production of data 
on the actual incidence of corruption, it should be noted that corruption is 
primarily an illegal act and as such it happens behind closed doors which make its 
detection even harder. Indeed data on the incidence of corruption have to be 
obtained on the case by case and each case could represent a totally independent 
investigation. While looking into corrupt practices in the award of government 
contracts one will  have to audit case by case the award of each of them not just 
look into the rule and regulation in place. Despite such limitations, the negative 
effect of corruption on government income (see Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998), on 
market efficiency (see Tanzi, 1998), on the quality of institutions (see Ades and 
Di-Tella, 1997) and on investment (see Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1995) highlight 
the importance of such type of information. Hence the use of perception indexes 
of corruption. 
Perception indexes of corruption unlike data on the actual incidence of 
corruption will be relatively easier to collect. The understanding is that by 
collecting individual perception level of corruption from a large enough 
(representative) sample one will have a close enough idea of the prevalence of 
corruption in the area covered. This is done with the use of opinion surveys and 
interview generally under anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. The GCB 
is an example. It is a world-wide opinion survey on people experience with 
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corruption in their respective country (TI 2, 2013). In addition, a more qualitative 
approach is often used by targeting a specific sample. As such the CPIA either 
from the AFDB or the WB will be using a more selective sample of both local and 
international economist to answer their surveys. However, such approach is 
potentially flawed as it will be highly sensitive to the quality of the survey and the 
sample. It is the case that an investor used to the mechanism of the business 
sphere of specific country will be less likely to see corruption to the same extend 
than another investor who is not just like local will be less likely to see the extend 
of corruption the same way foreigner will.  
Resulting from surveys, perception indexes are highly dependent of the 
quality of the questionnaire use, the awareness of the participants and even their 
political and/or economical affiliation as such those indexes are highly subjective. 
William De Maria (2008) in this extend describe the CPI as a tool for foreign 
policy in the case of Africa. He points out that with the allocation foreign aid 
more and more linked to the performance of anti-corruption policies as it is the 
case for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, this may limit the focus of 
government to the fight against corruption leaving aside important sectors like 
health and education (De Maria 2008, p 781-782). He also suggests that 
corruption as done in Africa should be seen as the result of a needy behaviour 
rather than a greedy behaviour as suggested by the assimilation of corruption to a 
rent seeking behaviour (see also Bayart, 1993). This will in fact widen the gap 
between petty corruption and political corruption as the former will be seen as 
needy corruption while the later will represent greedy corruption. The importance 
of such distinction is that it effectively reduces the scope of what is generally 
depicted as corruption with all the negative externalities coming along. Indeed, 
corruption resulting from a needy behaviour will be more like a tax as inevitable, 
constant and predictable while corruption resulting from a greedy behaviour or 
rent-seeking will be effectively harming due to its unpredictability and 
randomness. This contradict the findings of Curvo-Cazurra (2008) in his study of 
transition economies as he suggests that unpredictability in the form of arbitrary 
corruption is better than predictability in the form of pervasive corruption while 
looking at FDI. However, Curvo-Cazurra results are not only limited to transition 
economies, they also seem to be more related to the public image that the country 
in question display rather than the actual effect that the type of corruption will 
have on the country. 
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Hence, data on the actual incidence of corruption should be the primary 
source of information relative to the prevalence of corruption when available but 
when those data are not available the concern over the reliability of perception 
indexes remains. This concern is the focus of the growing literature on the 
assessment of perception indexes of corruption and also the comparison of 
perception indexes to actual evidence of the incidence of corruption. Our focus is 
on the later following the work of Sequeira (2012), Mocan (2008), Olken (2009), 
Donchev and Ujhlyi (2011) or even Fishman and Miguel (2007).  
 
2. Review of the literature on the comparison of perception 
indexes and the actual incidence of corruption 
New approaches to the measure of corruption are presented by Sequeira 
(2012) as she looks into field’s approaches to the measure of corruption. She 
advocates for measures of the incidence of corruption instead of its perception as 
perception index are potentially biased due to the impartiality of the respondents. 
As such, surveys relative to the experience of corruption that are the World Bank 
Enterprises surveys, the Business Enterprise Economic Survey and the 
International Crime and Victimization surveys could be good indicators. 
However, the wording of questions and cultural differences will highly affect their 
accuracy and reliability. As result she proposes three approaches to the measure of 
the incidence of corruption. One way could be to fill the gap between two official 
administrative datasets as in Ferraz et all (2012). This could be for example the 
case of the comparison between the amount of funds allocated by the state to a 
specific group and the amount of funds the group declares to have received from 
the state. Another way could be a comparison between administrative dataset and 
an independent audit as in the case of Olken’s paper (2009). Here the missing 
expenditure will constitute the incidence of corruption. At last one could generate 
two datasets and compare the gap between the two that will suggest corrupt 
behaviour. The relationship between measures of the incidence of corruption and 
its perception, the extent to which the culture explain difference in institution 
design and the rule of law and the conditions for the aggregation of direct 
measures of corruption at micro level to bring to life an accurate measures of the 
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level of corruption at country level are potential areas of future research made 
available by this methodology following Sequeira (2012).  
The methodology consisting of filling the gap between two administrative 
datasets is been use by Ferraz, Finan and Moreira in their paper on effects of 
corruption to the education system in Brazil (2012). They look into the hypothesis 
that corruption sees as the missing expenditures in federal education funds affects 
student’s outcome. As such they gather data from public primary school receiving 
central government’s funding and government audits in addition media report on 
corruption involving central government’s funding for education. Regressions of 
the academic achievements of an individual on his previous academic 
achievement and the amount of central government’s fund for education that has 
not been stolen reveals that students from corrupt localities present significantly 
lower output that those from non-corrupt localities in addition to higher drop out 
and failures rate as compare to other primary school. 
Mocan in his paper questions the causes of corruption in addition to the 
relation between its perception and its actual incidence (2008). He limits 
corruption to cases of bribery as he uses the United Nations Interregional Crime 
and Victimization Survey (ICVS) collecting individual data on reported payment 
of bribe by individual living in countries surveyed. This dataset clearly reports the 
respondent’s experience of case of corruption with bribe. While regressing the 
perception of corruption as reported by various perception indices such as the CPI 
on data on the incidence of corruption represented here by the ICVS and various 
others variables related to corruption such as governance and the quality of 
institutions, Mocan made two major findings. Firstly, the evolution of the 
perception of corruption is caused by the evolution of the incidence of corruption 
mainly the administration and the police but this only when one does not account 
for the quality of institutions. Secondly, taking into account the quality of 
institutions makes the incidence of corruption irrelevant to the evolution of its 
perception leaving the rule of law the only relevant variable. 
Focussing on a specific project, Olken (2009) similarly assess the 
difference between the perception and the incidence of corruption in addition to 
the relation between the two variables. Corruption in his paper is defined as the 
missing expenditures within a project of road construction in India. The dataset 
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used here is constituted of four surveys in addition to the administrative report on 
the official cost of the project. Indeed, an engineering survey is used to assess the 
effective quantity and quality of the material used and also the labour required for 
the project by digging and analysing samples of the road build. A worker survey 
is used to assess the work force employed for this project and the wage paid. A 
supplier survey is used to evaluate the price of the material at the time of the 
execution of the project. The last survey assesses the local population’s perception 
of corruption for this specific project. Using the first three surveys, Olken 
calculates the real cost of the road build which compared to the official reported 
cost provides the missing expenditure understood as the incidence of corruption. 
The missing expenditures are then compared to the perception of corruption as 
revealed by the last survey. This reveal that the local population could not detect 
corruption within the project as carried out through inflated quantities instead of 
inflated prices. 
Donchev and Ujhelyi present yet another way to compare the incidence of 
corruption to its perception as they attempt to find out if there are characteristics 
that will affect the perception of corruption in case of a constant incidence of 
corruption and also how accurate measures of the incidence of corruption will 
predict its perception (2011). For such purpose they use both the United Nation 
Interregional Crime and Victimization survey (ICVS) for the period 1996-1997 
and 2000-2001 and the World Bank Business surveys on firms experiences with 
corruption. As such they assess both corruption at individual level and country 
level. The method used is the regression at both country level and individual level. 
At country level they regress the CPI, the World Bank Governance indicator and 
the Political Risk Service corruption index and at the individual level they regress 
the ICVS and the World Bank Business Survey. The independent variables used 
are characteristics such as the origin of the legal system (whether British or not), 
the Colonization history (whether colonize or not), the religion (percentage of 
protestant population), the GDP per capita, the size of the population, the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, the political regime and the percentage of primary 
resources exported. This reveals that at country level the economy, the religion 
(Protestantism), the political regime and the protection of individual rights will 
reduce the perception of corruption for a steady incidence of corruption. In 
addition, at individual and firm level, the education, the age, the income and the 
employment status will increase the perception of corruption for a steady 
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incidence of corruption. One could conclude with those authors that the perceived 
level of corruption could differ between two countries even though its actual 
incidence is identical. 
Fisman and Miguel (2007) found an innovative way to compare the 
perception of corruption to its incidence while assessing the importance of the 
corruption culture and legal framework. Their paper looks at the illegal parking of 
United Nations Diplomats in New York City which is assimilate to the misuse of 
public office for private gains aware that their status did protect them from 
prosecution over parking fines up to 2002. The dataset used is the reported 
parking fines of United Nations Diplomatic plates in New York City for periods 
of November 1997 to November 2002 and November 2002 to November 2005 put 
together from the New York City Department of Finance, the United Nations Blue 
Book of permanent mission staff with diplomatic privileges and the United States 
Department Office of Foreign Mission. Fisman and Miguel regress the parking 
violation data on the enforcement measures taken, the corruption level of 
corresponding countries as reveal by perception indices, the number of diplomats 
included in the mission and various other countries related characteristics such as 
the GDP per capita. The regression shows that the behaviour of a diplomat 
(assimilated to the parking violation) is positively correlated to the corruption 
culture of his country (assimilated to the perception of corruption).  
There are others studies of the relationship between the perception of 
corruption and its actual incidence such as Weber Abramo (2005), Razafindrakoto 
and Roubaud (2010) or even Dreher et all (2007). Weber Abramo (2005) conducts 
an econometric analysis using the Global Corruption Barometer to compare the 
people experience with bribery and opinion on the prevalence of corruption found 
out that there is no relationship between the experience of bribery and the 
perception of corruption. A study by Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) 
comparing a survey administrated to a general population regarding their 
experience with corruption and an opinion survey administrated to expert for the 
six Sub-Saharan African countries suggests that the perception (opinion survey 
from experts) does not concur with the actual incidence of corruption (survey on 
people experience with corruption). At last, Dreher et all (2007) after isolating 
variables that will cause the presence of corruption (such as historical, socio-
cultural and economic context) and infer the presence of corruption ( such as the 
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GDP per capita, the level of investment, the mobility of capital, the quality of 
infrastructure, financial development and the consumption of cement)  and then 
generating a new index of corruption for over hundred countries concludes that 
perception indexes of corruption do not reflect factors that are directly causing 
corruption. It is the case that, as Weber Abramo (2005) concludes, perception 
indexes reflect the quality of institution rather than its actual incidence. 
We propose a different approach to the study of the relation between the 
perception of corruption and its actual incidence as we use the perception of 
corruption to improve the poor dataset on the incidence of corruption. In effect, 
we will use the CPIA and the CPI to not only account for the effect of the 
perception of corruption on its actual incidence but also to account for the lack 
reliability or availability of data on the actual incidence of corruption. The data on 
the incidence of corruption is obtained from actual reports by national agencies 
responsible for the fight against corruption. The novelty of our study is that we 
aggregate micro data on the incidence corruption into macro data that could be 
compared to the perception indexes that are at a macro level. This means that we 
could actually compare the prevalence of corruption on a daily base to the 
perception that people will have of it. As such effect we use an agent-based model 
of corruption that Chakrabarti developed and use to simulate the evolution of 
corruption in a fictional world. The other interest of this work is to take a step 
further into ways of not only improving perception indexes of corruption but 
maybe looking for indexes of the actual incidence of corruption. In addition, 
unlike any other of the studies mentioned above in which the focus is on a specific 
type of corruption (following the particularity of the dataset used) here we will be 
including all forms of corruption from petty or bureaucratic corruption to political 
corruption or state capture. This is because in the dataset for the incidence of 
corruption that we will be using all corrupt acts reported by the anti-corruption 
agency independently of the author of the act or his/her position are included. 
 
3. The importance of our study: Looking at the data on the 
prevalence of corruption in Cameroon 
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Despite the growing dedication to the fight against corruption in Sub-
Saharan Africa attested by the growing number of national agencies reporting 
case of corruption as mentioned earlier, the dataset on the actual incidence of 
corruption is still poor. Second to the Kenyan’s dataset that will be used for our 
analysis, only the Cameroonian’s dataset come close. However, concerns such as 
gaps within the dataset, inconsistencies over the years, unreliability of the data, 
micro-level data and the inability to detect some form of corruption are some of 
the main difficulties that considerably limit the use of this dataset. We will present 
the main concerns prohibiting the use of the Cameroonian’s dataset as an 
illustration of the overall limitations of studies using the actual incidence of 
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), who is the 
Cameroonian anti-corruption commission, published so far two reports on the 
prevalence and fight against corruption in Cameroon (see NACC, 2013). The 
2011 report includes investigations carried out between 2008 and 2010 (see our 
summary of this report in Appendix 2). Those investigations include 
investigations within institutions whether at a national level (such as various 
ministry or the postal service) or at a local level (such as local treasury offices) 
and investigations within specific projects (such as the Maize project or the 
construction of the road Ayos-Bonis). The second report published in 2012, takes 
a more qualitative approach as it assess the practice and the repression of 
corruption. It looks at practice of corruption within the allocation of wood-cutting 
permit by the ministry of forest and wildlife, the collusion between public officers 
and private individuals regarding the public procurement policy in local 
communities. Investigation into the repression of corruption targets corruption 
within the police and departments of ministries such as the ministry of domains, 
the ministry of lands and properties, the ministry of healthcare, the ministry of 
higher education, the ministry of secondary education and the ministry of 
transport. 
The dataset of the incidence of corruption in Cameroon covers a wide 
range of sectors. There is corruption within institutions such as ministries, the 
postal service, local treasury offices and the police and also corruption within 
specific projects such as the construction of the road Ayos-Bonis, the construction 
of teaching facilities and the provision of subventions to farmers. However, those 
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data are the result of one time only investigation in those sector. Indeed, 
investigation into corruption within ministries happens only for the year 2008 as it 
is only this year that reports from ministry cell in charge of the fight against 
corruption came out. Investigations into local treasury offices are only reported 
for the year 2009 and in 2010 only investigations into two projects in addition to 
the audit of the postal services took place. This means that one can only look at 
the state of corruption within ministries for 2008 or within local treasury offices 
for 2009 or within projects such as the maize project or the construction of a road 
for 2010. This also means that a study of the evolution of corruption is not 
feasible due to the random change of the sector surveyed over time. Further, with 
the second report published in 2012, the focus changed from a qualitative survey 
and detection of case of corruption to a qualitative research into the practices and 
repression of corruption. As result the second report focuses less on providing a 
detail database into the incidence of corruption in Cameroon and more on 
analysing the prevalence of corruption based on the limited surveys done. Hence, 
this dataset could not be used in another set-up than a temporal and sectorial 
analysis of corruption. 
A sectorial view of corruption will limit the usefulness of the data since 
such type of data is not as well documented. While with a broad view on 
corruption one could find a range of perception indexes that would be used to 
assess this big picture, with the incidence of corruption on a narrow and specific 
sector one will have to return to the field to gather perception of corruption for 
this specific sector. This is the case of the study of Olken (2009) as he compares 
incidence of corruption as suggested by the difference between the engineer and 
the worker surveys to the perception of corruption amongst the population. As 
result a sectorial approach of the collection of the data on the incidence of 
corruption will not be useful without another survey on the incidence of 
corruption in this specific sector. 
Looking at the case of ministries within the sectorial approach of the data 
on the incidence of corruption in Cameroon, the survey appears to be incomplete. 
The data in this case is the result of reports made by ministerial cells responsible 
for the fight against corruption located within each ministry. Those cells report 
directly to head of their department and send copy of their report to the NACC. 
This is already a considerable flaw as those cells are not independent from the 
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ministry in which they are located. Further, in their report of corruption within 
ministries, in the case of keys ministries such as Trade, Defence, Economy, 
Planning and Regional Development and Public work only case of 
mismanagement and unethical behaviour are reported (Here we characterise a 
ministry as key base on the amount of fund it is supposed to have access to, in this 
extend a ministry such a Public Work or Defence will be key ministry while 
Higher Education or Secondary Education will not). This is surprising as 
ministries such as Social Affairs or Youth have case of embezzlement and fraud. 
As result we can only suggest that this is an evidence of either the presence of 
political corruption hard to detect or it is part of a political unwillingness to do so. 
In either case, the data on the incidence of corruption within ministries become 
less credible as we seem to be missing keys elements. 
In addition to the case of ministries, local treasury offices and the postal 
services seems to suggest the presence of political corruption as well. In those last 
two instances, the amount of funds stolen per transaction is so high that one might 
need to have a considerable power of office to have access to it. For local treasury 
offices amounts varies between 30,000,000 Fcfa (£ 36 153.16) and 400,000,000 
Fcfa (£ 482 042.12) and for postal services they varies between 20,000,000 Fcfa 
(£ 24 102.11) and 13 billion Fcfa (£ 15 666 368.76). This could be therefore a 
clear sign of the heavy presence of political corruption in which case one will 
understand the concern over the availability of data on the incidence of 
corruption. Indeed, the presence of political corruption suggests that elite in power 
is corrupt as result they might want to protect the system that serve their interest 
which means that the detection of corruption will be harder as anti-corruption 
agencies have more difficulties to get through the opacity of the administration. In 
this context, data on the prevalence of corruption will be just part of a bigger 
strategy targeting the prosperity of the existing corrupt system rather than its end. 
The prevalence of political corruption could then justify the scarcity and 
uselessness of the dataset. 
Nevertheless, It could be the case that amounts suggesting political 
corruption are just cases of corruption involving a group of individual colluding to 
achieve such act. The audit of corruption in the postal services is in this extend 
really vague as to how many individual were involve for cases detected or any 
other detail relative to the case in question at the exception of the amount 
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involved. In such absence of details we can only speculate which once again 
highlight the unreliability of the dataset. 
The concern over the reliability of the dataset goes far beyond the absence 
of details as we did find some contradictions in the case of the audit of local 
treasury offices. Putting together regional reports of corruption within local 
treasury offices gives us a total of 6,179,458,559 Fcfa (£ 7 534 139.15) while the 
summary of cases of corruption around the country for this institution found in the 
same report gives us a total of 8,142,257,140 Fcfa (£ 9 927 228.69). The 
difference being considerable and the two totals nowhere similar to suggest a 
clerical error, we can question again the reliability of the dataset. 
Still within the audit of local treasury offices, another difficulty was to 
make the difference between acts of corruption and ordinary crimes such as theft 
and vandalism. The audit of the local treasury offices differentiates acts of 
embezzlement and fraud to acts of burglary and robbery. However, the question as 
to know whether one should put together those two categories remain as it could 
be that case that the burglary or robbery was just aiming a covering prior case of 
embezzlement or simply that those burglars were in collusion with administrative 
officer. Indeed, acts of embezzlement and fraud are considered as corrupt 
behaviour while burglary and robbery are not. The importance of this concern 
come to light when one considers the prevalence (accidental or not) of such acts 
of robbery and the amount of cash involved. 
Moving on to specific investigations the concern over the ability of the 
dataset to give a comprehensible picture of corruption in the sector considers 
remains. Looking at the Maize project difficulties seems to arise. The audit of the 
maize project reveals cases of corruption within the award of subvention to farmer 
as promised by the State. However, this audit considers as corruption only cases 
where the farmer did not receive at all the funding he/she was promised. This 
means that farmers who had to pay a bribe to receive a fraction of the subvention 
are not accounted for. This could possibly considerably affect the data as 
evidently it will be simpler and strategic for the corrupt official to require a bribe 
from the farmer willing receive the subvention and only steal all the subvention 
from farmers unwilling to pay the bribe  instead of just stealing it all while taking 
into account the probability of detection and its implications. 
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At last, the government launch in 2004 the so call “Operation Sparrow-
Hawk” which is an anti-corruption campaign targeting high profile civil servant. 
The idea was to detect and arrest political elite guilty of embezzlement of 
considerable amount of money, obliging them when possible to reimburse the 
State. However, having found evidences of the presence of political corruption in 
the 2011 report and in the light of the inconsistency, unreliability and 
unavailability of critical information within this dataset, “Operation Sparrow-
Hawk” does not seem to have succeeded its goal. An alternative approach will be 
to consider this anti-corruption campaign as a strategy implemented by the corrupt 
elite in power in the aim to comply with the need to advocate the end of 
corruption without effectively reducing the prevalence of corruption. In either 
case the ability and perhaps willingness of the NACC to effectively fight 
corruption can be questioned. As result, we will not be using this dataset but 
instead focus on the case of Kenya where the dataset seems more reliable and 
consistent over time. 
In the light of concerns over the continuity, the reliability and the ability to 
account for all forms of corruption relative to dataset on the incidence of 
corruption in Cameroon see as the second best dataset on the incidence of 
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, our study using the dataset on Kenya will lead 
the way to such type of studies and hopefully bring about the importance of such 
dataset. 
The availability and the collection of the data is a fundamental for our 
analysis as corrupt practices are not done in the open. We will therefore present 
the data of both the perception and the actual incidence of corruption in Chapter 
II.Section 3. More importantly, we will discuss in the same section the 
problematic with the use of data on the incidence of corruption. 
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Section 3. The Dataset on corruption 
We will be using perception indexes and data on the incidence of 
corruption relevant for Kenya. First we will introduce those data and later on 
discuss the problem face while trying to use them. 
 
1. Presentation of the data 
a) Perception indexes 
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment from AFDB is a 
perception index measuring the quality of institutions and their ability to promote 
development. The overall CPIA that we will be using is a composite of three 
categories that are: Economic Management, Structural Policies and Policies for 
Social Inclusion and Equity. In addition, there is a fourth category that stands on 
its own that is the Governance rating and there the sub-category Property Rights 
and Rule Based Governance will be included in our work. In addition, the CPIA 
from the WB also known as International Development Association Resource 
Allocation Index (IRAI) is the equivalent of the previous index at the difference 
that it is produced by the WB. As such it has a more international view on the 
subject as the previous one includes only African countries. Once again we will be 
using the overall IRAI score and the sub-category Property Rights and Rule Base 
Governance from the IRAI Governance Rating category.  
The GII is a perception index produced by Global Integrity a Non-profit 
organisation whose goal is to promote accountability and transparency amongst 
governments by providing tools essential to achieve such goals (see GII 2013 ). 
Two of those tools will be included in our analysis, they are the overall GII score 
and the score for Government accountability. The overall score as a measure of 
the quality of governance include six categories that are: Civil society, public 
information and media, Elections, Government accountability, administration and 
civil service, oversight and regulation and anti-corruption and rule of law. This 
perception index as an indicator of the quality of governance will be useful as it 
could highlight the relationship between the perception that individual have of 
their government and the prevalence of corruption amongst them. 
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One will notice that so far we are effectively only using the overall score 
of the index and the specific sub-category focusing on the accountability and 
transparency of institutions. The overall score which is in general a broad measure 
of governance is our actual perception index of corruption as it takes into account 
all the sectors that will be affected by a prevalence of corruption such as the 
macro-economy or trade or even equity amongst the population. In addition the 
accountability and transparency of institutions will be used as a measure of the 
quality of institutions as which is fundamental for our model as we will present 
later on. 
The CPI produced by Transparency International is an aggregate of a 
variety of other perception indexes on corruption, democracy and other factors 
related to corruption. Its 2010 version includes surveys from ten different sources 
that are: the AFDB, the Asian Development Bank, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, the Freedom House, the IHS Global Insight, the 
International Institute of Management Development, the Political & Economic 
Risk Consultancy Ltd, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum. As part 
of this work we will be using only the Overall score of the CPI (see the summary 
of the data on the perception of corruption in Appendix 3).  
b) Data on the Incidence of Corruption 
We gather data on the incidence of corruption for Kenya through website 
of the anti-corruption agency in Kenya. The Ethic and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC) is the agency responsible for the fight against corruption in 
Kenya. It is a model in the fight against corruption in Africa as it has produce 
quarterly reports on the fight against corruption since 2003 and annually report 
since 2004 (see EACC 2013). This means that so far it has produced nines reports 
on the incidence of corruption in Kenya all using a similar approach and covering 
the same sectors. The EACC presents the evolution of the following main 
characteristics across years: the classification of corrupt acts by type of offence 
and by type of individual involve, the list of complete and on-going 
investigations, the list of cases before the court, the list of complete and on-going 
asset tracing investigations and the list of averted losses due to the work of the 
EACC. Such continuous dataset unlike the one on Cameroon will be at the heart 
of our analysis despite the limitations inherent to its collection. 
104 | P a g e  
 
2. Advantages and disadvantages of our dataset 
Designs as responses to the lack of data on the actual incidence of 
corruption, perception indexes of corruption are generally consistent at least as far 
as the last eight years are concerned. They are consistent in the sense that year 
after year they use a similar methodology to survey the perception of corruption 
around the world. This consistence in addition to the variety of perception indexes 
makes them easy and practical to use even if they are limited for comparison over 
time and also cross-country comparison. The definition of corruption, the type of 
acts included, the capacity to detect, the number of countries included and mostly 
the awareness of people toward the problem considerably increase over time with 
the widespread of those indexes. Such change will affect the study of the 
evolution of corruption over time for any given country as those indexes rank the 
perception of corruption in a given country relatively to the other countries 
include in the dataset. This means that an increase or decrease of the number of 
countries included will affect the other countries included depending on where the 
incoming ones rank comparatively. As for cross country comparison because of 
the link between the phenomenon of corruption and the social context in which it 
operates what will be consider as heavy corruption in one context will could just 
be seen as local habits and attitudes in another. These are limitations faced while 
using perception indexes of corruption, they are inherent to perception indexes 
and the difficulty of the subject of corruption. 
Turning to the case of data on the incidence of corruption, we suggest 
earlier that such type of dataset is not without flaw considering its discontinuity 
and unreliability (see Section 2.3). However, the Kenya’s dataset is the exception 
considering its mains features that are its length, its spread and its continuity. The 
dataset of Kenya presents cases of from July 2004 to June 2012 divided into eight 
periods with each representing a report publish by the EACC (see an extract of the 
dataset in Appendix 4). This is a considerable amount of data compared as it 
could allow for a comprehensible analysis of the medium term evolution of 
corruption in Kenya. For example one can observe that the understanding of the 
work and the mandate of the EACC increases over the years as the relevance of 
corruption claims receive goes from nineteen per cent in 2006/2007 to forty-one 
per cent in 2011/2012 (see EACC 2013). This could suggest either an increase of 
the awareness and acceptance of the work of the EACC in the fight against 
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corruption or an increase of the mandate of the EACC over the years. In either 
case this will be a sign of the increasing efficiency of this agency in the fight 
against corruption. Hence, the length of the dataset as it covers eight years could 
give us an understanding of the picture of corruption in the medium term. 
The spread of the dataset is equally important as for a comprehensive 
picture of the incidence of corruption one will need details of the incidence of 
corruption across sectors rather than within specific sectors or projects. The 
EACC conducts investigations based on corruption claims received without any 
prior agenda. The variety of sectors targeted by those denunciations is insured by 
the multitude of ways to report corruption and the anonymity associated to it. 
Indeed, denunciations could be made in person, by phone, by mail and by email 
and more importantly the anonymity of whistle blower is protected via the 
provision of a secure platform where one can freely communicate with the EACC 
that is the Anonymous Whistleblower’s System. This representativeness of the 
data on the incidence of corruption in Kenya as the result of the ease and safety of 
the denunciation process in addition to the increase relevance of denunciations 
justify the spread of data on the incidence of corruption across sectors. As result 
the Kenyan dataset can give us a general view of the incidence of corruption 
within the country. 
The continuity feature links the length of the dataset to its spread as one 
will need to be able to observe the same general view of the incidence of 
corruption at different point in time in the aim to understand its evolution. Over 
the years the EACC report kept the same structure as it highlight the same type of 
statistics on the incidence of corruption in Kenya. Those statistics are: the 
classification of corrupt acts by type offence, the classification of corruption by 
type of individual involve, the list of complete and on-going investigations, the 
list of case before the court, the list of complete and on-going asset tracing 
investigations (investigations into the origin of assets that people have declare) 
and the list of averted losses (acts of corruption stop before happening) due to the 
work of the EACC. We can then assess how a specific type of offence did evolve 
over time or more importantly how corruption evolve for a specific group of 
offenders. Consequently, the length, the spread and the continuity of the Kenyan 
dataset give us the means to build a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the 
incidence of corruption in Kenya over the period observed. 
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Despite the many advantages of the data on the incidence of corruption in 
Kenya, some difficulties arose while using it. Cases of corruption highlight within 
the EACC report are generally relative to an institution, a sector or a project with 
details relative to the individual and amount involved. The classification of 
corruption acts by type of individuals involved is just summary table without 
details. This means that to establish a detailed table of cases of corruption by type 
of individual involved one will need to go through the each of the lists (the list of 
complete and on-going investigations, the list of case before the court, the list of 
complete and on-going asset tracing investigations and the list of averted losses 
due to the work of the EACC) and figure out how many individuals where 
involved, which type of individuals where involved and how much money was 
stolen. It is then highly time consuming. 
The other difficulty faced while using this dataset is the micro level of the 
data reported. Indeed, while we are attempting to compare perception of 
corruption to its incidence, data on the perception of corruption are generally 
macro-indicators. Perception index of corruption will report the perceive level of 
corruption for a specific country or institutions at best. It is different for data on 
the incidence of corruption as with the EACC report corruption is reported on 
case by case which means that we will have cases of corruption found per 
institutions or project or sector which will need to be aggregated before being able 
to see the overall picture of the incidence of corruption within institutions or for 
the country. However, this difficulty will be alleviate with the use of a model 
develop by Chakrabarti (2002) to aggregate micro level data into macro one as we 
will present in Section 4. 
 
3. Identifying the events that could have affected the 
prevalence of corruption in Kenya 
Looking at the history of Kenya within the period 2004-2012, we will at-
tempt to recognise events that could have acted as causes or deterrents of corrup-
tion as this will give us further indications relative to the actual incidence or prev-
alence of corruption within the country. In the absence of a better alternative we 
use the list of key facts from the timeline of the history of the country provided by 
the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13682176  ). We can summa-
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rise the causes of corruption as presented earlier into four mains categories that 
are: the frequency of dealing with public officials, the strength of rules and regula-
tions, the power of government officials and others causes such as the size of the 
population and unemployment (see Chapter I.Section 2). 
 
Table III-1 
Periods 
/ re-
ports 
Causes of corruption 
Frequency 
of dealing 
with public 
officials 
Strength of rules 
and regulations 
Power of gov-
ernment offi-
cials 
Population and Un-
employment 
July 
2004-
June 
2005 
0 - March-July 2004: 
completion of the 
draft of the new 
constitution 
(Negative) 
- February 2005: 
following the rev-
elation of the 
overall cost of 
corruption under 
the president 
Kibaki ($1billion) 
the leading anti-
graft official is 
forced to resign 
(Negative) 
-March July 
2004: the new 
draft of the 
constitution 
reducing the 
power of the 
president failed 
to be enacted 
on time ( Posi-
tive) 
 
0 
July 
2005-
June 
2006 
0 - July 2005: the 
parliament ap-
proves a draft of 
constitution ex-
tending the power 
of the president 
(Positive) 
- November – De-
cember 2005: the 
draft of the con-
stitution approve 
by the parliament 
is rejected by vot-
ers as the result of 
the extended 
power given to 
the president 
(Negative) 
- January- February 
2006: the finance 
minister resign 
-April 2006: 
signature of oil 
contracts with 
China (Posi-
tive) 
 
0 
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following a cor-
ruption scandal 
relative to the al-
location of gov-
ernment contracts 
(Negative) 
July 
2006-
June 
2007 
0 0  - October 2006: arrival 
of 35.000 Somali refu-
gee in Kenya follow-
ing drought and con-
flict in their home 
country (Positive) 
 
July 
2007-
June 
2008 
0 - December 2007: 
post electoral vio-
lence 1.500 death 
(Positive) 
0 0 
July 
2008-
June 
2009 
0 0 0 0 
July 
2009-
June 
2010 
0 - October 2009: the 
government ag-
gress to co-
operate with the 
ICC regarding the 
trial of keys sus-
pect of the post-
electoral violence 
(Negative) 
 
-January 2010: 
suspension of 
funding for free 
primary school 
by the US as 
the result of 
fraud allega-
tions (Nega-
tive) 
-February 2010: 
continuing 
support of min-
isters involve 
in corruption 
allegation by 
the president 
(Positive) 
 
0 
July 
2010-
June 
2011 
0 - July 2010: Kenya 
join its neighbour 
to form the East 
African Common 
market (Negative) 
- August 2010: 
adoption by refer-
endum of the new 
constitution limit-
ing the power of 
the president and 
decentralising 
power to regions 
0 0 
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(Negative) 
- March 2011: the 
government 
agrees to investi-
gate the illegal 
gold trade preva-
lent in Kenya 
(Negative) 
July 
2011-
June 
2012 
0 0 -March 2012: 
Oil discovery 
in Kenya (Posi-
tive) 
 
0 
 
Source: BBC Online – Country profile 
Table III-1 bring together all events that could have affected corruption 
based on their relationship with the four main causes of corruption selected. Their 
effect could be negative which means it could be seen as a cause of the reduction 
of the prevalence of corruption. It could be also seen as positive in which case this 
will essentially be cause for the increase of the prevalence of corruption. 
The frequency of dealing with public official as a cause of corruption refer 
to any event that will either increase or decrease the need for an individual or a 
firm to face a public official. It could be an event such as the creation of excessive 
or cumbersome regulations. Unfortunately, we did not find any event that could 
be related to such cause of corruption. One explanation could be the fact that such 
type of event because directly affecting only local population will rarely make it 
to international news aware that we collected information from an international 
news website (BBC Online). Another explanation will be to consider that the fre-
quency of dealing with public official could be accounted for by the power of 
government officials. One could consider that because more power to officials 
essentially means more rent available, this will be an accurate measure of the fre-
quency of dealing with public officials. 
The strength of rules and regulations as a cause of corruption refers to any 
related events that will cause or suggest either its increase and as such a “nega-
tive” effect on the prevalence of corruption or its decrease and as such a “posi-
tive” effect on the prevalence of corruption. This category is very important as 
corruption is generally considered in the literature as the lack of strong rule of law 
(see Jain 2011 and Ades and Di-Tella 1997). Hence, events here will be consid-
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ered as strongly having an effect on the prevalence of corruption. We find many 
events related to such cause of corruption.  
The power allocated to government officials see as a cause of corruption 
refers here to any events that will cause or reflect the increase (“positive” effect) 
or decrease (“negative” effect) of the power of officials. Indeed, the power allo-
cated to officials is directed assimilated to the increase or the decrease of rents 
available for those willing to sell them. Hence, events related to the power allo-
cated to government officials could be eventually link to the increase or the de-
crease of the prevalence of corruption. We find some evidence of such events.  
Population and unemployment as a cause of corruption refers to events re-
lated that will participate to or suggest the increase or decrease on this cause of 
corruption. By increasing (decreasing) such cause of corruption one will be in-
creasing (decreasing) the weight on already weak institutions which will have a 
“positive” (“negative”) effect on the prevalence of corruption. The effect of the 
event consider here is appreciated relatively to its effect on the quality institutions 
as weak institutions is considered as a breeding ground for corruption. It could be 
events such as a sudden rise of population or unemployment levels or simply an 
increase of those taking advantage of the public goods for a given period. We find 
only one events related to such cause of corruption.  
For period one that goes from July 2004 to June 2005, we found two 
events strongly indicating the regression of the prevalence of corruption and one 
event suggesting its increase (Table III-1). Those events are the completion of a 
new draft of the constitution and the resignation of a high public figure on ground 
of corruption on one side and the failure to actually pass that new constitution on 
time on the other. Such failure to enact the constitution on time mitigates the re-
solve of the apparent determination of the move toward better rules and regula-
tions. 
For period two that goes from July 2005 to June 2006, a modified draft of 
the constitution giving more power to the president approved by the parliament is 
then rejected by referendum. In addition, we have strong signal of the improve-
ment of the rule of law in the form of the resignation of the finance minister fol-
lowing a corruption scandal despite a potential increase of rent seeking as the re-
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sult of the signature of oil contract with China. Hence, this depicts an overall im-
provement of rule and regulation in a context where more rents are available. 
In period three that goes from July 2006 to June 2007, we only have the 
increase weight on weak institutions due to the arrival of Somali refugee in Ken-
ya. This could potentially increase the prevalence of corruption due to the erosion 
of the quality of institutions. 
 For period four that goes from July 2007 to June 2008, the post electoral 
violence suggests a clear context of weak institutions leading to the prevalence of 
corruption. 
In the period five that goes from July 2008 to June 2009, we register no 
event related to our selected causes of corruption. 
For period six that goes from July 2009 to June 2010, the decision to co-
operate with the International Criminal Court in the matter of the post electoral 
violence suggests an improvement of the quality of the rule of law. However, with 
the limitation of available rent following the suspension of the US funding be-
cause of fraud allegations despite the continue support of alleged corrupt minister 
by the president on the other the picture is less clear.  
For period seven that goes from July 2010 to June 2011, events gathered 
clearly point toward the improvement of the quality of the rule of law. These are 
the integration the East African Common market, the adoption of the new consti-
tution limiting the power of the president and agreement to investigate the illegal 
trade of gold. It is a clear sign of a move toward better governance which will 
limit the prevalence of corruption. 
At last for period eight that goes from July 2011 to June 2012, the discov-
ery of oil reserves in the country suggests an increase of rent available to official 
that could potentially foster corruption.  
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Section 4. The transformation of the data 
Our aim is to transform micro-evidence of corruption into macro ones 
while accounting for the effect of the perception of corruption. Focussing on the 
case of Kenya we have perception indexes from the WB, the AFDB, Global 
Integrity and TI but also data on the incidence of corruption in Kenya from the 
EACC. Perception indexes reflect the belief on the level of corruption for this 
country as a whole. Those indexes are macro indicators of the belief on the 
prevalence of corruption. However, the dataset on the incidence of corruption list 
cases of corruption detected over time. Those cases represent evidences of 
corruption at a micro-level as each of these cases will just be a composite of the 
bigger picture of the prevalence of corruption in Kenya. This is why we need to 
aggregate these micro-evidences of the incidence of corruption in a way that will 
give us the big picture of corruption at the level of the country before proceeding 
to any analysis. 
The easiest way to aggregate micro-evidences of the incidence of 
corruption could have been to use a weighted average. By using data on the 
incidence of corruption classify by type of individual involved, a weighted 
average will be use to give more importance to case of corruption achieved by 
high ranking official. However, one will have to decide whether to average the 
number of case by type of official or the amount involved. On one hand, 
averaging the number of case found give us no indications as to what the result 
found actually means in the light of the impossibility to compare it to the 
perception of corruption and the lack of similar data for other countries. On the 
other hand, averaging the amount of money stolen still give us no information as 
the result is meaningless and the amount themselves being already representative 
of the type of individual involved (this is based on the hypothesis that the amount 
of money capture is function of one position in the society as prior to capturing it 
one will need to have access to it). Hence, any attempt to aggregate those micro-
evidences will not be useful for our analysis. 
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Unable to aggregate those micro-evidences of the incidence of corruption 
in a way that will be help for our analysis we extract from it the individual 
propensity to be corrupt. In fact while the amount of case of corruption per type of 
individual or the amount of money capture per type of individual is meaningless, 
the propensity to be corrupt per type of individual is a lot more useful as it tells us 
how far individual are willing to be corrupt just like a an individual perception of 
corruption. Indeed, perception indexes of corruption are actually the perception of 
the propensity to be corrupt for the country as a whole. Individual answering 
surveys on perception indexes are ultimately just giving their belief on the 
probability corruption in the country in question. 
The individual propensity to be corrupt is measure as the quotient of the 
amount that the individual captures to the average of the amount captured by 
individuals from the same type. The underlined assumption here is that 
individuals capturing as much as the average of their type are considered as fully 
corrupt (the propensity to be corrupt is 1). The average per type considers here is 
the average from all the individuals from the same type across the years in the 
light of the small size of the dataset. This method will not allow us to account for 
the current value of amount embezzled in the past but again the density and the 
size of the dataset limit our options. 
Individual propensity to be corrupt could then be aggregate per type and 
per year using a simple average method and the result will be weighted to form 
the overall yearly propensity to be corrupt. The individual propensity to be corrupt 
for individual from the same type will form a yearly propensity for corruption for 
this type of individual while average per type and year. All four propensities to be 
corrupt (aware that we have four types of individuals) will be aggregated each 
year using a weighted average method. The use of a weighted average method at 
this point reflect the fact that each type will affect the overall level of corruption 
differently in the light of their different access to rent or their different power of 
office. In this extend one can see that the effect of corruption perpetrated by a 
minister or any other political elite will potentially be more harmful and attract 
more attention than corruption perpetrated by a police officer. 
So far we build our index of the prevalence of corruption by only using the 
propensity to be corrupt of individual extracted from the dataset on the incidence 
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of corruption. However, the reliability of the dataset will be function of its ability 
to detect cases of corruption which in turn will be function of the institutional 
framework allowing that to happen. This means that to attempt to account for the 
full extent of the prevalence of corruption one should use the quality of 
institutions to account for the potential loss due to the inability to detect. This is 
the reason why we use the agent based model of Chakrabarti (2002) to transform 
our individual propensity to be corrupt understood as individual level of 
dishonesty into a societal corruption index. 
1. The Model 
 Chakrabarti (2002) builds an agent based model of corruption to 
understand the way in which corruption evolves, the effect of the initial level of 
corruption to its overall level on the long run and the effect of socio-economic 
parameters on corruption. The agent based model is an attempt to bridge the gap 
between on one side an individual approach to the problem of corruption and a 
country level approach on the other. He suggests that the country level of 
corruption or societal corruption is the result of individual choice of his/her level 
of corruption or level of dishonesty that will optimise his/her aversion to risk and 
endowment in human capital. Further, Chakrabarti (2002) using heterogeneous 
agents and an overlapping generation model simulate the evolution of an economy 
to study corruption. 
a) Modelling corruption at different levels 
(1) At the level of individuals 
 For ki the endowment in human capital of individual i, ŷi the expected 
income level of individual i, Ө𝑦
2  the variance of ŷ and bi the degree of aversion 
toward risk of the individual i; 
 The individual utility function ui is therefore: 
𝑢𝑖 = ŷ𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖Ө𝑦
2  
Equation III-1 
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(2) At a country level: 
 We have two main input; K the individual input or simple sum of 
individual human capital and S the societal input or institutional set-up enabling 
the production process. Chakrabarti characterises S as externalities that makes the 
economy greater than the sum of its parts. Hence, for Y the total production of the 
economy we have: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑆𝐾 
Equation III-2 
 However, S will be a function of K as the increase of human capital will 
also improve the ability of individual to create better institutions. Therefore, we 
have: 
𝛼 =
𝑆
𝐾
 ⟹ 𝑌 = 𝛼𝐾2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 
Equation III-3 
(3) At a joint micro-macro level: 
For pi is the level of dishonesty of the individual i and q the societal corruption 
index: 
𝑞 =
1
𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 
 The societal corruption is present as the sum of the relative human 
capital of each individual weighted by their level of dishonesty. Here the 
individual level of human capital of an agent will determine his/her economic 
power which in turn determines his decisional or discretionary power that could 
be assimilated to the level of rent available to him/her. Indeed, it is the power that 
comes with one’s position or responsibilities within the state that is use to 
leverage rents. However, Chakrabarti here presents societal corruption as the sum 
of individual level of dishonesty that is aggregate with the relative human capital 
of each individual leaving aside a major component that is the quality of 
institutions.  
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 Indeed, although the social input that are institutions are take into 
account through the effect of K on S, this could not account for the fact that bad 
institutions are now accepted as the main driver of corruption. Ades and Di-Tella 
(1997), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) and Rose Ackerman (1975) all insist on the 
institutional framework as the main cause of corruption. Further, the social input 
sees here as the quality of institutions will not only affect the societal corruption 
index through its effect on the human capital but also directly through its effect on 
the ability to detect cases of corruption. As we mention earlier the ability for the 
relevant agency to detect cases of corruption will depend on the institutional 
framework allowing it to operate smoothly. In the case of Cameroon for example 
we saw that despite being created in 2006, it was only in 2008 the member of the 
NACC were appointed, this suggests that the quality of the NACC as an 
institution (see here as it ability to effectively operate) could be seen as one of the 
reason why cases of corruption detected go as far as 2008 (see Appendix 2). This 
is why we suggest that the social capital should be added as a mark-up factor as 
ceteris paribus its will negatively affect the societal level of corruption. Hence, we 
will express the relationship between societal corruption and individual level of 
dishonesty as:  
𝑞 =
1
𝑆𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 =
𝛼
𝑆2
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖  
Equation III-4 
 
 This means that given a constant level of individual level of dishonesty, 
the societal corruption will increase with the relative human capital of the 
individual but decrease with the social input or quality of institutions which is 
conform to the literature on corruption. Indeed, high ranking official are involve 
with political corruption which has a worse effect on the economy than 
bureaucratic corruption and weak institutions are seen as the main cause of 
corruption. In addition, we are using the perception of the quality of institutions to 
account for the inability of institutions to detect all cases of corruption. 
 Both p and q have their range between 0 and 1 with 0 corresponding to a 
totally honest individual or an absence of corruption in a country and 1 
corresponding to a totally dishonest individual or a completely corrupt country. A 
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totally honest individual refers to one who does not take advantage of the rent 
available to him and a corrupt free country will refer to one in which the total 
output function remain :  
𝑌 = 𝑆𝐾 
A totally dishonest individual will be the one whom captures the full amount of 
rent available to him and a completely corrupt country will be the one in which 
the effective production is zero as the full amount of the total output is absorb by 
corruption. 
 Consequently, taking into account the presence of corruption, the total 
production function become: 
𝑌 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝐾 
Equation III-5 
 At this point Chakrabarti highlight two main effects of corruption: 
 The Output Reducing effect as he claims that corruption will reduce the 
total output through its negative effect on the social input aware that the 
social input is the externality that makes the economy greater than the 
sum of its part. This could be judge constraining as corruption will not 
only affect institutions ( the social input S) but also the use of the human 
capital (the individual input K) as the decay of institutions will  limit the 
access to human capital and as such reduce the overall human  capital. In 
other words corruption will affect the productivity of the economy 
through mainly its effect on institutions (social capital) but also on the 
reproduction of human capital. 
 The Output Distributive effect is the idea that corruption extorts a 
proportion q of the total output while a proportion (1 - q) becomes the 
new total output available to all the individual in the society. This could 
be seen as the next step of the previous effect as here the new total 
output following the output reducing effect will be further divided. 
Corrupt individuals are expected to gain more than the rest of the society 
as in addition to their regular share of the reduced new total output ((1-
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q)Y), they will also have a share of the "corruption pie" qY which is a 
proportion of the reduce new total output 3. 
b) Risk associated with corruption 
 For 𝑦𝑐
𝑖 the income of a completely dishonest individual i ( 𝑝𝑖 = 1), 𝑦𝑐
𝑖 
have the following characteristics: 
 It is assumed to be randomly distributed following a normal distribution. 
 The mean of the normal distribution of 𝑦𝑐
𝑖 is likely to be positively 
related to the human capital endowment (𝑘𝑖) of the individual i. 
 It is positively related to the size of the corruption pie qY. 
 It is negatively related to the human capital weighted cumulative efforts 
of the other contenders ∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖. This for a very large population could be 
approximated to qK. 
 We will disagree with Chakrabarti on the last characteristic as we 
suggest that for a large enough population: 
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 ≃ 𝐾. 
 The reason is that by assuming ∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 ≃ 𝑞𝐾 Chakrabarti suggests that 
the income of the corrupt individual i will be negatively related to the human 
capital of (only) corrupt individual relative to the human capital of the individual 
i. However, the access to rent that is determined by the level of human capital of 
an individual will be the same whether or not the individual in question decides 
later on to capture those rents (be corrupt or not). In other words, a corrupt 
minister and a not corrupt one (ceteris paribus) should both have access to the 
same power of office (or same level of rent) as their power of office (access to 
rent) is not function of their level of dishonesty but their social capital (such as 
level of education). As result the income of the corrupt official should be 
negatively related to the level of the human capital of the rest of the population 
relative to his/her human capital  as his/her access to rent will depend on his/her 
                                                          
3 It is similar to assimilating the societal corruption to an additional tax. However, it is widely 
accepted now in the literature that corruption is more insidious that a simple tax. This is 
accounted for by the double effect of corruption as it first reduce the output and then reduce it 
again by distributing it unequally. 
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relative human capital (relative to the society as a whole)4. This means that under 
the assumption that one’s status in the society is function of his/her level of 
education (see here as human capital), the level of education of the rest of the 
population relative to the corrupt individual will negatively affect his/her overall 
income as this will determine how much he/she can capture5. 
 The risk associated with corruption will be measure by the variance of 
the distribution of 𝑦𝑐
𝑖 and this will be a function of: 
 The level of effective social capital (1-q)S (positive) 
 The proportion of national income devoted to the fight against 
corruption γ(positive) 
 The increase of the human capital of the individual 𝑘𝑖 (positive) 
Hence the income of a totally dishonest individual will be: 
𝑦𝑐
𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(
𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖
𝑞𝑌, 𝛾𝑘𝑖 (1 − 𝑞)𝑆) ⟺  𝑦𝑐
𝑖~𝑁(𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑘𝑖, 𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆)6 
Equation III-6 
 
With ∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 = 𝐾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞𝑌 =  𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆𝐾  
 Interestingly here both the risk (𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆) and the return (𝑞𝑆𝑘𝑖) 
from corruption increase with the quality of institutional set up (S) which is 
similar to the literature on corruption as there is an emphasis on the importance of 
institutions. 
                                                          
4 Posing ∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 ≃ 𝐾 and aware that 𝑞 =
1
𝑆𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖  we have then 𝑞 =
1
𝑆
. Despite being an extreme 
case, assuming that the societal corruption will be proportional to the inverse of the quality of 
institutions is not far from the reality especially if we consider that this relationship should be 
strictly true for country with a large population such as India, Russia or China. 
5 By assuming the absence of corruption in the repartition of the power of office with instead an 
honest repartition based on the level of human capital we limit the scope of this model. Indeed, 
one can easily point out that the presence of corruption will not be limited to the capture of the 
available rent where one stand but could also be included in the fight for the positions with the 
higher power of office. However, our assumption make the model realistic enough as we pose 
that the income of a corrupt individual i will be negatively affected by the human capital of all the 
other individuals relative to the human capital of the individual i but not just the corrupt ones. 
6 For Chakrabarti, 𝑦𝑐
𝑖 ∼ 𝑁 (
𝑘𝑖
𝑞𝐾
𝑞𝑌, 𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆) ⟺  𝑦𝑐
𝑖~𝑁(𝑆𝑘𝑖, 𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆) as he 
assume that ∑ 𝑝𝑖 𝑘𝑖 ≃ 𝑞𝐾 in addition to considering that 𝑌 = 𝑆𝐾 despite being in the 
presence of corruption. 
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c) Choice of the level of dishonesty pi 
 The individual choosing his level of dishonesty pi within the range 0 to 1 
is effectively choosing a type of asset that vary from an honest activity which is a 
risk-free asset ((1 - q)S ki) to a fully corrupt activity that is risky (qSki). Such 
choice will depend on the distribution of ŷ𝑖 and the risk aversion level of the 
individual bi. In other words the individual will choose a level of dishonesty that 
maximise his utility function. 
According to Chakrabarti this give then: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑞)((1 − 𝑞)𝑆)𝑘𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖((1 − 𝑞)𝑆) − 𝑏𝑖[𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑝𝑖]
2 
Further assuming that the individual does not cares about his effect on the societal 
corruption: 
𝑝𝑖 =
1
2𝑏𝑖𝛾2𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆
 
 We will disagree again with Chakrabarti here. The function pi set to be 
maximise is compose of three elements: the normal income of all agent as a share 
of the new total income following corruption((1 − 𝑞)((1 − 𝑞)𝑆)𝑘𝑖) , the surplus 
that only corrupt individual receive as a share of the corruption pie 𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖((1 −
𝑞)𝑆) and the cost of the activity choose due to the potential exposure to risk 
𝑏𝑖[𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑝𝑖]
2. 
 Looking at the first term, Chakrabarti is suggesting that corruption is 
affecting the society through two effects: the output reducing effect which in fact 
decreases the productivity and an output distributive effect which captures a share 
of the new reduce production output to constitute the corruption pie. Hence, 
although the new total output of is (1 - q)SK for the society and (1 - q)S ki for the 
individual only (1 - q)((1 - q) S K) will be share amongst all the individual 
independently of their dishonesty level just like Chakrabarti point out. 
 However with the second term that is the return from corruption, we 
presented earlier that it is 
𝑘𝑖
𝐾
𝑞𝑌 (instead of 
𝑘𝑖
𝑞𝐾
𝑞𝑌 ) and aware that the corruption 
pie is 𝑞𝑌 =  𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆𝐾, the return from corruption for all individual will be: 
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𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝑖
𝐾
𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆𝐾 =  𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆. Chakrabarti obtains  𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖((1 −  𝑞)𝑆) as he 
considers that the return from corruption is 
𝑘𝑖
𝑞𝐾
𝑞𝑌 instead. Once again this brings 
us back to the understanding that corruption will not only be affected by the 
quality of institution through its effect on human capital but also directly as the 
decreasing (increasing) quality of institution will be a mark-up (discount) factor 
for the societal corruption (Hence 𝑞 =
1
𝑆𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 instead of 𝑞 =
1
𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖). 
 The third term which represents the cost of the activity chosen relative to 
the exposure to risk is simply the risk aversion level of the individual bi multiply 
by the square of the risk which gives 𝑏𝑖[𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑝𝑖]
2 just like Chakrabarti 
suggests. 
 Therefore, we suggest that pi will be chosen so that it maximises the 
function: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑞)((1 − 𝑞)𝑆)𝑘𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖𝑞((1 − 𝑞)𝑆)𝑘𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖[𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑝𝑖]
2 
Equation III-7 
 At this point, Chakrabarti assumes that individuals will not care about 
their effect on the societal corruption while attempting to solve the maximisation 
problem. We will not make this assumption. We will instead differentiate the 
function as it is easy to find the solution. 
For 𝑓(𝑝𝑖)  =  (1 −  𝑞)((1 −  𝑞)𝑆)𝑘𝑖  +  𝑝𝑖 𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆𝑘𝑖  −  𝑏𝑖[𝛾𝑘𝑖(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑝𝑖]
2  
𝑑𝑓(𝑝𝑖)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
 =  𝑞( 1 −  𝑞)𝑆𝑘𝑖  −  2 𝑏𝑖𝛾
2𝑘𝑖
2(1 −  𝑞)2𝑆2𝑝𝑖 
By posing we obtain: 
𝑑𝑓(𝑝𝑖)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
 = 0 we obtain: 
𝑝𝑖 =  𝑘𝑖
𝑞(1 −  𝑞)𝑆
2 𝑏𝑖𝛾2𝑘𝑖
2(1 −  𝑞)2𝑆2
 ⟺ 𝑝𝑖  =
𝑞
2𝑏𝑖𝛾2(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑘𝑖
 
Equation III-8 
 This means that the level of dishonesty of an individual will increase 
with the societal corruption and decrease with both his own aversion to risk and 
the proportion of national income devoted to the fight against corruption. 
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𝑝𝑖  =
𝑞
2𝑏𝑖𝛾2(1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑘𝑖
⟺ 𝑞 =
2𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑖γ
2Sk𝑖
1 + 2𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑖γ2Sk𝑖
 
 That is q is an function such as 𝑦 =
𝑥
1+𝑥
 where the lim
𝑥→∞
𝑦 = 1 and for 
𝑥 = 1 ⇒ 𝑦 = .5. In addition, aware that 𝑥 = 2𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑖γ
2Sk𝑖 < 1𝑝𝑖, 𝑏𝑖, 𝛾, 𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝑖 ∈
[0,1], y will never be higher than .5. As result such approximation cannot be use 
as an index of the incidence of corruption since we consider that 𝑞 ∈ [0,1].  
 We will therefore only use Equation III-4 for our transformations. 
Chakrabarti extends his work to a multiple period model using an 
overlapping generation’s model as he primarily studies the evolution of 
corruption. We will not go that far as we aim to propose an index of the incidence 
of corruption at a macro-level accounting for the perception of corruption and that 
could be directly compare to perception indexes. Hence we will use the model just 
to transform micro data on the incidence of corruption into country level data. 
2. Presentation of the dataset before transformations 
 As mention earlier we will use two types of data in this research: data 
relative to the perception of corruption that are various perception indexes on the 
prevalence of corruption at countries levels and data relatives to the incidence of 
corruption that are reports on actual cases of corruption obtained from state 
agencies responsible for the fight against corruption. 
 The data on the perception of corruption have been provided by the 
African Development Bank (AFDB). They brought together all the majors 
perception indexes of corruption in addition to their own CPIA. Here we will 
mainly use the AFDB CPIA and AFBD GR, the World Bank CPIA and GR (IRAI 
and IRAI GR), the Global Integrity Index (GII) and the Transparency 
International Index (CPI). 
 The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index produces 
by the AFDB measures various aspects that will affect corruption. The AFDB 
uses available surveys to create a benchmark per type of country and then adjust it 
over the years based on macroeconomics indicators and other indicators such as 
the quality of social and economic policies. It is divided into three clusters that are 
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economic management, structural policies and policies for social inclusion and 
equity. Governance Rating indicators (GR) focuses on quality of institutions that 
is a proxy for the quality of governance. It is divided into sub cluster that are: 
Property rights and rule based governance, quality of budgetary and financial 
management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration 
and transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector. The rating of 
those two indexes has a range going from 1 suggesting that the aspect measure has 
been very weak for two years or more to 6 suggesting that the aspect measure has 
been very strong for three years or more. 
 The World Bank Resources Allocation Indexes that are IRAI and IRAI 
GR are similar to the AFDB indicators as the IRAI is divided into three clusters 
similar to the one presented for the AFDB CPIA and the IRAI GR focuses on the 
quality of governance. In addition, IRAI and IRAI GR indexes have a range from 
1 corresponding to a very weak performance to 6 corresponding to a very strong 
performance. The main difference between those two types of indicators is the 
fact that while the first one is provided by the AFDB, the second one is provide by 
the World Bank as result the first one is more appropriate for African economies 
as it is focus on them while the second is a worldwide indicator. 
 The Global Integrity Index (GII) is produce by the Global Integrity an 
independent provider of information relative to governance around the world. The 
GII provide an "empirical on-the-ground research" done by local expert on both 
governance and corruption (see GII 2013). Here, data are collected first hand and 
adjusted with the help of local experts. In addition, the GII index is a percentage. 
It indicates a very weak aspect for score below 60, a weak aspect for score above 
60, a moderate aspect for score above 70, a strong aspect for score above 80 and a 
very strong aspect for score above 90. 
 Transparency International produces the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) which is essentially an aggregate of all the majors’ indicators available. The 
aggregation is weighted based on the reputation of the indicators and the 
indicators included will vary over the years. The final score is on a scale 0-100 
where 0 characterises countries highly corrupt and 100 characterises country very 
clean. We present in Appendix 3 a summary of the data on the perception of 
corruption use for our analysis. 
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 Data relative to the incidence of corruption are the result of yearly 
reports issued by states organisations responsible for the fight against corruption. 
In the case of Kenya the Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) - former 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission - is the agency responsible for the yearly 
release of those documents since 2003. Their reports include six main 
classifications of corrupt acts. First corruption is classify according to the type of 
practices that are: civil issues, bribery embezzlement, abuse of office, criminal 
offence, fraud, public procurement irregularities, administrative issues, labour 
issues and other issues. 
 Second, there is the classification of corruption following the type of 
individual involved such as top level officials, senior officials, middle level 
officials and low level officials. They include in the category top level officials 
ministers, assistant minister and political elite. Senior public officials refer to 
permanent secretaries, accounting officers and chief executive officers. The 
category middle level officers include inspectors and procurement officers. Low 
level personnel refers to chief, assistant chief and clerks. It is worth mentioning 
that for the first and second classification we only have the percentage of 
complaints relative to each category with no further details. 
 Third, there are the completed and on-going investigations of cases of 
corruption. This classification give details regarding the amounts and in some 
cases institutions and individuals involved. 
 Fourth, there are cases of corruption before the court. This category 
summarises the case in front of the court for the period observed.  
 Fifth, the completed and on-going cases of assets tracing investigations 
category presents case of corruption relative to misappropriation of assets such as 
land or cash in addition to the case of individual not able to justify the provenance 
of their assets.  
 At last the sixth category present averted losses as the result of the work 
of the EACC. This classification just like the others at the exception of the first 
and the second one, provide details relative to the amount per case found and 
sometime the name of individuals and/or institutions involved. 
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 Out of the nine reports produced by the EACC so far, we will be using 
the eight covering the following period: July 2004- June 2005, July 2005- June 
2006, July 2006- June 2007, July 2007- June 2008, July 2008- June 2009, July 
2009- June 2010, July 2010- June 2011 and July 2011- June 2012. In addition, we 
did rearrange all those data into one big dataset showing each corrupt case per 
year, amount involved and type of official involved. We present in Appendix 4 a 
sample of our aggregation of the dataset on the incidence of corruption in Kenya 
based on the report by the EACC. 
 Further, we also use data from the Kenya Ministry of Finance relative to 
budget of the country in the aim to assess the percentage of the government fund 
allocated to the fight against corruption. 
3. Presentation of the transformation process 
 Our objective is to be able to compare the perception of corruption to its 
actual incidence looking for any relationship between those two variables. 
However, while for the perception of corruption we have a range of country level 
measures of corruption, for the incidence of corruption we only have micro data 
highlighting cases of corrupt practices detected in Kenya. This is the reason why 
we will use a modified version of the Chakrabarti agent based model of corruption 
to convert the micro data we have into a country level measure of corruption. 
 We will use Equation III-4 to compute a societal measure of corruption. 
Equation III-4 characterises societal corruption as the result of the sum of the 
relative human capital of each individual weighted by their individual level of 
dishonesty which will be divided by the level of social input or quality of 
institutions within the society.  
 The Equation III-4 is as follow: 
𝑞 =
1
𝑆𝐾
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 =
𝛼
𝑆2
∑𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑖 
𝑘𝑖 is the individual level of human capital,𝑝𝑖 is the individual degree of 
dishonesty, K is the individual input in the process of production or simply the 
sum of individual human capital 𝑘𝑖, S is the social input or quality of institutions 
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that complete the process of production and q is societal level of corruption that 
we are attempting to compute. 
 The human capital is used here to determinate the level of rent that each 
individual will have access to. It represents not only the level of education but 
include also all the relationships and network that one might use to get in a 
position of power. However, we will simplify our model by assuming that we 
only have four level of human capital within the society following the 
categorisation of the type of corrupt official as done by the EACC in their report. 
We will thus have: Top level officials, senior public officials, Middle level 
officers and low level personnel. Top level officials will be refers to as 𝑘1, Senior 
public official as 𝑘2, Middle level officers as 𝑘3and low level personnel as 𝑘4.  
 Aware that each type of official have access to a different level of rent 
and assuming that the total individual input K is equal to 1 we will distribute the 
access to rent amongst officials as follow: 𝑘1 = 0.5, 𝑘2 = 0.35, 𝑘3 = 0.10, 𝑘4 =
0.05 and 𝐾 = 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 + 𝑘3 + 𝑘4 = 1. By designing the access to rent of group of 
official as such we are suggesting that the higher an individual is in the society to 
more rents he/she can extract. 
 The individual level of dishonesty is the main component of our 
equation and we will use the amount of money captured by the individual as a 
proxy. However, the level of dishonesty should be about the percentage of the rent 
available that the individual is extracting. As result we will have to define the 
level of rent available per type of corrupt official (?̅?𝑗) and then compute the 
individual level of dishonesty as the percentage of this level of rent that the 
individual extracted (𝑝𝑗
𝑖)7. In addition,?̅?𝑗 will be compute as the average of all the 
corrupt case detected over the year per category of corrupt official with all the 
case with amounts above the average corresponding to a fully corrupt official 
(𝑝𝑗
𝑖 = 1). Following that we will generate the annual average weighted sum of 
human capital per type of individual and then bring the four results together to 
form the annual overall weighted sum of human capital ∑𝑝𝑗
𝑖𝑘𝑗 . 
                                                          
7 Here the notation slightly changes as it become 𝑝𝑗
𝑖  instead of 𝑝𝑖  with j representing the type of 
official to which the individual i belongs to. 
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 The social input or quality of institutions S will be proxy by a range of 
perception index on the quality of institutions in Kenya. The reason is that 
individual will choose their level of dishonesty based on their own perception of 
societal corruption amongst other things. This individual perception of societal 
corruption will be informed in general by media and popular opinions regarding 
the quality of governance and the spread of corruption which is now heavily 
affected by the widespread of perception indexes. Hence, we suggest here that 
those perception indexes will inform individual on the quality of institutions 
within the country.  Effectively S will be in percentage the rank of the country 
relative to the range of the index, this percentage will be rescale to fit the range 0-
1 representing the increasing good quality of institutions. 
Consequently for the transformation we will have: 
𝑞𝑡1 =
1
𝑆
∑𝑝𝑗
𝑖𝑘𝑗  𝑎𝑠 𝐾 = 1 
Equation III-9 
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4. Results of the transformation of the data 
 
Figure III-1 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
 
Notes: 
Using majors perceptions indexes as provided by the African Development 
Bank and accounting for the real incidence of corruption using corrupt acts 
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detected as reported by the Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of 
Kenya we put together our indexes of the prevalence of corruption that are 
mpk, q_Safdb, q_Swb and q_Sgii 
The majors’ perception indexes of corruption in Kenya used are afdb_ind, 
irai_ind, gii_ind and ti_ind. They have been rescaled to fit the range 0 to 1. 
 mpk is the yearly average of individual weighted propensity for 
corruption, as such it is the index of the prevalence of corruption while 
accounting exclusively on detected cases of corruption. 
q_Safdb, q_Swb, q_Sgii are our indexes of the prevalence of corruption 
majored by respectively Afdb, Wb and Gii perception of the quality of 
institutions following Equation III-9. They actually reflect how the 
perception of the quality of institutions by those respective agencies will 
affect mpk. 
Looking at subjective indicators of corruption that are perception indexes 
such as the AFDB index (afdb_ind), the WB index (irai_ind), the GII index 
(gii_ind) and the TI index (ti_ind) and at our indexes of the actual prevalence of 
corruption based on cases of corruption detected (mpk, q_Safdb, q_Swb and 
q_Sgii), it is clear that there is a divide between the perception of corruption and 
its actual incidence. Perception indexes are not only flatter but also lower than 
their corresponding indexes of the actual prevalence of corruption. Here lies the 
novelty of our work as in the aim to circumvent the limitations of perception 
indexes and improve upon the literature we use data accounting for actual 
detected cases of corruption. Aside from concerns over the ability to detect cases 
of corruption that lead us to the inclusion of the perception of corruption in our 
estimation (as discuss in  section 4- 1), this data is an accurate indicator of how 
spread corruption is in a given country. At last the inclusion of perception indexes 
as proxies to account for the effect of the perception of corruption on its incidence 
and also the potential inability to detect some cases of corruption, improve the 
quality of our indicators making it stands as actual indexes of the prevalence of 
corruption. 
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Section 5. Analysis 
 
1. Description of the trend of the indexes of societal 
corruption 
 
Figure III-2 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
 
The average of weighted individual propensity to corruption that is mpk 
decreases on overall for the period observed (see Figure III-2). Within this period 
it reaches its peak in the period July 2005 – June 2006 and its base in the period 
July 2010 – June 2011. At last, from the period July 2006 to June 2007 mpk is 
lower than all the perception indexes suggesting less incidence of corruption than 
it is perceived (see Figure III-2). 
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Figure III-3 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
Figure III-3 represents our index of the prevalence of corruption using the 
quality of institution as suggested by the GII index (q_Sgii) and the GII 
perception index of corruption (gii_ind). Figure III-4 and Figure III-5  do the 
same for respectively Afdb and the Wb. It is the case that in all the case our index 
of the prevalence of corruption is higher and curvier than it respective perception 
of corruption (the perception index use to account for the quality of institution). 
Our indices depict a higher prevalence of corruption on overall as compare 
to their respective perception indices (see Figure III-3, Figure III-4 and Figure 
III-5). In fact, the index representing the marginal propensity for corruption of the 
society (mpk) that is an index of the prevalence of corruption while accounting 
exclusively for the actual incidence of corruption is always lower than our other 
indices of the prevalence of corruption and also lower than all the perception 
indices used by July 2006 (seeFigure III-2). It is only when we use perception 
indices to account for potential flaws of the dataset that our indices of the 
prevalence of corruption (q_Sgii, q_Safdb and q_Swb) rise above the perception 
indices level. One explanation is to consider that such leap can illustrate the effect 
of the perception of corruption on its actual incidence. Our indexes clearly capture 
such effect aware that the hierarchy (as suggested by the overall level of the 
index) between the perception indices used is the same for our respective indices 
of the prevalence of corruption as from low to high we have q_Sgii, q_Safdb and 
q_Swb (see Figure III-2). The other explanation will be to simply continue with 
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the assumption that our indexes of the prevalence of corruption (and not the 
marginal propensity for corruption) depict the actual level corruption as our 
dataset fail to account for all the case of corruption. 
Our indices of the prevalence of corruption are also changing a lot more 
overtime than perception indices. Indeed, our perception indices are made out of 
micro-evidence of the prevalence of corruption which means that they are sensible 
to short term change in the prevalence of corruption unlike perception indexes 
which resulting from surveys are less quantitative. Hence, our indices are more 
appropriate to account for the short term evolution of corruption compare to 
perception indices. 
 
Figure III-4 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
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Figure III-5 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
 
The index of the prevalence of corruption using the perception of the 
quality of institutions by GII (q_Sgii) considerably decreases over the period 
observed (see Figure III-3). It reaches its peak in the period July 2005 to June 2006 
and its base in the period July 2010 to June 2011. It also suggests a higher 
prevalence of corruption than all the perception indexes only for the period July 
2005 – June 2006 but for the period July 2007 to June 2010, only the TI index is 
higher. 
The index of the prevalence of corruption using the perception of the 
quality of institutions by AFDB that is q_Safdb slightly decreases over the period 
observed (see Figure III-4). Similarly to q_Sgii it reaches its peak in the period July 
2005 – June 2006 and its base in the period July 2010 – June 2011. This index is 
higher than the AFDB, the WB and the GII perception indexes of corruption 
except during the period July 2010 – June 2011. At last q_Safdb is higher than the 
TI index for the period July 2004 – June 2006. 
The last index produce following equation 4 is q_Swb. It is the index of 
the prevalence of corruption using the perception of the quality of institutions by 
WB. Its overall decrease over the years is the same as q_Safdb (see Figure III-5). It 
reaches its peak in the period July 2005 – June 2006 and its base the following 
period (July 2006 – June 2007). In addition, for the period July 2004 to June 2006 
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and July 2007 to June 2010 this index is the highest and for the period July 2006 
to June 2007 and July 2010 to June 2012 it came second after the TI index. 
2. Distinctive features  
After its peak in the period July 2005 – June 2006, the average weighted 
individual propensity to corruption that is mpk suggests the lowest presence of 
corruption amongst all the indicators (see Figure III-2). That is, by July 2006, all 
the indicators of the perception of corruption in Kenya might have over-estimated 
corruption. However, mpk is highly dependent of the ability to detect cases of 
corruption (also seen as quality of institutions) as it is made of actual detected 
cases. As result, the fact that mpk is lower than all perception indexes (by July 
2006) is a sign that perception index of corruption might actually account for the 
full extent of the incidence of corruption as unburden by the inability to detect 
some case of corruption. It could be also the case that perception indexes instead 
inflate the actual incidence of corruption. 
Moreover, mpk peaks in the period July 2005 – June 2006, rising above all 
but the TI perception index of corruption (see Figure III-2). In addition, looking 
at the perception indexes they do not increase from the previous period to suggest 
an even slightly change in the prevalence of corruption. This means that for the 
period July 2005 to June 2006 it is the case of the high prevalence of the incidence 
of corruption and the inability of perception indexes to detect the increase of 
corruption above a threshold (which will be July 2004 – June 2005 level). One 
could explain the failure of perception indexes to account for this drastic rise of 
the incidence of corruption by considering that as result of the belief in the 
prevalence of corruption perception indexes are less likely to change over a short 
period. Indeed, ceteris paribus people belief in the occurrence of corruption is 
more likely to remain steady from one year to another as only an event that will 
affect the whole sample of respondents could shift it in one way or the other. 
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Figure III-6 
Source: African Development Bank and Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
 
The indexes of the incidence of corruption that are q_Swb, q_Safdb and 
q_Sgii all have a similar pattern over time (seeFigure III-6). The main difference 
is the level of each index which is the result of the effect perception index of the 
quality of governance used. Hence, from the high prevalence of corruption to low 
prevalence of corruption we have q_Swb, q_Safdb and q_Sgii which correspond 
perception of the quality of governance from low to high as the WB index suggest 
the worst rating followed by the AFDB index and the GII index at last. 
Presenting the same pattern over the period observed means that they all 
reach their peak and base at the same time. They all peak in three periods that are: 
July 2005 – June 2006 (peak 1), July 2007 – June 2008 (peak 2), and July 2011 – 
June 2012 (peak 3) (seeFigure III-6). In addition, they all considerably decrease 
in two periods that are July 2006 – June 2007 (base 1) and July 2010 – June 2011 
(base 2). 
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Looking at the peaks, none of them correspond to a definitive increase of 
the perception across all the indicators. With peak 1, none of the perception index 
has change from the previous period. This is unexpected considering the 
magnitude of the increase of the index of the incidence of corruption as they all 
suggest the maximal prevalence of corruption. 
For peak 2, two perception indexes suggest a decrease of corruption, one 
remains steady and the last one increase. Indeed, both AFDB and GII perception 
indexes suggest a decrease of corruption which contradicts all the indexes of the 
incidence of corruption. The WB index remains steady and only the TI index 
seems to follow the index of the incidence of corruption.  
The last peak (peak 3) is only a peak due to the limited availability of the 
dataset (as the incidence of corruption could still be rising after June 2012). 
Nevertheless, the perception of corruption by AFDB and GII confirm the increase 
of the prevalence of corruption as they both increases from the previous period. 
The TI index contradicts such result as it decreases instead of increasing while the 
WB index remains steady. This time the same perception indexes that did 
contradict the results of the index of the incidence of corruption in peak 2, 
confirms it in peak 3. The TI index behaves similarly as it increases with peak 2 
but decreases with peak 3. 
As far as q_Swb and q_Sgii are concerns, the three peaks suggest an 
overall decrease of the incidence of corruption over the whole period as they are 
getting lower over time. In this extent, one could conclude that indexes of the 
incidence of corruption make the case of the reduction corruption over the period 
2004 – 2012 as far as Kenya is concern. 
The existence of the first base (base 1) for all the indexes of the incidence 
of corruption is supported by the perception of corruption following AFDB, WB 
and TI. All three perception indexes suggest a decrease of the prevalence of 
corruption in that period. The fourth perception index (GII) does not change in 
that period which does not support nor contradict the finding of the index of the 
incidence of corruption. 
Base 2 as the second base of indexes of the incidence of corruption is 
supported by none of the perception indexes. Indeed, while the index perception 
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of corruption by AFDB remains the same in that period, all the other increase 
suggesting a rise of corruption which is the opposite of the finding from all the 
indexes of the incidence of corruption. 
Consequently, the index resulting of accounting only detected cases of 
corruption post July 2006 make the case of the perception of corruption as either a 
precise measure of corruption or an overestimated one. Nevertheless, with the 
peak of the prevalence of corruption in the period July 2005-June 2006 it is the 
case of the inability of perception indexes to account for short term change in the 
prevalence of corruption. Further, accounting for the potential effect of the 
perception of corruption on its prevalence to overcome the difficulty to detect 
corruption we obtain three indexes similar in shape as all having three peaks and 
two bases but all at different level highlighting the effect of the perception index 
for the quality of governance used. At the exception of peak three supported by 
the Afdb and Gii perception indexes and base one confirm by all perception 
indexes, the remaining peaks and base are not supported and sometime 
contradicted (see peak one and two) by the evidence from perception indexes of 
corruption.  
 
3. Incidence and perception of corruption looking at the 
key fact of the history of Kenya 
We compare the incidence of corruption to its perception earlier by 
looking at the change of perception indexes in peaks and bases of the incidence of 
corruption. We found out that peaks and bases depicted by our indexes of the 
incidence of corruption (q_Swb, q_Safdb and q_Sgii) are generally not supported 
by the evidence from perception indexes. Now looking back at the event that 
could have affected the prevalence of corruption in Kenya (see Section 3.3Chapter 
III.Section 3.3) we will attempt to assess the accuracy of our indicator of the 
prevalence of corruption compare to perception indexes. 
In peak one (which occurs in period two) none of the perception indexes 
support the considerable rise of the prevalence of corruption suggested by our 
indexes. However, during the same period rules and regulations seems to have 
improved in Kenya despite a clear rise of opportunities for corruption. This means 
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that the sudden rise of the prevalence of corruption could only be explained by a 
punctual rise of the ability to detect cases of corruption which could be explain by 
the improvement of rules and regulations. 
Peak two (which occurs in period four) is contradicted by two perception 
indexes suggesting instead a decrease of corruption. With up to 1.500 death as the 
result of post electoral violence (see Table III-1), there is a clear sign of weak 
institutions. This will justify the increase of the prevalence of corruption aware 
that weak institutions are a breeding ground for corruption. 
The existence of the last peak (peak three) occurring in period eight is 
supported by afdb_ind and gii_ind. The discovery of oil reserve during the same 
period could potentially justify such increase of corruption as it means more rent 
available and potentially more corruption. 
Looking at the bases, base one (which occurs in period three) is supported 
by all perception indexes as they all suggest the decline of corruption in that 
period. However, during the same period there are evidences of an increasing 
weight on institutions that could potentially harm them. Indeed,  the additional 
population taking advantage of the common good that are the Somali refugee 
could have weaken the quality of institutions which will lead the way to more 
opportunities for corruption. This does not seems to have happen as all indicators 
suggested the decline of corruption. 
Base two (which occurs in period seven) is supported by none of the 
perception indexes. There is a clear divide between our index of the prevalence of 
corruption suggesting the decline of corruption and perception indexes such as 
gii_ind and ti_ind suggesting instead a rise of corruption. Nevertheless, events 
such as the integration of a common market and the adoption of a new 
constitution limiting the power of the president are indicators of an improvement 
of governance which will reduce the scope of corruption. 
Our indexes of the prevalence of corruption are supported by perception 
indexes as far as peak three and base one are concern. However, for peak one, 
peak two and base two it is not the case as perception indexes contradict our 
indexes of the prevalence of corruption. The existence of peak one can only be 
explained by considering a punctual rise of the ability to detect corruption which 
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discredit the suggestion of a rise of the prevalence of corruption in that period. 
Peak two and base two are both supported by evidences suggesting respectively a 
clear decline of the quality of institutions and the improvement of the quality of 
governance. Hence, it is the case that our indexes of the prevalence of corruption 
despite being sensible to the ability to detect cases of corruption appears to draw a 
better picture of the evolution of corruption from one year to the other as compare 
to perception indexes in the case of Kenya. 
4. Summary of the findings 
We compute the marginal propensity for corruption of the society as a 
whole (mpk) using average individual propensity for corruption. Using perception 
indexes to account for the effect of the perception of corruption on its prevalence, 
we generate societal indexes of corruption or indexes of the prevalence of 
corruption that are q_Safdb, q_Swb and q_Sgii. We found out that while the 
marginal propensity for corruption is generally lower than perception indexes, it is 
the opposite for our societal indexes of corruption. The leap from the marginal 
propensity for corruption to our societal indexes of corruption could be seen as the 
effect of the perception of corruption on its actual incidence. We also found out 
that compare to perception indexes our societal indexes of the prevalence of 
corruption are far more fluctuating overtime suggesting a higher sensibility to 
short term change in the prevalence of corruption. 
 All three societal indexes of corruption are similar in the sense that their 
evolution over time follows the same pattern with the only difference that each 
suggests a unique level of the prevalence of corruption following the perception of 
the quality of governance as suggest by the perception index use as such effect. 
They all reach their peak in period 2 (peak one), period 4 (peak two) and period 8 
(peak three). They also reach their base all together in period 3 (base one) and 
period 7 (base two). 
The evolution of corruption as depicted by our societal indexes of 
corruption is rarely supported by evidence from perception indexes. Only peak 
three and base one are consistent with the evidences from perception indexes. 
Peak one, peak two and base two are contradicted by the evidences from 
perception indexes. Nevertheless, considering evidences relatives to significant 
events in the history of Kenya that could have affected the prevalence of 
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corruption it is the case that our societal indexes of corruption draw a better 
picture of the evolution of corruption in Kenya despite a clear sensitivity toward 
the ability to detect corruption. 
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Section 6. Conclusion and limits of the analysis 
 
Few countries seem to actually report a comprehensive dataset on the 
actual incidence of corruption mainly due to the difficulty to detect it but also 
because of the lack of willingness to do so. As result perception indexes of 
corruption proliferate as the main option for a viable study of the phenomenon of 
corruption. However, those perception indexes because highly subjective as 
depending on the sample use or the definition use or even the approach take could 
be biased and as such not appropriated for a study of corruption. 
Many authors looked at the relationship between those two types of 
indexes using more and more ingenious ways to achieve it. Sequeina (2012) 
suggests the use of specific wording referring to the incidence of corruption rather 
than its perception especially while using surveys. Ferraz et all (2012) propose to 
fill the gap between dataset as they consider corruption as the missing 
expenditures between two administrative datasets. Mocan (2008) looking at the 
relationship between the incidence of corruption proxy by the prevalence of 
bribery and the perception of corruption proxy by the CPI index find out that the 
perception of corruption measures the quality of institutions rather than its actual 
incidence. Olken (2009) using four different surveys to assess the relationship 
between individual perception of corruption and its actual incidence in a project of 
road construction in India find out that people are not able to perceive some type 
of corruption. 
Our approach is different from all those studies as instead of using proxies 
of the incidence of corruption we use data of its actual incidence. Indeed, here we 
compare perception indexes of corruption to data of the actual case of corruption 
detected as reported by national agencies responsible for the fight against 
corruption. In addition, we are not limited to a specific type of corruption as we 
include all case as reported by anti-corruption agencies. At last, we propose here 
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an effective way to aggregate micro evidences of the incidence of corruption into 
an indicator of the level of societal corruption. 
The perception indexes used are those provide by the AFDB, the WB, the 
GII and TI. The data of the incidence of corruption are issued by the EACC which 
is the institution responsible for the fight against corruption in Kenya. Our focus is 
limited to this country as we hardly found similar comprehensive and usable 
evidences of the actual incidence from another country. Indeed, among all the 
Sub-Saharan African countries publicly releasing data on the incidence of 
corruption we also looked at the case of Cameroon (who provide the second best 
dataset behind Kenya) and found out that its lacks the density, the precision, and 
the size require for an analysis of corruption. 
Having selected the case of corruption in Kenya, the next step was to 
transform micro-evidences of the incidence of corruption into macro data that 
could be compared to the perception of corruption that is only available at macro 
levels. As such focussing on the individual propensity for corruption defined as 
the quotient of the amount captured to the average captured by individuals from 
the same type, we use the Chakrabarti (2002) agent-based model of corruption to 
obtain societal indexes of corruption or indexes of the incidence of corruption. 
Initially build to simulate the long term evolution of corruption in an 
economy, the Chakrabarti model was modify to allow us to convert the individual 
propensity for corruption or individual level of dishonesty into a societal index of 
corruption using the perception of the quality of institutions to account for cases 
where institutions fail to detect corruption. Chakrabarti makes further assumptions 
beyond that point but we demonstrate that they do not hold in for the specificity of 
our work. 
Our transformation gives us three indexes of societal corruption following 
the three perception indexes of the quality of institutions used. Those societal 
indexes of corruption are q_Safdb, q_Swb and q_Sgii and they depict a similar 
pattern of the evolution of the prevalence of corruption in Kenya at different 
levels corresponding to the perception of the quality of institutions used. In 
addition, it is the case that the effect of the perception of corruption on its actual 
incidence can be characterise as the leap between an index of the prevalence of 
corruption accounting only for detected case (the marginal propensity of 
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corruption of the society) and our societal indexes of corruption. It is also the case 
that our societal indexes of corruption are more sensible to short term change in 
the prevalence of corruption compare to perception indexes. 
Considering our societal indexes of corruption and perception indexes it is 
the case that they present different picture of the evolution of corruption in Kenya. 
However, coming back to the keys events of the history of Kenya that will affect 
the prevalence of corruption we found out that even though our societal indexes of 
corruption are sensible to the anti-corruption agency’s ability to detect cases of 
corruption, it is the case that our societal indexes of corruption present a better 
picture of the evolution of corruption in Kenya. 
These results bear similarities to the work of Mocan (2008), Olken (2009) 
and Donchev and Ujhelyi (2011) as its gives evidences of the divergence between 
the actual incidence of corruption and its perception. However, we go beyond that 
as we suggest yet another innovative way to generate an index of the incidence of 
corruption while confirming in the same time the importance of the perception of 
the quality of institutions for corruption. Finally, our index being sensitive to the 
slight change in the incidence of corruption, it could potentially be a better way to 
assess corruption. 
Nevertheless, the availability of data on the actual incidence of corruption 
will limit the production of such type of indexes as suggested by the inability to 
use the dataset of the incidence of corruption in Cameroon. Further, because 
highly function of the ability to detect cases of corruption our result should be 
consider carefully. Indeed, one could consider the size and deep of the yearly 
dataset as the result of the willingness, means and power of the anti-corruption 
agency which cannot be account for. This will hopefully participate to the 
promotion of the necessity of such type of data rather than the reliance on 
perception indexes. 
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Chapter IV. General Conclusion 
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The Economic of corruption proposes a focus on incentives and motives 
while attempting to study the problem of corruption. Defined as the rent seeking 
behaviour of state official that goes against the rule of law and in some case is 
within the law (given that the law no longer express the will of the majority), 
corruption is a motivated choice. State officials motivated by their greed will 
attempt to boost their income through the means of corruption. In addition, the 
main causes of corruption being excessive bureaucracy, the quality of rule and 
regulations, the amount of power allocated to government officials, excessive 
population mainly poor and unemployment, we can see that corruption is all about 
individuals being in a position to extract rent with a minimal risk. It is the case 
that each cause of corruption can be characterised as a means by which official are 
in a position to increase their income through rent seeking. Hence the study of 
corruption will start with the understanding of corruption as a motivated choice. 
If it is true that corrupt individuals are motivated to behave accordingly, it 
will be interesting to figure out how does those incentives come together to lead 
individuals toward corruption. Indeed, the knowledge of the equilibrium in which 
corruption dominates and the context that will foster it tell us little regarding the 
rationale of such behaviour. To this extend, we looked at the rationality of the 
decision to side with corruption and its implication in Chapter II. 
The understanding of the rationality of agents deciding to be corrupt; the 
rationale of their actions and its implications are the focus of Chapter II. With the 
understanding  that the choice of corruption over honesty is the result of motives 
and incentives making the former more rewarding than the later, the question 
become the process or rationale through which thoses incentives come together to 
lead to such result. Such rationale has only been assumed in the literature 
especially while accounting for the behaviour of both sides taking part to the 
corruption game and free to decide what is best for them in the context of the 
game. 
The efficiency of corruption has been established by a wide range of 
studies on corruption (see Beck and Maher 1986, Lien 1986, Lien 1987 and Lien 
1988). This essentially leads the way for the rationality of the decision process for 
those siding with corruption. The literature on the analysis of corruption will also 
promote a methodology for the study of the interactions leading to corruption and 
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the implications of such problem. This methodology consist of using game theory 
for the modelling of problems into a game in which the behaviour of players will 
be assimilated to the one expected from individuals in a real world. 
We aimed at understanding the strategies of both sides taking part to a 
corruption game consisting of a case of bureaucratic corruption. The particularity 
of our study being the focus on the strategies of both sides, the implications of 
those strategies and also the implication of the resulting equilibrium. To this end 
we used a modified version of Macrae (1982) model. Macrae build a model to 
study the rationale of agent deciding to be corrupt in a context of bribery for the 
award of a contract. 
Macrae focus on bribery as he builds a game in which firm will bribe an 
official while competing for a contract that is to be awarded by the official. Here 
the purpose of the bribe is only to increase the expected gain but not the 
probability of winning the contract. In addition, officials are assumed to be 
corrupt and only firms can choose between corruption and honesty. Macrae 
concludes that firm and officials will attempt to cooperate in a way that prohibit 
other firm to do the same as only one bribe will be accepted. However, our 
version of Macrae model will diverge as we model a case of bureaucratic 
corruption in a game where farmers apply for a stamp to officials.  
Although every farmer will eventually receive his/her stamp the difference 
will be how long it will take to get it as a bribe will speed the process. In addition, 
we also consider that both the official and the farmer are free to side with either 
corruption or honesty. The corrupt official will be rewarding the corrupt farmer 
while punishing the honest one. At last, the prevalence of corruption among each 
group will affect the payoff of both group through its effect on the ability to detect 
corrupt individual (which in turn determinate the level of punishment) and its 
effect on the availability of rents to be purchase (as the rent sold by corrupt 
officials will be equally share among corrupt farmer). 
We found out that while the farmer will always side with corruption as 
long as the reward is higher than the cost, an official will be willing to do so even 
when only the bribe receive from a corrupt farmer is higher than the cost of being 
corrupt (the punishment he/she face). Looking at the equilibriums, it is the case 
that whenever corruption exist, the strategy corrupt-corrupt is an equilibrium. 
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There is also a second equilibrium that is the strategy honest-honest and this one 
will always coexist with the corruption equilibrium as it appears only in few cases 
unlike the previous one. It is worth mentioning at this point that the corruption 
equilibrium require a critical mass of honest farmers as the rent sold to corrupt 
farmers is function of the delay caused to honest ones. At last, we confirm the 
findings of Andvig and Moene (1990) following which the gain from corruption is 
increasing with its prevalence as far as the official is concern. However, it is not 
the case while looking at the farmer. 
Prior to analysing the rationale of corruption, we reviewed the mains 
points of the debate of corruption in Chapter I. There we looked at the definition, 
the cause, the effects, the types and the measures of corruption. Considering the 
measure of corruption, the variety of corrupt acts and their illegality make them 
hard to account for. This is why measures of its perception rather than its 
prevalence are generally accepted as indicators of the widespread of corruption. 
Perception indexes are widely spread and used as a reliable source of 
information relative to the prevalence of corruption. There is a wide range of 
indicators published regularly and covering an increasing amount of countries. 
However, they remain perception indexes as they are essentially the result of 
survey of opinion relative to people belief on the level of corruption in a country. 
In this regard they will fail to assess the prevalence of corruption. 
The growing commitment to the fight against corruption comes along with 
an increasing number of country agencies tracking and reporting cases of 
corruption. Those reports are essentially data on the actual incidence of 
corruption. Various studies proposing innovative ways to compare the perception 
and the actual incidence of corruption comes to the conclusion of the divergence 
between perception of corruption and its actual incidence. Hence, we propose in 
Chapter III an index of the actual incidence of corruption out of data on its actual 
incidence and accounting for the effect of its perception. 
We build a new index of the actual prevalence of corruption that could be 
compared to perception indexes. This is done using reports from national agencies 
relative to cases of corruption found as data on the actual incidence of corruption. 
Focussing on the case of Kenya, we have micro evidence of the prevalence of 
corruption from 2004 to 2012. However, perception indexes being at a macro 
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level; we will use a model developed by Chakrabarti to aggregate those micro 
evidences of corruption into a country level index of the prevalence of corruption 
(or societal corruption). 
Chakrabarti model was built to simulate and understand the evolution of 
corruption in the long term. We will use it to aggregate the individual propensity 
for corruption see as the individual percentage of rent capture comparatively to 
the average capture per category into the incidence of corruption for the country 
as a whole while accounting for the effect of the perception of corruption. 
This gives us three indexes of the societal level of corruption each using 
the quality of institutions to account for the effect of the perception of corruption. 
Those new indexes have a similar evolution over time with the only difference 
being the level of corruption depicted. The level of each index reflects the 
difference between the perception of quality of institutions following each 
perception index. However, there is a clear divergence in the evolution of 
corruption in Kenya whether one look at our new indexes or at perception 
indexes. Looking at keys fact of the history of Kenya in an attempt to side with 
one of the indexes, we found out that the societal index of corruption that we put 
together is more accurate than perception indexes while accounting for yearly 
changes of the prevalence of corruption. In addition, this process confirms that the 
quality of institutions can effectively account for the difficulty to detect all cases 
of corruption. 
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Appendices: 
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Appendix 1: Proof 
 
Case of the expected return of the corrupt farmer: 
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=
𝑁𝑑
𝑀𝑥2
(−𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) +
𝑑
𝑁𝑀
(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) 
 
Δ𝑋1
Δ𝑥
= 0 ⟺
𝑁𝑑
𝑀𝑥2
(−𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) +
𝑑
𝑁𝑀
(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) = 0
⟺
𝑁𝑑
𝑀𝑥2
(−𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) = −
𝑑
𝑁𝑀
(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2)
⟺
𝑀𝑥2
𝑁𝑀
(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) = −
𝑁𝑑
𝑑
(−𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2) ⟺ 𝑥
2
= −𝑁2 ∗
(−𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2)
(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2)
⟺ 𝑥2
= 𝑁2 ∗
(𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2 − 𝑦)
(𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2 − 𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1 − 𝑦)
 
Hence, 𝑥 = 𝑁 ∗ √
(𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2−𝑦)
(𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥2−𝑀𝑣𝑝𝑥1−𝑦)
 (aware that 𝑥 ≥ 0. 
As such once again 
Δ𝑋1
Δ𝑥
= 0 has a solution. Consequently the expected gain of the 
farmer 𝐸𝑋1will either have a minimum or a maximum. The case that the preva-
lence of corruption for the farmer will affect the profitability of corruption both 
negatively and positively depending on the value of the surrounding parameters 
such as the prevalence of corruption among official, the value of the boost and the 
level of punishment. 
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Case of the expected return of the corrupt official: 
𝐸𝑌1 =
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
∗ 𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝐹𝑦 (
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑝𝑦2)) 
However 𝐹𝑦 = 𝑤(𝑘𝑑 ∗
𝑁−𝑥
𝑁
+ 𝑐 ∗
𝑥
𝑁
) 
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𝐸𝑌1 =
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑤 (
𝑘𝑑(𝑁 − 𝑥)
𝑥
+
𝑐𝑥
𝑁
) (
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑤 (
𝑘𝑑(𝑁 − 𝑥)
𝑥
+
𝑐𝑥
𝑁
) (
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦1 +
𝑀 − 𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑤 (𝑘𝑑 −
𝑘𝑑𝑥
𝑁
+
𝑐𝑥
𝑁
) (
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑 − 𝑤 (𝑘𝑑 −
𝑘𝑑𝑥
𝑁
+
𝑐𝑥
𝑁
) (
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑦2 −
𝑦
𝑀
𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐
− 𝑤 (
𝑘𝑑𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑘𝑑𝑝𝑦2 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2)
+
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑)𝑝𝑦2))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑
− 𝑤 (
𝑘𝑑𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) + 𝑘𝑑𝑝𝑦2 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2)
+
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑)𝑝𝑦2))
=
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐
− 𝑤 (
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑))
+ 𝑝𝑦2 (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑))))
+
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
(𝑘𝑑
− 𝑤 (
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑))
+ 𝑝𝑦2 (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑)))) 
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∆𝐸𝑌1
∆𝑦
= −
𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑤
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑)) −
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗
𝑤
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑))
= −
𝑤
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
(𝑐 − 𝑘𝑑))
=
𝑤
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦2 − 𝑝𝑦1) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (𝑘𝑑 +
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑐 −
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑘𝑑)
=
𝑤
𝑀
∗ (𝑝𝑦2 − 𝑝𝑦1) ∗
𝑦
𝑀
(𝑝𝑦1 − 𝑝𝑦2) (
𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑐 +
𝑁 − 𝑥
𝑁
∗ 𝑘𝑑) 
Since 𝑝𝑦2 > 𝑝𝑦1, 𝑁 ≥ 𝑥, 𝑤 ∈ [0; ∞], 𝑀 > 0, 𝑁 > 0, 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑘𝑑 > 0 then 
∆𝐸𝑌1
∆𝑦
> 0. In other words, the expected gain of the official is increasing with the 
prevalence of corruption among officials.  
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Appendix 2: Summary of the report by the NACC 
Presentation of the NACC and the various others actor in the fight against corruption: 
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was created in March 2006 by presi-
dential decree. The article 24 alineas 3 and 4 of this decree impose the annual publica-
tion of a report presenting the state of the fight against corruption in the country (p2). 
However it was only in 2008 that the commission start working effectively since it was 
then that the various members were appointed by the presidency of the republic. 
Similarly, the law of the 16 April 2006 create a commission in charge of the declaration 
of wealth (p10). The article 66 of the constitution institutionalizes and organizes the 
duty of declaration of wealth by high public officers of the state. This instance was sup-
pose to assist the NACC in the fight against corruption by reporting cases where the 
wealth of an individual was not explain by its legal and declared income but once again 
the members of this commission are still to be appointed and no one have ever declare 
the extent of his wealth within the country. 
The NACC understand corruption as acts of offering, asking or accepting any kind of gifts 
or advantages carry out by public officers, regular citizen or foreigner for themselves or 
a third part aiming to take advantage of their position (p2-3).  This definition is the short 
version of the large definition of corruption in the criminal law article 134 alineas 1, arti-
cle 134 bis and 312. It is also in the line of the definition of corruption by the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption that the country joint in October 2003 at Merida 
(p13).  The convention assimilates corruption to the following actions: embezzlement, 
the misuse and misappropriation of public funds, the misuse and misappropriation of 
public office and money laundry (p14). 
As one of the major actors in the fight against corruption the NACC is responsible for a 
wide range of missions such as the follow up and evaluation of the implementation of 
the government strategy in this domain, the reception, collection and investigation of 
denunciations, the conduct of studies targeting the causes and the ways out of corrup-
tion, the vulgarisation of documents relative to the fight against corruption and at last 
the accomplishment any task assign by the presidency of the republic (p24-25). In addi-
tion within its ability to investigate any corrupt practice brought to its attention, the 
NACC has the obligation to protect its sources at the only exception of cases where the 
denunciator appears willing to harm (p25). However the specificity of what constitutes 
the willingness to harm is not explain which could imply that in case of corruption in-
volving powerful political figures the anonymity of the denunciator could be uncovered. 
The NACC is composed of two main bodies. On one hand there is the coordination 
committee compose of the president of the commission, the vice president of the com-
mission and nine other members chose by presidential decree amongst the administra-
tion and the civil society based on their integrity (p26). On the other hand the perma-
nent secretary is compose of the following division; the investigation division, the pre-
vention and communication division, the studies and cooperation division, the courier 
and archive service, the general affair service and the translation services (p25). Howev-
er, it is worth mentioning that despite the existence of the translation service within the 
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NACC and aware that English and French are equally official language within the coun-
try, the first and only up to this date report of the NACC was only available in French. 
Looking at the institutions involve in the fight against corruption, beside the presidency 
of the republic over viewing and shadowing the whole process and the NACC as pre-
sents, they are: 
 The ministry of justice: there is there a department highly involve in the fight 
against corruption since this department is responsible for the discipline and ef-
ficiency of all those include with the ministry p17 
 The ministry of the supreme state audit:  it is responsible for the external audit 
of publics services, publics establishments, decentralised territorial collectivities, 
public and semi-public companies, religious and laic establishments receiving fi-
nancial assistance from the government. It is also responsible for the control of 
the proper use of the state budget, the control of the proper execution of pro-
ject finance externally and the technical, methodological and pedagogical assis-
tance to structures responsible for internal audit of departmental ministry, pub-
lic and semi-public organisms p18.  
 The audit bench of the supreme court of Cameroon:  it overview the execution 
of ex-post  of the state budget and report annually to the president of the re-
public p18 
 The judicial police: with the help of the General Delegation for National Security 
and the Secretary State to Defence has an important role in all criminal matters 
p18-19 
 Ministerial cells for the fight against corruption: present in every ministry those 
cells have as task; follow the effective implementation of the measure adopted 
by government for the fight against corruption, prevent and sanction corruption 
and propose measures aiming to eradicate corruption p19 
 The Governance National Program: aiming to improve transparency of the gov-
ernment body and fight corruption (p20) 
 the Public Contract Regulatory Agency: this institution contain two organs; the 
administrative council and the general management team. This organism is re-
sponsible for the regulation, the follow up and the evaluation of public contract 
award system p20 
 the National Agency for Financial Investigation: this agency have the task to 
track illegal financial transaction potentially link to the finance of terrorism, 
track financial fraud and provide financial information to judicial police for their 
investigation p21. This institutions is involve in the prevention, formation and 
awareness of economic criminality within the country and internationally  p93-
94 
Further it should be mention the so call “Operation Sparrow-Hawk” launched in 2004 
targeting corruption cases involving high profile civil servant. Just like the Sparrow-Hawk 
stalks and snatches it victims within this operation corrupt formers or current public 
officers are arrested and jailed. This is however seen by the opposition as a way to push 
aside eventual contenders for the presidency while for the UN Commission on Human 
rights and the UN Committee Against torture this seems to increase human rights viola-
tions and impunity (UN Commission on Human Rights august 2010 and UN Committee 
Against Torture may 2010).  
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At last the civil society and various NGO do play an important role in the fight against 
corruption in Cameroon. As the main representative of the civil society the GICAM which 
is an association regrouping all the private companies and private investors within the 
country did made recommendation to the NACC following its report on the mission 
achieve in the northen part of the country. Those recommendations involve the im-
portance of the vulgarisation of regulations, the fight against smuggling, the importance 
of the collaboration between economics actors and the administration and the simplifi-
cation and clarification of procedures within the customs services (p98). Amongst the 
various NGO such as “Action Citoyenne”, “Voies Nouvelles” and “Bonne Conscience”, 
Transparency International Cameroon did play a majors role especially with the publica-
tion of the index of incidence of corruption revealing the steady state if not increase of 
the incidence of corruption despite all the measures taken since the creation of the 
NACC in 2006 or the start of the “Operation Sparrow-Hawk” in 2002. 
Instruments used within the fight against corruption in Cameroon: 
NACC publish three majors documents relative to the fight against corruption in 2010: 
the National Coalition Charter for the Fight Against corruption, the National Strategy for 
the Fight against Corruption and the National Program for the Education to Integrity. 
The National Coalition Charter for the Fight Against Corruption aims to strengthen and 
organize the participation of the civil society to the fight against corruption in Cameroon 
(p203).  
The National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption base on the Document for the 
Strategy for Growth and Employment (DSCE) and the Millennium Development Goals is 
oriented toward the following objectives; improve the efficiency of institution within the 
country, mobilize the civil society and the majors sectors toward the eradication of cor-
ruption, participate to the rise of positive social norms require for the eradication of 
corruption and implement the organization and follow up of strategies agreed upon 
(p210-211). Within this strategy eight priority sectors are define for the fight against 
corruption call Integrity pillars they are; the executive system, the judiciary system, the 
legislative system, the institutions fighting corruption, the technical and financial part-
ners, the media, the private sector and the civil society (p214). They could be sees as the 
backbone of the fight against corruption in Cameroon. In addition to the integrity pillars 
some sectors have been targeted base on the prevalence of corruption,  they are; the 
public investment budget and public works, private sector and business, decentraliza-
tion, education, finances (customs, tax...), environment and forest, industries and mines, 
public health and transport(p215). 
The National Program for the Education to Integrity , at last , attempt to address the 
problem of the distortion of moral values within the Cameroonians society where bad 
practices such as embezzlement and misuse of public office became so common that 
people tend to see them as example to follow (p219). It aims to bring back good moral 
values through education system right from the early age. 
 
Data on corruption in Cameroon: 
Summary of investigations and reports for 2008: 
158 | P a g e  
 
Reports from the ministerial cells: 
Within each ministry there is a specialise cell responsible for the fight against corruption 
reporting annually to the NACC. Those cells are responsible for the effective implemen-
tation of measures include in the governmental plan for the fight of corruption, for car-
rying out the prevention and the repression of corruption and the suggestion of meas-
ure aiming to eradicate corruption (p55). For 2008 in addition to the report of the Gen-
eral Delegation for National Security thirty ministries over thirty-five did submit their 
annual report to the NACC (p55). The following tables summarise those reports 
In the case of administrative measures: 
Ministries Facts Sanctions or measures 
taken 
Social Affairs ministry Embezzlement of 4.133.000 
FCFA in two social centre 
The two authors sack 
Agriculture and rural 
development ministry 
Mismanagement of the Project 
for the improvement of rural 
familial income (PARFAR) 
The coordinator was sack 
Commerce ministry Unethical behaviour Suspension of two offic-
ers plus another one sack 
Culture ministry Unethical behaviour and misuse 
of public fund 
Suspension and  
Defence ministry Unethical behaviour consisting 
of swindle at road control 
Strong disciplinary sanc-
tions 
Urban development and 
housing ministry 
Fault and unethical behaviour Cancelation of some 
public contract and sanc-
tions toward public offic-
ers involve 
Lands and titles ministry Corruption, embezzlement and 
other misuse of public funds 
Administrative sanctions, 
sacks and reimburse-
ment of stolen funds 
Economy, planning and 
regional development 
Corruption involving the award 
of public contract for this minis-
try 
The chef of staff has 
been sack 
Basic education ministry Embezzlement of funds sup-
posedly receive for temporarily 
teachers in the East  
The former regional del-
egate and also the for-
mer departmental dele-
gate to basic education 
were sack 
Livestock and fisheries 
ministry 
Embezzlement, fraud and falsi-
fication of statistical documents 
of livestock 
Administrative sanctions 
for all the people involve 
into those practices 
Employment and profes-
sional formation ministry 
Embezzlement of public and 
privates funds 
Sack of some of the peo-
ple involve and adminis-
trative sanctions for the 
others are to be ex-
pected 
Energy and water re-
sources ministry 
Suspicion of corruption and 
misbehaviour 
Warning to those involve 
Secondary education 
ministry 
Embezzlement of the official 
examinations cost (5000000 
Fcfa+2000000 Fcfa+3431670 
Administrative sanction 
and judiciary one on the 
way for the first three 
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Fcfa+365000 Fcfa) and restitution of the 
funds plus sack for the 
last one 
Higher education ministry Cheating during exams organ-
ised by some professor, embez-
zlement of 141743272 Fcfa by 
the former director of the de-
velopment of higher education 
and unethical behaviour. 
Administrative sanctions 
for professors and stu-
dents involve in the 
cheating and further 
judiciary sanctions to 
come for the embezzle-
ment 
Environment and nature 
protection ministry 
Scam and misuse of public of-
fice 
Sack of the one involve 
Forestry and wildlife min-
istry 
Illegal activities Suspension of some 
companies, administra-
tive sanctions, fines im-
pose to some firms and 
confiscation of products 
obtain  illegally 
Youth ministry Fraud, unethical and unprofes-
sional behaviour 
Sack of the people re-
sponsible 
Post and telecommunica-
tion ministry 
Suspicion of corruption Sack of the people re-
sponsible 
Women and family pro-
tection ministry 
Unethical behaviour Recommendations has 
been made 
Public health ministry Scam, fraud, unethical behav-
iour, misuse and mismanage-
ment of public goods. 
Illicit medicine sell on the street 
Warnings made in addi-
tion to administrative 
sanction to those involve. 
Reimbursement in sums 
stolen in some cases and 
destruction of illicit med-
icine 
Public works ministry Collusion aiming to direct the 
award of contracts to relatives 
or allies. Non respect of con-
tract (mainly concerning the 
quality of the work provide) 
Suspension and sack of 
public officers and sus-
pension of public works 
Labour  and social securi-
ty ministry 
Strong suspicion of corruption Reimbursement of sums 
stolen under the treat of 
disciplinary sanctions 
General Delegation for 
national security 
Bribe at check-point and for any 
service require, embezzlement 
and others unethical and unpro-
fessional behaviour 
Disciplinary sanctions to 
patrolman, inspectors, 
officers and commission-
ers 
Sources: NACC report p84-87 
In the case of judiciary measures: 
Ministries Facts Judiciary sanctions 
Social Affairs ministry Scam organised by public officers 
within the ministry 
Judiciary enquiry open 
by the ministry 
Lands and titles ministry Corruption, embezzlement and 
other misuse of public funds 
Judiciary enquiry open 
by the ministry 
Basic education ministry Embezzlement of funds supposedly 
receive for temporarily teachers in 
The two responsible 
are under  provisional 
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the East  custody 
Employment and pro-
fessional formation 
ministry 
Embezzlement of funds provide for 
formation 
A judiciary procedure 
has been open in the 
justice department for 
the one responsible 
Secondary education 
ministry 
Embezzlement of the official exam-
inations cost 
(5000000+2000000+3431670) 
Provisional custody for 
the two involve 
Higher education minis-
try 
Cheating during exams organised by 
some professor, embezzlement of 
141743272 by the former director 
of the development of higher edu-
cation and unethical behaviour. 
Provisional custody for 
the one involve 
Environment and nature 
protection ministry 
Scam and misuse of public office A judiciary procedure 
has been open in the 
justice department for 
the one responsible 
Source: the NACC report p88-89 
 
Procedure and arrests involving “Operation Sparrow-hawk”: 
Procedures started before 2008 Judiciary decisions 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Titus 
Edzoa former general secretary at the pres-
idency 
15 years of prison 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Engo 
Pierre Desire former General Director of 
the CNPS (National Fund for Social Preven-
tion a kind of Social Security) 
10 years of prison 
Embezzlement of public funds (2.5 billions 
FCFA) by Mr Mounchipou Seidou former 
minister of Post and telecommunication 
15 years of prison 
Embezzlement of public funds (over 26 
billions Fcfa) by Gerard Ondo Ndong former 
General director of FEICOM (interregional  
funds for equipment and intervention) and 
companies 
Between 20 to 10 years of prison for 
those involve 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Belin-
ga Jules former general director of SIC (Re-
al-estate Society of Cameroon) and compa-
nies 
The case is on trial 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Edou 
Joseph former general director of CFC 
(Land Loan Company of Cameroon) and 
companies 
Between 45 to 1 years of prison for those 
involve in addition to the confiscation of 
their assets 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr 
Etonde Ekoto Edouard former president of 
the administrative board of the autono-
mous harbour , Mr Siyam Siewe Alphonse 
former general director of the autonomous 
harbour and some of their collaborators 
The first two have been inculped of re-
spectively 15 and 30 years of prison. For 
the others the case is still on trial 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Ur- Provisional custody of since april 2008 
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bain Olanguena Awono former public 
health minister and sixteen of his collabo-
rators 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Abah 
abah Polycarpe former general director of 
taxes and former finance minister 
Provisional detention since april 2008 
Embezzlement of public funds 
(1.189.251.144 fcfa) by Mr Moampamb 
Abono Paulin former secretary of the state 
for public works and former mayor of 
Yokadouma 
Provisional detention mandate issued 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Jean 
Marie Atangana Mebara former general 
secretary at the presidency 
Provisional detention mandate have been 
issued in august 2008 
Embezzlement of public funds by Mr Zac-
chaeus Nforjindam former General director 
of the Industrial Shipyard of Cameroon and 
collaborators 
Provisional detention mandate have been 
issued 
Source: NACC report p88-89 
 
Summary of investigations carried out by the NACC in 2008: 
For eighty-three files receive the institution transmit twenty-eight to the judiciary sys-
tem representing a financial incidence of two hundred and forty billion eight hundred 
thirteen million five hundred eighty four thousand one hundred fourteen Fcfa  
Cases Number Amount in Fcfa Amount in £ 
Misuse of corporate 
assets 
2 1,592,718,214 
2,016,201 
Corruption 7 1,310,639,531 
1,659,121 
Embezzlement 6 221,027,314,477 
279,795,578 
Various frauds 11 13,870,788,086 
17,558,849 
Impersonation of pub-
lic officers 
2 3,012,123,806 
3,813,008 
Total 28 240,813,584,114 304,842,757 
Source: NACC report p94-95 
 
Summary of investigation carried out by the NACC in 2009: 
Case of the locals finance offices: 
162 | P a g e  
 
The local finance office are generally not well secure which make them easy targets for 
burglar and thieves. Indeed up to FCFA 178 754 333 have been already stolen in such 
manner (p118-119). In addition in those local finance offices there is a lack of up to date 
informatics equipment or in some case informatics equipment at all, a lack regular con-
trol and qualified people (p120-129). 
Here is an overview of the deficit within each region  
Region Initial amount 
(FCFA)  
Amount found 
(FCFA)  
deficit 
(FCFA)  
deficit in £ 
Centre 1,949,346,295 22,231,242 1,927,115,053 
2,439,510 
Adamawa 22,416,406 6,272,549 16,143,857 
20,436 
Far-North 415,924,014   335,709,486 
424,970 
South     351,539,013 445,009 
Littoral     3,051,211,584 3,862,489 
Littoral 2     115,496,811 146,206 
East 456,785,885 4,732,533 704,903,389 892,328 
North-west 
  13,887,442 205,144,154 259,689 
South-west 
  16,208,397 612,567,563 775,441 
North     238,070,422 301,370 
West     548,672,280 694,557 
Total 2,844,472,600 63,332,163 6,179,458,559 7,822,496 
 
 
Region Initial amount Amount found 
(FCFA)  
deficit 
(FCFA)  (FCFA)  
Centre 1,949,346,295 22,231,242 1 927115053  
Adamawa 22,416,406 6,272,549 16,143,857 
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Far-North 415,924,014   335,709,486 
South     351,539,013 
Littoral     3,051,211,584 
Littoral 2     115,496,811 
East 456,785,885 4,732,533 704,903,389 
North-west   13,887,442 205,144,154 
South-west   16,208,397 612,567,563 
North     238,070,422 
West     548,672,280 
Total 2,844,472,600 63,332,163 6,179,458,559 
Source: NACC report p120-128 
However the reliability of those data could be question since the table below showing a 
summary of the deficit per region is quite different from the data obtain through the 
detailed report of each finance office as present before.  
Dénominations  Montants constatés 
(FCFA)  
Observations  
Circonscription financière 
du Littoral  
3 051211584  2,9 milliards affaire FRU 
SALAH  
Circonscription financière du Centre  2038452801  
Circonscription financière 
de l’Est  
630168614  Inspection des Services  
Circonscription financière 
de l’Ouest  
548672280  Inspection des Services  
Circonscription financière 
du Nord-Ouest  
204324672  Inspection des Services  
Circonscription financière du Sud-Ouest  612567563  
Circonscription financière du Sud  351439050  
Circonscription financière 
du Nord  
238070422  Inspection des Services  
Circonscription financière du Littoral II 
(Nkongsamba)  
115496811  
Circonscription financière 
de l’Extrême-Nord  
335709486  Mission de contrôle  
Circonscription financière de l’Adamaoua  16143857  
Total  8142257140  
Source: NACC report p128 
Specific cases of fraud and embezzlement for the year 2009  
N
°  
Responsable  Matricule  Montant 
(FCFA)  
Poste compta-
ble  
Observations  
MONTANTS DE PLUS DE 400 000 000  
1  NASAKO PETER  468 000 000  R.F. LIMBE  
2  DALIL AMOUM 
BOUBA  
050.623-Z  493 423 293  OFFICE DU BACC  
TOTAL1  961 423 293  
MONTANTS DE PLUS DE 300 000 000  
3  ZILI ATOUBA EU-
GENE  
123.625-C  355 278 334  2ème déficit après 
celui de 109 381 
500  
4  ASSANA ABAKAR  532.378-R  341 415 500  
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5  NSORO  336 449 580  R.F. BANGANTE  1997  
TOTAL2  1 033 143 414  
MONTANTS DE PLUS DE 200 000 000  
6  NGAMVOAH 
EDITH ARMAND  
291 337 510  P. MINDEF  EN FUITE  
7  HAMIDOU MAIBOURO  106.031-M  280 274 154  
8  NGNIA Levid  048.716-P  255 809 304  9  
9  NANGA LOUIS Bernard  249 768 031  P. AWAE  
TOTAL3  1 077 188 999  
MONTANTS DE PLUS DE 100 000 000  
10  ASSIGA CELESTIN  068.107-Z  179 792 530  
11  NJABA MARTIN  171 675 258  R.F. BAFIA  
12  JEAN PIERRE SEKE  127 231 136  ANC. PERCEPTEUR 
NSIMALEN  
13  MIMBANG CYRI-
AQUE  
586.617-R  123 784 453  CHEF DE COMP-
TABILITE A MA-
ROUA  
14  OWOUNDI ZAMBO  122 961 950  PERCEPTEUR OKOLA  
15  AYIMANE ANSENE 
J  
172.031-P  115 301 434  CHEF SERVICE 
COMPTABILITE  
R. F. BATOURI EN 
2005  
16  ZILI ATOUBA EU-
GENE  
123.625-C  109 381 560  EN FUITE  
TOTAL4  950 128 321  
MONTANTS DE PLUS DE 50 000 000  
17  MAMADALA BIANAKAL  89 576 460  P. LEMBE YEZOUM  
18  88 008 350  R.F. BAFANG  
19  NDJAMEN NJIYA IDE  050 885-H  80 680 000  
20  HAMAN NAS-
SOUROU  
78 985 044  P. DE BOGO  2002  
21  BOUHARI OUSMANOU  062 222-S  76 000 000  
22  MEDIO EBOLO DAVID  056 482-Z  71 561 960  
23  GBAMBIE ALIOU  095 018-P  70 016 290  
24  TCHAIJ THEODORE  68 385 871  R.F. D’ABONG-BANG  
25  NKELZIEH WILLIAM  66 336 681  R.F. YOKADOUMA  
26  BABA OUMAR  081.814-K  65 511 328  
27  NOUMSI PAUL  023.303-0  65 399 371  
2
8  
MAME THOM-
AS  
084.148-J  60 000 000  ANC. CAISSIER 
A PARIS  
DECEDE  
29  ANONG MACHIA 
ABDOULAYE  
047.417-T  59 557 660  
30  EMINI ZANGBWA-
LA  
55 152 950  R.F. MBALMAYO  DECEDE  
31  TABI TAKO HENRIETTE  53 498 935  TG YAOUNDE  
32  ABDOULAYE 
DJARMA  
174.324-M  53 419 502  P. BANGOUA  
33  AMADOU BENGA 
BENGA ISAAC BAKARI  
51 597 735  P. DIBANG  
34  50 067 760  R.F. MONATELE  
TOTAL 5  1 203 755 897  
MONTANTS SUPERIEURS A 30 000 000  
35  BRAQUEURS  47 135 751  P. MBANGASSINA  
36  OWONO PAUL  069 518-G  46 656 589  
37  YEDNA HIOBI  134 066-D  46 369 355  
3
8  
NGAMVOAH 
EDITH AR-
MAND  
515 195- ?  44 485 800  EN POSTE AU 
MINDEF  
2e détourne-
ment  
39  TCHOUBALA A 
BETCHEM CALVIN  
018 426-N  42 045 000  
40  EVINA BANGA 056 005-G  40 789 226  2ème détournement  
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BASILE  
41  BABA TOUKOUR  054 895-C  40 220 000  
4
2  
AKONO 
AKONO DAN-
IEL ROUSSEL  
173 426-M  38 872 928  P. BATSENGA  2006  
43  OTTO EYENE AUGUSTE  38 073 061  P. ASSAMBA  
44  NTSAMA BELINGA JEAN  170 082-A  37 416 636  
45  EBANGA NGOU-
MOU  
511 311-M  36 453 400  Billeteur personnel 
enseignant Ordre de 
recette du MINFI N° 
1879 du 23 mai 
2008  
46  MEESIENG Emmanuel  36 136 218  RF MBALMAYO  
4
7  
ESSAMA 
OTABELA  
370 087-T  35 685 623  P. SA’A  2006  
48  EVINA BANGA BASILE  35 547 185  P. ESSE  
4
9  
BOMBA EFFA 
ALAIN FRAN-
COIS  
567 316-X  35 357 138  R.F. MANGE  2003  
50  ABINA MEKOUBOU 
TIMOTHEE  
047 716-P  34 722 287  
51  MOHAMADOU 
OUSMANOU  
018 697-T  33 439 680  
52  MAMA MARC  068 108-A  31 734 000  
53  ZOLLO HANS  012 507-Q  30 538 715  
54  RECEVEUR DES FI-
NANCES  
30 187 803  R.F. NGOUMOU  
TOTAL6  723 793 334  
TOTAL GENERAL 
(T1+T2+T3+T4+T5)  
5 949 433 258  
Source: NACC report p131-133 
 
Case of the maize project: 
 An NGO (ACDIC) reveals embezzlement and various others unacceptable practices with-
in the project maize relative to subventions provide by the Cameroonians government 
to local maize producers. Started in 2006, It could be the case that up to half of the two 
billion Fcfa made available for farmers have been stolen (p138). 
Summary of the allocation of the subvention for this program: 
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Re-
gions 
con-
trolled 
Years 
of the 
recep-
tion of 
the 
sub-
ven-
tion 
Total 
amount 
allocated 
to the 
maize 
project 
Total 
num-
ber 
of 
recip-
ient 
Total 
num-
ber of 
recipi-
ent 
con-
trolled 
Num-
ber of 
fake or 
un-
known 
associa-
tions 
found 
Total 
amount 
per-
ceive by 
fake or 
un-
known 
associa-
tions (in 
FCFA) 
Total 
amount 
per-
ceive by 
fake or 
un-
known 
associa-
tions (in 
£) 
Total 
amount 
per-
ceive by 
fake or 
un-
known 
associa-
tions (in 
per-
centage 
of the 
total 
alloca-
tion for 
those 
con-
trolled) 
Centre 2006, 
2007, 
2008 
235,961,
000 
457 25 8 4,700,0
00 
5,950 39.82% 
Litto-
ral 
2006, 
2007, 
2008 
160,664,
000 
250 10 4 2,630,0
00 
3,329 57.35% 
West 2006, 
2007, 
2008 
278,101,
000 
648 32 5 3,000,0
00 
3,798 17.39% 
South 2006, 
2007, 
2008 
156,447,
000 
273 14 6 3,449,0
00 
4,366 38.44% 
South-
west 
2006, 
2007, 
2008 
171,161,
000 
358 16 6 4,200,0
00 
5,317 58.33% 
Total   1,002,33
4,000 1,986 97 29 
17,979,
000 
22,759   
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Re-
gions 
con-
trolled 
Years of the 
reception 
of the sub-
vention 
Total 
amount 
allocated 
to the 
maize 
project 
Total 
num-
ber of 
recip-
ient 
Total 
num-
ber of 
recipi-
ent 
con-
trolled 
Number 
of fake 
or un-
known 
associa-
tions 
found 
Total 
amount 
perceive 
by fake 
or un-
known 
associa-
tions (in 
FCFA) 
Total 
amount 
perceive 
by fake 
or un-
known 
associa-
tions (in 
percent-
age of 
the total 
alloca-
tion for 
those 
con-
trolled) 
Centre 2006,2007, 
2008 
23596100
0 
457 25 8 4700000 39.82% 
Littoral 2006, 2007, 
2008 
16066400
0 
250 10 4 2630000 57.35% 
West 2006,2007,
2008 
27810100
0 
648 32 5 3000000 17.39% 
South 2006, 2007, 
2008 
15644700
0 
273 14 6 3449000 38.44% 
South-
west 
2006, 2007, 
2008 
17116100
0 
358 16 6 4200000 58.33% 
Total  1,002,334,
000 1,986 97 29 
17,979,0
00 
 
Source: NACC report p147 
The report note that out of the 1,002,334,000 Fcfa at the disposition of the program for 
subventions up to 341,194,495 Fcfa(34.04%) have been embezzle through by various 
means (p148) 
Summary of Investigations carried out by the NACC in 2010: 
Investigation of the Construction of the road Ayos-Bonis: 
This public work was divided into two contracts the first for the road Ayos-Abong Mbang 
(88km) won by PANTECKNIKI for a cost of 17935171630 FCFA and the second for the 
road Abong Mbang-Bonis (103km) won by PANTECHNIKI/EDOK ETER for a cost of 
21610523415 FCFA (p229-230). For this project the investigation reveals a collusion of 
public officer within the ministry of public work and the enterprise which won the con-
tract, this lead to up 932000000 Fcfa increase of the initial budget, up to two billions 
Fcfa illegally obtain for transport indemnities, up to 71737933 Fcfa obtain through the 
misuse of public office at customs plus various frauds corresponding to fraudulent billing 
(p230-231). This leads to a final cost of 14694371927 Fcfa for the two projects (almost 
three time the initial cost) (p233). 
Investigation of the construction of teaching facilities and laboratory at the medical sci-
ence faculty of the University of Buea:  
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This contract was awarded to “Group WAGA INC” for a cost of 567291600 Fcfa. At the 
time of the control the project was achieve at more than 75% but many irregularities 
were observed including the replacement of many majors actors of the project (which 
will inevitably affect the quality of the final outcome), delay within the execution and 
the falsification of document for the award of the contract.  
The audit of the Cameroon Postal Services: 
Looking at the financial aspects of this audit, the following irregularity appears: 
Irregularities Amount in Fcfa Amount in £ 
an invoice for provision of 
services waiting to be paid 
in the economic and finance 
ministry for the account of 
the Postal Services 
405000000 
515956.4 
Embezzlement 20000000 25479.33 
Embezzlement through a 
fake contract of provision of 
services 
123927375 
157879.3 
Embezzlement 2120000000 2700809 
falsification of accounting 
documents 
Unknown 
#VALUE! 
Mismanagement through 
unauthorised payments to 
relatives or unidentified 
people 
1477405185 
1882165 
Subvention for investment 
from the State to the Postal 
Services in 2005, there is no 
records of the investment 
made 
13232223338 
16857409 
The subvention for exploita-
tion provide in 2005 appear 
to have not being use ap-
propriately since the com-
plains of the former em-
ployee did increase 
4687852588 
5972167 
Land previously own by the 
Postal Services which has 
been sell to the company 
TRADEX S.A without any 
deposit made into the ac-
count of the Postal services 
238997484 
304474.8 
  
 
Irregularities Amount authors 
an invoice for provision of 
services waiting to be paid 
in the economic and fi-
nance ministry for the ac-
405000000 Fcfa unknown 
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count of the Postal Services 
Embezzlement 20000000 Fcfa Mr Jean Marie Mioumnde 
Senior Executive in the Post 
and telecommunication 
ministry 
Embezzlement through a 
fake contract of provision 
of services 
123927375 Fcfa Mr Charles Tawamba 
Embezzlement 2120000000 Fcfa Unknown 
falsification of accounting 
documents 
Unknown Unknown 
Mismanagement through 
unauthorised payments to 
relatives or unidentified 
people 
1477405185 Fcfa Unknown 
Subvention for investment 
from the State to the Postal 
Services in 2005, there is no 
records of the investment 
made 
13232223338 Fcfa Unknown 
The subvention for exploi-
tation provide in 2005 ap-
pear to have not being use 
appropriately since the 
complains of the former 
employee did increase 
4687852588 Fcfa Unknown 
Land previously own by the 
Postal Services which has 
been sell to the company 
TRADEX S.A without any 
deposit made into the ac-
count of the Postal services 
238997484 Fcfa Unknown 
Source: the NACC report p243  
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Appendix 3: Summary of the data on the perception of corruption 
used in our analyse 
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Appendix 4: Capture of our aggregation of the dataset on the incidence of corruption in Kenya base on the report by the EACC 
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Abbreviations: 
 
 AFDB: African Development Bank 
 afdb_ind: perception index of corruption in Kenya from AFDB 
 BPI: Bribe Payer Index from TI 
 CPI: Corruption Perception Index from TI 
 CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index from AFDB 
 CPIA GR: Governance Rating index from AFDB 
 EACC: Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya 
 EFCC: Economic and Financial Crime Commission of Nigeria 
 GCB: Global Corruption Barometer from TI 
 GII : Global Integrity Index from Global Integrity 
 gii_ind: perception index of corruption in Kenya from Global Integrity 
 GR: Governance Rating Indicator 
 ICVS: United Nation Crime and Victimization Surveys 
 IRAI: International Development Association Ressource Allocation index 
or CPIA from WB 
 IRAI GR: Governance Rating index from WB 
 irai_ind: perception index of corruption in Kenya from WB 
 LACC: Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission 
 NACC: National Anti-Corruption Commission of Cameroon 
 mpk : Yearly average of individual weighted propensity for corruption in 
Kenya as the result of data on the prevalence of corruption from EACC 
 q_Safdb: Our index of the prevalence of Corruption in Kenya using the 
CPIA GR 
 q_Sgii: Our index of the prevalence of Corruption in Kenya using the GII 
index of the quality of governance 
 q_Swb: Our index of the prevalence of Corruption in Kenya using the 
IRAI GR 
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 TI: Transparency International 
 ti_ind: perception index of corruption in Kenya from TI  
 WB: World Bank 
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